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One of the political and economic responses to globalisation and the associated rise of 
multilateral trade agreements is the integration of national markets and their governance 
within regions. As developing economies have become increasingly integrated into the global 
economy, the harmonisation of policies and standardisation of regulations to create 
economies of scale and scope, has been one of the primary strategies to improve regional 
competitiveness. 
With the global economy underpinned by a dynamic communication infrastructure, 
African regional economic communities (RECs) have increasingly recognised the importance 
of Information and Communication Technology  (ICT) in realising the vision of regional 
integration, and as a major determinant of national and regional competitiveness. 
Despite member states’ acknowledgement of the need for regional connectivity, many 
initiatives across Africa aimed at supporting and establishing harmonised ICT policy 
frameworks have not had the intended outcomes. Strategies for developing seamless regional 
ICT infrastructures — necessary for the achievement of universal policy objectives of 
improved access to, and usage of, affordable broadband services now widely demonstrated to 
drive economic growth — have not been realised. 
Through a case study of regional policy-making in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the thesis examines the political economy underlying regional 
processes and structures for the development and the implementation of ICT policy 
frameworks, as shaped by epistemic communities. A conceptual framework is constructed as 
a lens through which to assess the role of capacity building as a tool in foreign affairs in the 
institutional arrangements within SADC countries and ICT policy outcomes in the region. 
This reveals the wider political, economic and more specific policy and regulatory constraints 
hampering the development of the information society from a developing region perspective. 
Applying a hybrid methodology, empirical information was gathered through quantitative 
secondary data but using qualitative methods to gather the primary evidence for the case.  
This evidence from multiple sources is examined through a broad political economy 
framework to contextualise the research problem and develop a rich narrative of regional 
integration efforts in the area of information communication technologies in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). 
Following rigorous and extensive gathering of information from face to face interviews 
following an exhaustive document analysis, detailed coding of the data and triangulation of 
findings enabled an analysis of how institutional arrangements in the region - despite the 
accepted rationale and logic of market integration - have largely failed to achieve the intended 
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ICT policy objectives stated in SADC protocols and declarations despite considerable 
advances in the formal harmonisation of aspects of ICT policy and regulation. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
The idea of studying regionalism and ICT sector development in southern Africa emerged 
in 2009 while I was in Namibia working at the Southern African Development 
Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF). Specifically, the UNDESA fellowship 
programme assigned me to the Parliamentary Leadership Centre (PLC), which was the 
capacity-building arm of the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF).1 From personal 
observations of regional integration processes while working as a technical advisor for the 
regional ICT programme, I realised that despite international, continental and regional 
commitment to strengthen regional economic communities, they were not effective as 
instruments of regulatory reform. For instance, although regional bodies in Africa are 
recognised as strategic institutions for ICT sector development of member states, the 
impact of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on telecommunication 
sector reform, through influencing and improving ICT policy and regulatory formulation 
and implementation at a member state level, has been limited. This is despite regional 
structures and processes being supported by international organisations and the donor 
community. Often they organised meetings for Members of Parliament (MPs) in order to 
provide opportunities for MPs from different countries in the region to learn about ICT 
policy and regulation, exchange ideas, and build a Southern African regional identity, but 
from a practical perspective, these meetings had little effect in addressing ICT issues. 
In order to understand the issue of regionalism and the impact of regional 
organisations on the development of the information society in Africa, the thesis builds a 
case study method on SADC and ICT policy development. It does so by adopting a 
political economy approach to the analysis of the effectiveness of regional structures and 
processes in addressing some pressing ICT policy issues at a national level.  
This chapter explores issues around regionalism in Africa through a brief historical 
overview of regional integration on the African continent. It then presents regional trade 
strategies and explains why they failed in Africa. Thereafter it examines the regional 
telecommunications infrastructure as an outcome of regional ICT policy and regulatory 
frameworks, and concludes with the problem statement and the main and secondary 
questions which will be answered in this dissertation. 
                                       
1 The PLC was entirely dependent on donors and when donors withdrew, it had to close down. The lack of 
political will to renegotiate after it closed down caused conflicts for four years, which contributed to the end 
of its activities (telephonic interview, Matanga, 6 November 2012). The relevance of the PLC for capacity 
building at a parliamentary level could improve if the SADC-PF were to become an intergovernmental body, 
i.e. a regional parliament (Musavengana, 2011).  
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1.1 The rise of regionalism 
In critically analysing studies on the process of regionalisation within the global economy, 
it is possible to identify the emergence of regional north-south inequalities in the 
concentration of, and competition between, regional blocs. At the end of the 1990s, 
Castells (1998) referring to a work of Stallings (1993), shows that there was an increasing 
concentration of trade and investment at a regional level, in particular within three blocs: 
United States, Japan, and Europe. This triangle of “wealth, power and technology” among 
economic blocs in economic competition, marginalised other areas of the globe, resulting 
in a “hierarchical and asymmetric interdependent web, as different countries and regions 
compete to attract capital, human skills, and technology to their shores” (Castells, 1998: 
101). 
The process of regional integration is rooted in a particular historical period of 
globalisation, decolonisation, and political and economic enthusiasm for integration of 
national markets and institutional organisations — what we refer to as “regionalism” 
(Söderbaum, 2004). 2 The majority of the studies on regionalism focus on regional 
economic integration at the expense of an analysis of the institutions underlying the 
creation of regions and the politics that developed the regional organisations, regional 
policy and regulatory frameworks.  
Drawing on the regional integration experience of the European Economic 
Community (EEC),3 integration can be defined as a political process fostered by economic 
processes (Weiss, 1999). It occurs among countries (or provinces) whose geographical 
borders affect their mutual security, and where economic and political processes 
eventually coincide. Wallace’s (1995) studies on regionalism following the Second World 
War, argue that the post-war (WWII) process of integration in Western Europe was a 
                                       
2 Söderbaum (2004) argued that regionalism is not a recent phenomenon, since cross-border interactions have 
always existed. In particular, what we refer to “regionalism” today is predominantly a post-Second World War 
phenomenon. 
3 Weiss (1999) argues that the theoretical framework of integration emanates from its empirical basis in the 
international relations of Western Europe and, in particular, studies exploring the European integration 
process through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) (Laursen, 2008). The growing functional scope of regions is investigated by Haas (1958), 
who defines regionalism as a spill-over effect of the development of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Lindberg (1963, in Laursen, 2008) applies the 
same concept to regional integration and stresses that spill-over refers to a process where actions developed to 
fulfil a specific goal, create the condition for other actions necessary to achieve that goal, to be created. 
Subsequently, the new conditions create new actions to complement early policies, and so forth. According to 
Haas (1958) regional trade liberalisation would lead to harmonisation of general economic policies and 
therefore spill-over into political areas that will generate a political community. 
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response to American hegemony and the Soviet threat. For security reasons, an initial bloc 
of five countries, namely Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and Luxemburg, took a policy 
and normative position to increase economic cooperation in order to avoid the threat of a 
new war. The Schuman plan to unify Europe’s coal and steel markets laid the foundations 
for a Franco-German reconciliation process which later developed into close economic 
and political cooperation, and thus provided the basis for European integration. 
During the historical period of European unification, two integration explanatory 
frameworks emerged. On the one side, British and Scandinavian leaders tended to present 
“functionalist” views, as they favoured cooperative aspects of integration such as the 
coordinated provision of raw materials among states; on the other hand, continental states 
tended to be more “federalist” as they advocated the establishment of a supranational state 
(Nye 1971, in Weiss, 1999).  
In economics, integration is a process leading to the creation of the most desirable 
structure for an international economy by removing artificial obstacles to optimal 
multilateral trade operations (Tinbergen, 1954). Although regional agreements vary 
widely, all have the same objective of reducing barriers to trade between member 
countries (Schiff and Winters, 2003). In order to achieve this goal, national states are 
called to deliberately introduce elements of coordination or unification of national 
economies through policies of liberalisation, such as the free movement of resources, as 
well as the development of economies of scale, capital, and increased competition 
(Pentland, 1973). These agreements are aimed at removing tariffs for intra-bloc trade, but 
many also cover non-tariff barriers, liberalisation of investment, and other policies (Schiff 
and Winters, 2003). 
Balassa (1961) identifies five stages in the process of economic integration. During 
the first stage, member states remove trading restrictions on commodity movements (such 
as tariffs among member states) to create a free trade area. Subsequently, they set up a 
customs union through the equalisation of national tariffs with non-member countries as 
was done with the customs union in southern Africa. As a result, a common market is 
realised since restrictions on factor movements are abolished. During the following stage, 
states develop an economic and monetary union through a combination of the abolition of 
restrictions on commodities and factor movements, with some degree of harmonisation4 
of national economic policies. Finally, they achieve complete economic integration. The 
latter presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies 
                                       
4 Although the words integration and harmonisation are similar in meaning, throughout the thesis the term 
harmonisation refers to policy, legal and regulatory alignment or compliance whereas integration is used to 
describe an objective or outcome. The term “harmonised” is used only when it was used in official documents. 
The term “integration” refers to more than the underlying policy, legal and regulatory frameworks to include 
also economic and social outcomes. 
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and requires the setting up of a supra-national authority whose decisions are binding on 
the member states. Balassa’s theory (1961), however, does not address the issue of 
sovereignty even though it draws from this conceptualisation. He asserts that unifying 
national markets would lead to policy integration but not necessarily to a unified 
institutional structure. Furthermore, according to Weiss (1999), economic integration is 
sustained by a process of deepening interdependence between firms, through the 
consolidation of firms by mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures. 
Söderbaum (2004), who carried out a case study on the political economy of the 
southern African region, defines regionalism in terms of processes such as cooperation 
and integration. These processes create cohesion and identity, which develop into a 
regional space. This definition also includes a strategy to drive a project of regional 
integration pursued by state or non-state actors.  
Finally, according to Laursen (2008), the most important aspect of all regional 
integration efforts is a collective decision-making process, which can cover several 
functional areas (scope) and can be more or less efficient, with regional institutions more 
or less effective and adequate (institutional capacity). 
From an international relations perspective, economic integration aims at economic 
growth through an ever-expanding perimeter of market relationships, which promote a 
stable international system (Weiss, 1999). Economic integration can lead the way to 
realising political goals. For instance, European integration is the political result of 
economic integration between Germany and France. Economic and political integration, 
from a theoretical point of view, are inter-related. Scheingold and Lindberg (1970) assert 
that economic integration is mainly based on the political support of national states for 
free trade, while Balassa (1961) focuses on the rules of the market in coordinating 
monetary and fiscal policies between national states. According to the latter, regional 
economic growth is the result of increasing transactions between national states. 
1.2 Regionalism in Africa 
Theories on regionalism in Africa indicate that there has been a need for political and 
economic cohesion as a possible solution to post-colonial problems since the mid-1970s 
(Moore, 2013). The common objective of regional economic communities in Africa is to 
reduce trade barriers among member countries by creating a larger economic space 
(Economic Commission for Africa and AU, 2006).  
Globalisation is an important factor driving Africa’s regional integration (ECA and 
AU, 2006). Trading rules and trade sanctions, as set by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), imposed trade obligations on small sub-Saharan African governments, forcing 
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African countries to follow strategies adopted in Europe, in the United States and in the 
Asian emerging economies.  
Progress towards economic integration in Europe became attractive to political and 
economic leaders in the ‘Third World’ who wanted to emulate European successes. The 
desire to emulate the European model brought about the proliferation of regional 
arrangements in Africa (Asante, 1997). Weiss’s (1999) argument on regional integration 
also underpins this conceptualisation. She supports Balassa’s (1961) view, arguing that 
integration processes may be seen as a deliberate effort to counteract possible trade 
diversion effects of the European Common Market. According to other theories on 
regional integration in Africa, integration was considered a paradigm for industrialisation 
and it was expected to foster economic growth through trade and economies of scale 
(Mytelka 1973; Weiss, 1999).  
In the 1980s and 1990s the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB) promoted structural adjustment programmes (SAP). These programmes entailed the 
provision of loans for developing countries conditional on the adoption of economic 
policies.5 According to the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) (2006), few domestic 
protections were left after the implementation of SAP. As a result, African countries were 
marginalised, since domestic economic activities were suppressed, wages and tax 
revenues reduced, and the balance of payments worsened. In order to counter these 
negative effects of the globalisation process, African leaders saw regional integration as a 
strategy6 for growth and for increasing negotiating power with major trading partners 
(ECA and AU, 2006). Similarly, Alemayehu and Haile (2002), argue that the political will 
for regional integration, as it emerged in the Abuja Treaty of 1991, can be seen as a 
political reaction to the strengthening of regional blocks in Europe, Asia, and the 
Americas, and aimed at avoiding African marginalisation. 
According to the African Development Bank (ADB, 2000), the fragmentation of 
Africa into many states with limited economic coherence led African leaders to adopt 
regional integration as a key strategy for development. Regionalism was perceived as a 
solution to overcome three major barriers to development: (a) the relatively small size of 
                                       
5 Structural adjustment programmes allowed African countries to get a loan from the IMF or the World Bank 
based on conditionalities such as significant policy reforms including reduction of inflation, currency 
devaluation, fiscal policy to decrease budget deficit, trade liberalisation, labour market reform, and financial 
liberalisation. Studies that have tried to estimate the impact of structural adjustment programmes on a variety 
of poverty indicators concluded that these programmes had negative impacts on poverty and income 
distribution (Oberdabernig, 2008).  
6 Both the Lomé Convention (first signed in February 1975) and the Abuja Treaty (1991) of the African 
Economic Community (AEC) and NEPAD are attempts to avoid economic marginalisation of small 
economies through regional integration. 
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African national economies, (b) their dependence on imports of high-value or finished 
goods, and (c) their dependence on exports of a narrow range of low-value primary 
products, mainly natural resources (Mugabe, 2006). 
Further examination of regional integration in Africa shows that economic 
integration was recognised as an appropriate strategy to overcome problems related to the 
fragmentation of the African continent and to achieve development goals. Economic 
development is cited as the main motivation for establishing regional integration schemes 
in Africa. That is why the majority of studies on African regionalism assess regional 
arrangements in relation to the creation of conditions for, and fulfilment of, economic 
growth. The objectives of the Regional Integration Arrangements (RIA), despite being on 
a geographical scale, are similar to those identified by the literature on regional 
competitiveness. Those arrangements, in fact, are expected to lead to the creation of larger 
integrated regional markets, which would enable participating countries to exploit 
economies of scale, enhance domestic competition, raise return on investment, and hence, 
attract more foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Another leading motivation of an RIA in the African context is the need to 
overcome the constraints arising from small national markets (Senghor et al., 2009). The 
African continent is fragmented into 54 countries, characterised by small populations and 
low income, thus limited domestic markets. Similarly, SADC countries are very different 
in terms of demographics and market development, as displayed in Table 1.1 below.7  
  
                                       
7 Six of the fifteen SADC states are land-locked. Land-locked countries, as well as the great industrial and 
mining centre of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, have been served by the harbours of Lobito, Maputo, 
Benguela, Beira, Durban, and Cape Town. 
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GDP (PPP) per capita 
(international USD) 
Angola 20.82 114.1 6,006.3 
Botswana 2 14.5 16,104.9 
DR Congo 65.7 17.2 -- 
Lesotho 2 2.4 1,931.2 
Madagascar 22.29 10 962.5 
Malawi 15.9 4.3 753.4 
Mauritius 1.29 10.5 14,902.3 
Mozambique 25.2 14.2 1,007.2 
Namibia 2.26 13 7,442.3 
Seychelles 0.09 1.1 26,728.6 
South Africa 51.19 384.3 11,254.8 
Swaziland 1.23 3.7 5,161.1 
Tanzania 47.78 28.2 1,574.8 
Zambia 14.08 20.7 1,684.2 
Zimbabwe 13.72 9.8 --  
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2014. 
 
Eight out of fifteen SADC countries - Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia - are defined as Least 
Developed Countries (LDC)8 (United Nations, 2014). Their economies are characterised 
by weak factor-driven elements, including basic levels of institutional development, poor 
infrastructure, health, primary education and macro-economic stability, as well as a lack 
of efficiency-driven elements, such as small or acceptable market size, reasonable levels 
of higher education and training, goods and labour market efficiencies, and financial 
market sophistication and technological readiness (Lewis and Abrahams, 2013). 
The establishment of regional integration schemes was motivated by two specific 
trade objectives. First, the expectation was that RIAs would increase the bargaining power 
of African countries in international trade negotiations. In addition, as in the case of the 
European Union, promoting intraregional trade would help reduce regional conflicts. It 
was also argued that these arrangements could be particularly beneficial to many small 
and landlocked countries with inadequate infrastructures. Second, RIAs were seen as 
‘training grounds’ to prepare domestic producers to face the competitive pressure that 
would emerge through the general liberalisation of markets.  
However, fears about multilateral trade arrangements limited the exposure of 
African countries to RIAs. In particular, African countries feared that multilateral trade 
arrangements would damage Africa’s infant manufacturing industry base. This motivation 
                                       
8 The UN (2014) uses a set of criteria to classify LDCs. The criteria were established in 1971 and include low 
per capita GDP and structural impediments to growth. They are defined as “low-income countries suffering 
from the most severe structural impediments to sustainable development” (UN, 2014).  
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seems to exclude Mbeki (2009), who argues that the economy of sub-Saharan Africa 
cannot be defined as an industry-based economy and that post-independence policies were 
not formulated with the aim of increasing national productiveness. Furthermore, African 
countries feared that regional trade liberalisation would cause large customs revenue 
losses, one of the main sources of government revenue in underdeveloped economies, and 
would be difficult to recoup (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005). 
Problems in the integration of African nations into regional arrangements are also 
related to tensions between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. 9  Hoste and 
Anderson (2010) have identified two reasons for this. On the one hand, African countries 
seem reluctant to delegate part of their national sovereignty to supranational institutions; 
on the other hand, as discussed later in this thesis, most African RECs were established in 
reaction to something such as colonialism and apartheid, and not with a visionary 
economic purpose as described in the literature (Pentland, 1973; Balassa, 1961), with the 
exception of a hard-to-implement pan-Africanist narrative.  
1.3 Brief historical overview of regional integration in Africa 
Developing countries embarked on regionalism because it was considered a development 
tool, although its effectiveness as such has not been thoroughly assessed as yet (Schiff and 
Winters, 2003). 
Regional integration history in Africa dates back as far as 1910, with the 
establishment of the South African Customs Union (SACU), and the East African 
Community (EAC) established in 1919 (Alemayehu and Haile, 2002). In 1958, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) was established with the aim of 
providing regional economic communities with economic orientation (Mugabe, 2006). 
Since then, and in particular since 1970, many regional organisations have been created in 
Africa.  
According to Ndulo (1999), African economic cooperation was conceptualised in 
September 1961 with the establishment of the African and Malagasy Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation (OAMCE). The continental integration project in Africa formally 
began in 1963, when the desire for a pan-African political identity and unity, and the need 
to build sovereignty at the end of the colonial era (Mugabe, 2006), was formalised in the 
foundation of the Organisation of African Unity (Senghor et al., 2009). Later in 1991, the 
Heads of State and Government of the member states of the Organization of African 
                                       
9 In 2001, African states gathered in Addis Ababa and established the African Union (AU) as a continental 
intergovernmental union consisting of 54 African states. This approach to regional integration does not require 
African states to delegate some of their legislative power to a supranational entity. Conversely, a supranational 
approach would require them to give up some of their decision-making power to a regional government. 
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Unity (OAU) gathered in Abuja, establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) 
with the goal of achieving greater coordination and harmonisation between regional 
economic communities.10 The Abuja Treaty came into force in 1994 (Alemayehu and 
Haile, 2002). The plan to establish continent-wide economic cooperation was re-launched 
in 1999 with the Sirte Declaration, which aimed to speed up the implementation of the 
Abuja treaty, and in 2000 with the Lome Declaration, which reinforced the agreement 
(Alemayehu and Haile, 2002). In 2001, the organisation adopted the Constitutive Act, a 
legal framework to address Africa’s development challenges (Mugabe, 2006), and it was 
transformed into the African Union. The Constitutive Act underpins principles of 
democracy, respect for human rights, good governance, gender equality, and people-
centred development (Mugabe, 2006).  
In the 1980s and 1990s, African governments designed several pan-African 
development programmes for economic development.11 However, as a response to the 
failures of these plans and of a falling growth rate as a result of structural adjustment 
programmes, African leaders embarked on three initiatives: first, the Millennium Africa 
Recovery Plan led by the South African president Thabo Mbeki;12 second, the Omega 
Plan, which was designed by the President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade; and, third, the 
combination of these two initiatives in the New African Initiative which then led to the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001. NEPAD was adopted by 
the African Heads of State and Government of the OAU in 2001 and was ratified by the 
African Union (AU) in 2002 (NEPAD, 2014). NEPAD has, as its core mandate, the 
objective of poverty reduction through regional integration (Senghor et al., 2009).  
Since the creation of the OAU, many regional treaties and institutions have 
emerged between the mid-1960s to the 1990s13 aimed at promoting regional integration. 
                                       
10 The 1970s and 1980s were characterised by political instability, military coups, one-party governments, 
dictatorships, and the influence of Cold War politics on African affairs. Affected by economic crises 
exacerbated by the negative effects of structural adjustment programmes, African leaders found it necessary to 
transform the focus of the OAU from political liberation to economic development (NEPAD, 2014).  
11 These initiatives included: the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the Final Act of Lagos (1980), Africa's Priority 
Programme for Economic Recovery (1986-1990), the African Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Programme (1989), the African (Arusha) Charter for Popular Participation and Development 
(1990), the Abuja Treaty (1991), and the Cairo Agenda (1994), amongst others (NEPAD, 2014). 
12 The South African President, Thabo Mbeki led this initiative. 
13 According to Mugabe (2006), the following regional bodies were established between the mid-1960s and 
1980s: the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC, 1964), the East African Community 
(EAC, 1967-77; re-established in the early 1990s), the South African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC, 1980, now Southern African Development Community), the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS, 1975), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, 1995), 
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The common objectives of these regional groupings were the elimination of all tariffs and 
barriers between members, the establishment of a customs union, a unified fiscal policy, 
and coordinated regional policies in areas such as transport, communication, energy, and 
other infrastructural facilities.  
Regional communities are organisations based on a decentralised project-based 
approach where member states maintain sovereignty over their territories. According to 
Schoeman (2003), regionalism is a political project based on political objectives shared by 
national governments at supranational level. Ndulo (1999) asserts that the concept of a 
Southern African Development Community developed as a response to South Africa’s 
plan to establish the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) in 1979, an 
economic forum which would have fostered economic development in the region.14 In 
order to thwart apartheid South Africa’s military and economic domination of the region, 
the Front Line States15 on 1 April 1980, signed the Lusaka Declaration entitled “Southern 
Africa: Towards Economic Liberation,”16 establishing the Southern African Development 
Coordinating Conference (SADCC), as well as a Programme of Action covering areas 
such as food and agriculture, industry, manpower development and energy. The 
programme also identified transport and communications as key priority areas for regional 
cooperation. Therefore, the political objective at the origin of the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), a Regional Economic Community 
(REC) founded in 1980 in Lusaka, was military security to protect independent southern 
African states against South Africa under the apartheid system. However, economic 
reasons to foster economic growth and development were also at the heart of the creation 
of SADCC. 
1.3.1 Contemporary context of the research 
The contemporary historical context of the research coincides with the reinforcement of 
regional blocks in the globalisation process. This process is rooted in a particular 
historical period of globalisation, decolonisation, and political and economic enthusiasm 
                                                                                                         
the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU, 1989), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD, 1998), and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa (1996). 
14 The main economic drivers at the origin of the SADC were the exploitation of gold and diamond mines in 
South Africa and the copper mines of Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia), as well as agricultural activities 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Abegunrin, 2009). 
15 Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
16 The Lusaka Declaration is a policy statement reflecting a strategy to achieve total liberation for southern 
Africa. It not only reflects the growing concern of black southern African countries over the economic 
domination of apartheid South Africa, but also recognises the need to develop a regional economic strategy to 
lessen the economic dependence of southern African states on apartheid South Africa (Abegunrin, 2009). 
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for the integration of national markets and institutional organisations, referred to as 
“regionalism” (Söderbaum, 2004).  
While the European Union was threatened by financial crises and the unevenness of 
member states’ response, regionalism was once again gaining momentum. With the 
recognition of new powers exercised by the European Union (EU) in global bodies such 
as the United Nations (UN), the global assembly was moving towards the representation 
not only of national states’ rights, but also those of regional blocs. In May 2011, with the 
resolution granting the European Union right of reply and the ability to present oral 
amendments (General Assembly of the UN, 2011), regional blocks increased their 
negotiating power at international forums such as the UN. The EU moved from observer 
status to recognition of almost all the rights that member states enjoy, plus additional seats 
for the EU’s foreign policy office. In addition, other regional integration blocks could be 
granted the same rights as the EU in the global assembly, should they be required. 
In June 2011, African leaders agreed upon a framework to create the Grand Free 
Trade Area, a 26-member trade group that integrates three existing African trade blocs, 
namely COMESA, SADC, and the East African Community (EAC). The aim of the 
expanded block is to improve integration among the nations by reducing costs of trade 
between African countries. Also, it aims to increase investment flows and address 
capacity constraints (Africa Review, 2011). The new agreement, that is supposed to be 
implemented in three phases, has been once again positively acclaimed, in particular by 
the three main national economic powers involved in this regional political economy 
game: South Africa, Kenya, and Egypt. Expected gains for South Africa, for instance, are 
related to reduced, if not tariff-free, access to African markets that are growing faster than 
its own economy. 
According to Draper (2011), three driving forces are at the foundation of this new 
agreement. First, the political rationale of such a trade agreement is to provide a vision of 
an African economic community which is part of the broader goal of African unity. 
Second, many African countries belong to more than one regional group or organisation, 
and therefore there is a need to rationalise the groupings to avoid policy and regulatory 
incoherencies and to simplify administrative procedures. Third, the economic 
consideration is that national markets need to find ways to accelerate trade liberalisation 
for faster economic growth and development. In addition, the political economy of such 
negotiations is a central consideration, especially if the interests of constituent states, such 
as South Africa, Kenya, and Egypt, are aligned. Although the political enthusiasm for 
cohesive regional economic growth is evident, the main obstacle to agreement between 
member states (Draper, 2011), is the relative institutional weakness of the states involved 
in the negotiation process. 
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1.3.2 The problem of overlapping regional communities  
When analysing the regional integration process from an institutional arrangements 
perspective, one of the main obstacles related to the creation of intra-regional trade at the 
SADC level, is the overlapping of institutional functions and objectives – the so-called 
‘spaghetti bowl’ (Senghor et al., 2009). For instance, the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU)17 existed long before the SADC. The latter, as pointed out previously, was 
driven by economic cooperation principles and built around an explicit political objective, 
i.e. to make the region less dependent on apartheid South Africa. The decision to 
transform SADC into an instrument for regional integration, following majority rule in 
South Africa in 1994, created an inevitable overlap between SACU and SADC.  
Problems related to membership overlaps are analysed in a study by the African 
Union (2012) on African Regional Integration. In particular, the study, which involved the 
Economic Commission for Africa, the African Union, and the African Development Bank, 
notes that conflicting regional initiatives are of particular concern in eastern and southern 
Africa. In these areas it is possible to count six intra-African regional integration groups, 
including large ones, such as COMESA and SADC, which have a remarkable overlapping 
of members. SACU lies within SADC, and EAC overlaps in membership with both 
COMESA and SADC. And last, within southern Africa, several bilateral agreements 
between individual countries also exist, cutting across both SACU and SADC.18  
                                       
17 SACU is the world’s oldest custom union founded in the 1910 with the aim of creating common external 
tariffs (CET), free movement of manufactured products within the SACU, and a revenue-sharing formula for 
the distribution of customs. 
18 The AU recognises the following RECs: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). The non-recognised regional bodies include the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), the Indian Ocean Commission 
(IOC), the Mano River Union (MRU), and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).  
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Figure 1.1: Overlapping RECs – the ‘spaghetti bowl’  
Source: Economic Commission for Africa & African Union, ARIA II, 2006. 
 
This membership overlap raises the costs of administering the agreements, as it 
creates difficulties and conflicts in setting criteria for establishing origin. Moreover, the 
multiplication of customs procedures complicates paper work and this runs counter to the 
goal of simplifying and facilitating intraregional trade.19 Membership is associated with 
financial obligations and the poorer countries find it difficult to meet financial 
membership obligations when due, especially if they belong to more than one regional 
organisation. Costs of duplication waste efforts and resources, for example, attending 
meetings, implementing agreements, and so on. These costs are significantly higher for 
poor countries, which, in addition to public budget constraints, lack the appropriate 
human and institutional capacity to manage multiple intraregional trade arrangements.  
                                       
19 From an implementation perspective with regard to common external tariffs (CETs), it is technically 
impossible for countries to implement two different CETs. This problem is particularly crucial in Kenya and 
Uganda who are both members of EAC and COMESA. Namibia and Swaziland belong to SACU, COMESA 
and SADC, each of which has its own CET. 
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Ndulo et al. (2005) are very critical about the mix of different trade agreements 
within a region. They stress that overlapping regional membership also represents a 
barrier to the trade of services process, since it is perceived as a major barrier to foreign 
direct investment (FDI). It seems that the multiplicity of trade agreements only increases 
the amount of bureaucracy that investors face. Moreover, the number of different regimes 
makes trade facilitation more difficult and this has a negative effect on FDI.  
The universally-accepted solution for Africa to overcome the problem of 
membership overlap, seems to be ‘harmonisation’, together with merging and 
rationalisation.  
The need for rationalisation of RECs, although not specifically mentioned, is also 
stressed by the OAU. In particular, the Abuja Treaty (1991), establishing the Africa 
Economic Community, highlights the importance of coordinating, harmonising and 
progressively integrating activities of regional economic communities. Similarly, the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) also stressed the need for coordination and 
harmonisation of policies between RECs (ECA and AU, 2006). 
1.4 Failure of regional trade strategies 
A strategy adopted to facilitate integration between member states was to facilitate trade 
by liberalising intraregional trade. Within this strategy, tariff reduction has been the 
primary objective of regional integration arrangements. Recently, however, in order to 
expand the size of the integrated regional market, emphasis has been put on the reduction 
of other non-border internal constraints on intraregional trade flows. However, Oyejide 
and Njinkeu (2002) reveal that the implementation of regional trade liberalisation 
programmes in Africa has generally remained behind schedule. For instance, in the 
ECOWAS and COMESA trade liberalisation schedules, implementation target dates have 
repeatedly been missed and rescheduled.20 On the other hand, SACU is widely recognised 
as successfully implementing an intraregional tariff-free trade programme, although much 
less progress has been made in the reduction of non-tariff barriers to intraregional trade.  
1.4.1 The emergence of trade in services in southern Africa 
The participation of developing countries in multilateral trading negotiating processes is 
increasingly crucial for their development since the establishment of the WTO at the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). In particular, Bilal and Szapesi (2004) 
argue that participation of developing countries in the WTO is imperative to ensure the 
legitimacy and sustainability of the world trade regime. 
                                       
20 It needs to be mentioned that Oyejide and Njinkeu (2002) did not investigate reasons for such a delay. 
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The authors also analysed the role of international organisations such as UNCTAD 
in regional issues with regard to SADC participation to WTO negotiation meetings. Bilal 
and Szapesi (2004) argue that traditionally, trade-related issues are not central to the 
SADC agenda, since the Secretariat has a broader mandate, encompassing development 
and political dimensions. They point out that due to staff constraints, insufficient financial 
and technical means, and insufficient absorption capacity with a growing regional agenda, 
it is very difficult for the SADC Secretariat to contribute significantly to strengthening the 
trade capacity of its member states on WTO issues. 
The SADC Secretariat lacks programmes specifically dedicated to WTO issues. 
However, with the support of the UNCTAD, technical assistance was provided on issues 
of trade in services.21 Bilal and Szepesi (2004) investigate the interrelation between 
multilateral trade agreements within the WTO process and regional economic integration, 
in order to understand if SADC structures have facilitated or obstructed the participation 
of its members in multilateral trade agreement processes such as the WTO. Their analysis 
focuses on two countries, Mauritius and Zambia, and on two regional blocks, i.e. the 
COMESA and the SADC. The study aims to illustrate how regional integration processes 
and regional negotiations affect the preparation for and participation of members in the 
WTO.  
Although the study addresses issues related to infra-regional trade, it does not 
specifically investigate the matter of trade in services. However, it unveils interesting 
dynamics between the SADC regional process and WTO negotiation processes. 
According to Bilal and Szepesi (2004), poor and small SADC countries do not have 
the capacity to significantly influence WTO negotiations. Moreover, if they make a 
commitment, it is usually difficult to implement. One of the main challenges they face is 
determining and defending their positions in technical negotiations, even on key strategic 
issues, such as telecommunications. 
The authors describe the policy process for negotiations at the WTO, which 
involves a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) and its various sub-committees or 
regular WTO councils present in Geneva (see Figure 1.2 below).  
                                       
21 The work consisted of the identification of key service sectors and the drafting of a legal framework to 
facilitate intra-regional liberalisation of services. The Secretariat has mainly organised formal meetings in 
preparation for WTO Ministerial Conferences. In addition, it collaborated with the Southern Africa Trade 
Research Network (SATRN) at the annual symposium on WTO issues in order to share views on WTO and 
developments with researchers, as well as policy makers and negotiators.   
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Figure 1.2: Inputs in the WTO from the capital to Geneva  
Source: Bilal and Szepesi, 2004. 
 
Bilal and Szepesi (2004) assert that RECs are useful organisations for the 
participation of member countries in WTO negotiations for a few reasons. First, an REC 
can support the preparatory work of their member states, such as identifying strategic 
interests and collecting information about the consequences of various policy options 
open to them. Second, regional organisations can support their member countries in 
coordinating their positions at WTO level so that they are consistent with their regional 
integration and trade policy objectives. Therefore, they can support member states in 
identifying a negotiation strategy. According to the authors, co-operating, co-ordinating 
and pooling resources with countries that have similar interests is of a vital importance for 
the effective participation of many developing countries in the WTO. However, the study 
reveals that the SADC lacks human and financial resources, lacks representation in 
Geneva, and lacks the formation of concrete inputs at national level. All these elements 
create major obstacles to effectively negotiate in Geneva. 
The study concludes that regional support is more appropriate on technical issues 
and in capacity-building initiatives than for the co-ordination of similar positions between 
countries. According to the authors, these are better dealt with directly within WTO 
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coalition groupings. In the WTO negotiation process, the main role of these regional 
organisations has been to facilitate informal co-operation and stimulate co-ordination 
among members. Therefore, the regional dimension has had little direct impact so far on 
the preparation and conduct of WTO negotiations.  
Regional trade in services in the SADC, of which ICT is an important component,22 
was explored by a study conducted by the Ministerio da Industria e Comercio Direccao 
National do Comercio of the Republic of Mozambique (2003). ICT-related trade is 
generally strengthened by multilateral commitments. However, the study reveals that the 
potential for ICT-related trade in sub-Saharan Africa is largely untapped.  
The long-term goal of the SADC is to create a free trade area (FTA) of goods and 
services and to further liberalise regional trade (MICDNC, 2003). In June 2002 UNCTAD 
presented to the SADC a Protocol of Trade aimed at liberalising trade in services.  
In 2002, SADC Trade Ministers decided to include an annexure on Trade in 
Services to the SADC Trade Protocol, as a follow-up to Article 23 of the same. However, 
according to the MICDNC (2003) the annexure has many limitations, including the 
absence of guidelines on how liberalisation should be achieved, and it does not provide 
indications regarding the pace at which such liberalisation should occur. Communications 
is one of the six core sectors23 identified by the SADC Committee on Trade in Services. 
The annexure also requested that SADC countries coordinate negotiations in trade in 
services in the WTO (the so-called SADC-plus position). The general idea is to share the 
requests SADC countries receive in the GATS negotiations, and to cooperate and 
coordinate their respective offers.24 
With regard to telecommunications services, the WTO round of trade talks in 
services called for full liberalisation of the sector (Hodge, 2002). In particular, the 1994 
                                       
22 ICT and trade are interdependent. A well-developed trade environment facilitates the development of ICT. 
Likewise, ICT fosters, enables and facilitates trade. ICT-related trade is made up of three main components: 
(a) trade in ICT itself, (b) trade in services to which ICT makes critical inputs, such as software development 
services or banking, and (c) ICT as a general facilitator of other types of trade (Telecommunications 
Management Group Inc, 2007). 
23 The other sectors are Tourism (9. Tourism and Travel related services in the GATS); Transport (11. 
Transport Services in the GATS), Finance (7. Financial Services in the GATS), Construction (3. Construction 
and related Engineering Services in the GATS), Services provided by the energy sector (it is not a sector in its 
own right in the GATS) (MICDNC, 2003).  
24 The MICDNC study (2003) identifies several problems related to the annexure. First, although all the 
actions included in the first action plan were not completed, the SADC secretariat presented a new work plan 
to complete the trade in services. This second agreement replaced the previous one. The main objective of the 
new plan is to increase the pace of liberalisation of the services market through increasing the number of 
negotiations at a regional level (MICDNC, 2003). 
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General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) has influenced domestic telecoms policy 
and regulatory development (Hodge, 2002). According to the Annexure on 
Telecommunications of the GATS, telecommunications is not only a source of negotiation 
itself, but it is a carrier for trading other services in the economy (Hodge, 2002). Three 
components of the GATS are related to telecommunications: (a) the framework articles of 
the GATS, which set general rules that apply to all services, (b) the Annexure on 
Telecommunications, and (c) the Schedule of Specific Commitments, which includes the 
reference paper that contains additional commitments (Hodge, 2002; Telecommunications 
Management Group Inc., 2007). Some components have a direct effect on members 
regardless of whether they have made specific commitments in the telecommunications 
sector, while others become binding only once specific commitments are made. However, 
all signatories have to comply with general principles of the GATS contained in the 
framework articles (Hodge, 2002).  
Within the process of globalisation of telecommunications, national markets have 
not been considered “too small” to be of interest in the GATS negotiation processes. 
However, negotiations also developed “out-going” interests in foreign 
telecommunications markets at a national level (Adlung and Carzaniga, 2001), and 
subsequently a growing interest towards regional markets that are expected to be free 
goods and services trade areas has emerged.  
 




Mode 1  
Cross-border 
supply 
Defined to cover service flows from 
the territory of one member into the 
territory of another member  
A UK consumer making a 
telephone call to Tanzania  
 
Mode 2  
Consumption 
abroad  
Refers to situations where a service 
consumer moves into another 
member's territory to obtain a service  
A Kenyan mobile user 
roaming into Uganda  
Mode 3  
Commercial 
presence  
A service supplier of one member 
establishes a commercial presence in 
another member's territory to provide a 
service  
An Irish company opens an 
office in Kenya to provide 
data processing for its 
European operations  
Mode 4  
Presence of 
natural persons  
Consists of persons of one member 
entering the territory of another 
member to supply a service  
A Ugandan IT consultant 
temporarily employed by a 
company in the US  
Source: TMG, Inc. adapted from WTO. 
1.4.2 WTO commitments of SADC countries 
Although SADC countries have embarked on reforms in telecommunications, and a few 
have made commitments in the WTO, none went so far as to propose full liberalisation of 
the sector (Hodge, 2002). 
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In the SADC, only six countries (Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, South Africa, 
Mauritius and Zimbabwe) made specific commitments in telecommunications, and only 
Lesotho submitted commitments related to the audio-visual market. In the fixed-line 
market segment, all these countries, other than Swaziland, have terminated their 
monopolies. Swaziland is the only country in the region which did not liberalise its fixed 
and mobile monopolies. The country does not have formal restrictions on foreign 
ownership but there are some limitations in practice.  
Angola, Botswana, Malawi, and Mozambique have partially liberalised their 
markets and have allowed some foreign investment. In Angola, the majority of foreign 
ownership in telecommunication companies is forbidden and cross-ownership of licenced 
operators is limited to 10% (Lewis and Abrahams, 2013), while in Botswana and Malawi 
there are no restrictions on foreign ownership (Lewis and Abrahams, 2013). Lesotho, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe have liberalised their mobile markets. Lesotho committed to full 
liberalisation and Zambia has allowed extensive foreign investment. In the value-added 
services (VAS) market segment, only Lesotho committed to full liberalisation of the 
sector, while South Africa and Zimbabwe offered limited liberalisation since all service 
providers were required to use monopoly facilities (i.e. leased lines) to provide their 
services (Lewis and Abrahams, 2013). Although Zimbabwe has liberalised the mobile 
market, foreign investors have some limitations linked to an indigenisation policy that 
requires majority ownership by “indigenous Zimbabweans” (Lewis and Abrahams, 
2013:74).  
Namibia has been characterised by so-called “compromised liberalisation” as 
telecommunications is mostly state-owned with limited foreign investment. In Namibia, 
more than 49% of foreign ownership is prohibited (Lewis and Abrahams, 2013:73).  
The DRC and Madagascar have liberalised their markets as well. In the DRC, 
although the foreign ownership provision is unclear, there are several fully foreign-owned 
licences.  
Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania and South Africa have committed to a fully 
liberalised market with no restrictions on ownership. In Seychelles, the market is fully 
foreign-owned while in South Africa ownership is accompanied by the black economic 
empowerment (BEE) policy.25 South Africa was the only country to commit to the 
Reference Paper of the IV Protocol to the General Agreements on Trade and Service 
                                       
25 Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is a programme launched by the South African government to 
reduce the inequalities of apartheid by giving previously disadvantaged groups (i.e. blacks, coloureds, Indians, 
and Chinese who arrived before 1994) of South African citizens economic privileges previously not available 
to them. It includes measures such as employment preference, skills development, preferential procurement, 
etc.  
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(GATS) in full and it also committed to opening up the resale of fixed line services and 
promised at least a Second National Operator (SNO). With regard to mobile 
communications, only South Africa and Mauritius made commitments, both pledging 
limited liberalisation by allowing two operators to enter the market. 
The following table compares telecommunications market liberalisation and 
communication service commitments among SADC countries.  
 
Table 1.3: Telecoms market liberalisation and commitments 




Modes of supply 
Restrictions based 
on legal status, 
investment, 
nationality 
Angola 1996 No Partially liberalised 
market with 
foreign investment 





Botswana 1995 Yes Partially liberalised 
market with 
foreign investment 
restricted to current 
3 PTO licences 
No restrictions on 
foreign ownership 
DRC 1997 Yes Liberalised market 
with foreign 
investment – 




but several 100% 
foreign-owned 
licences 
Lesotho 1995 Yes Liberalised mobile 
market with 
foreign investment 
– commitment to 
full liberalisation 
No restrictions on 
foreign ownership 
Madagascar 1995 No Liberalised market 
with foreign 
investment – 





Mauritius 1995 Yes Fully liberalised 
market with 
foreign investment 
No restrictions on 
foreign ownership 
Malawi 1995 No Partially liberalised 
market with some 
foreign investment 
– further entry 
restricted 
No restrictions on 
foreign ownership 
Mozambique 1995 No Partially liberalised 
mobile market with 
some foreign 
investment – no 
information on 
further entry status 




Table 1.3: Telecoms market liberalisation and commitments 




Modes of supply 
Restrictions based 
on legal status, 
investment, 
nationality 












Seychelles No N/A Liberalised 
telecoms market – 
fully foreign-
owned 
No restrictions on 
foreign ownership 
Swaziland 1995 No No liberalisation – 







but limitation in 
practice 













on entry in one 
segment 
No restrictions on 
foreign ownership 






No restrictions on 
foreign ownership 
Zimbabwe 1995 Yes Liberalised mobile 
market with some 
foreign investment 







Source: Author’s own tabulation from WTO; Lewis and Abrahams, 2013 
 
According to Hodge (2002) there is a similarity in the way SADC countries 
approach economic policy reform of the infrastructure service sector. The dominant 
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strategy adopted in the region is gradual ‘managed liberalisation’.26 The adoption of a 
cautious reform of the telecommunications sector is partly the result of strong political 
opposition to full liberalisation of the sector (Hodge, 2002). This strategy was considered 
the best way to serve SADC development needs and the specific characteristics of the 
SADC member states. 
While in wealthy countries efficiency goals were at the forefront of the 
telecommunications reform agenda, the main goals in southern African countries are 
related to reducing debt, financing investment, improving delivery to the poor through 
network expansion and universal access, and expanding domestic private-sector 
participation. This has resulted in a “cautionary approach” to market liberalisation which 
has had a significant impact on national telecommunications market performance. 
1.4.3 The missed objective of regionalising free-trade 
Other studies on intraregional and intra-African trade (Yan and Gupta, 2005) demonstrate 
that intra-African regional integration arrangements have not been successful in 
eliminating intraregional trade barriers, and that they appear not to have contributed 
significantly to the boosting of intraregional trade in Africa. As a result, trade is mostly 
governed within national decision-making processes (Hoste and Anderson, 2010). African 
countries either have little experience of trade negotiations, or are those categorised as 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) who already benefit from market access benefits and 
schemes, meaning that they do not have the incentive to enter additional trade agreements 
and free trade zones. In addition, as is the case with SADC, most regional trade is with 
actors external to the southern African region (Hoste and Anderson, 2010). 
Therefore, it seems that African RIAs have failed to achieve the primary trade 
objective of eliminating barriers and obstacles for the realisation of a regional free-trade 
area. As this constitutes the most important element motivating their establishment, they 
have therefore failed to address their own development goals from a regional integration 
perspective. In addition, when analysing the African economy from a broader prospective, 
Yeats (1998) notes that Africa’s intra-regional trade is dominated by only a few countries 
and a limited number of primary commodities. Second, in sharp contrast to the pattern of 
                                       
26 The “managed liberalisation” approach has had negative consequences in the development of the sector. 
According to Gillwald (2009), the privatisation of Telkom in South Africa through the extension of its 
monopoly has had a negative impact on affordable access and market development. The “managed 
liberalisation” allowed the incumbent to extract monopoly profits which were partially repatriated to the 
United States by SBC. “By the end of the five years exclusivity period in 2002, the partially-privatised and 
foreign-controlled incumbent, Telkom, had retrenched over 20,000 workers, and cut off millions of people 
who could not afford to pay even for local and national services” (Gillwald, 2009:167). 
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intra-regional trade in other integrated regions, very little intra-industry trade27 occurs in 
Africa.28 FDI flows to Africa remain limited and have not been influenced in any 
discernible way by the configuration of the existing intra-African regional integration 
arrangements. However, positive FDI flows came from additional WTO privatisation. For 
instance, in 1997, SBC and Telekom Malaysia bought 30% of Telkom South Africa for 
R5.6 billion, which was the biggest source of FDI in Africa at that time (Gillwald, 2009). 
In addition, regional integration in Africa is incapable of serving as an agency of restraint 
for enhancing policy credibility or providing efficient and high-quality institutions. 
Finally, since African exports can meet only a very small portion of regional import needs, 
non-regional sources will continue to provide key imported products which are required to 
facilitate the continent’s industrialisation and growth. In this respect, a common external 
tariff plan has yet to be implemented. 
The failure to implement regional trade strategies is compounded, according to 
Senghor et al. (2009), by the lack of political will among national governments. This and 
inadequate resources are some of the reasons for the failure of regional cooperation from a 
political economy perspective. 
1.4.4 The managed liberalisation of the sector 
The main concerns about the process of liberalisation have been loss of control over the 
development process and uncertainty over the outcomes in terms of fulfilling 
development goals. The combination of the two made the SADC countries pursue a policy 
of cautious, managed liberalisation of the sector.  
In addition to that, key groups of incumbent firms and investors, trade unions and 
consumers, all had reasons to delay reforms and therefore had a political influence on the 
process (Hodge, 2002). The perceived small and unattractive southern African markets 
gave potential investors or incumbent firms considerable bargaining power in negotiating 
reform with governments. Further, fixed-line operators also had leverage, being universal 
access and service providers, thus making governments cautious about making reforms 
that could damage their profits. In addition, trade unions opposed rapid liberalisation 
because they were afraid of job losses.  
Therefore, as a result of maximising revenues for the government, southern African 
countries used their rule-making power to slow down the pace of telecommunications 
                                       
27 Intra-industry trade is defined as simultaneous import and export of similar but differentiated goods. 
28  Cassim (2001) studied structural factors determining the scope and success of regional integration 
initiatives in the SADC. A major finding of his study is that structural and economic factors, such as the 
transaction costs of trading, the growth paths of economies and changes in per-capita income, should be the 
focus of regional integration rather than trade policy on its own. 
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reform, creating regulatory barriers that obstruct market entry and limit competition in the 
sector. 
The managed liberalisation process is at the core of the Telecommunications 
Regulators’ Association of Southern Africa (TRASA) telecommunications policy model 
and it represents the model widely adopted in the region. This approach in the fixed-line 
sector is characterised by the following elements: 
a) Corporatisation: separation of the incumbent monopoly from the ministry; 
b) Exclusivity period: granting an exclusivity period during which a foreign partner 
is found to inject capital and technical know-how while the incumbent prepares 
itself for competition. In order to balance a potential loss in voice services, 
operators were forced to lease all long-distance facilities from the incumbent. 
Furthermore, both resale and the use of VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) 
were prohibited. In addition, the incumbent had infrastructure roll-out targets 
and obligations in rural areas. The rationale was a presumed market failure to 
cover undeserved and marginalised areas in an emerging competitive market; 
c) Second national operator (SNO): Introduction of a single new operator to 
compete on a facilities-basis only. It also granted a period within which no new 
competition would be allowed in the market. The SNO is often guaranteed a 
period of duopoly in the fixed line market in exchange for universal service 
obligations; 
d) Resale competition: Allowed since it did not threaten the basic revenues of the 
operators. However, TRASA imposed some price restrictions.  
A similar protectionist approach was pursued in the mobile market segment. At that 
time this market was considered a small luxury niche (Hodge, 2002), and the rationale of 
economies of scale suggested that only a few players were viable. Therefore, in smaller 
markets, only one operator was allowed, while in bigger markets up to two licences were 
granted. These new firms are often chosen through the beauty pageant method, rather than 
by auctioning licences. In value-added services, the approach has been to open up the 
segment to competition. 
According to Hodge (2002), infrastructure reform was used to improve countries’ 
fiscal positions. The strategy pursued was to reduce the drain on the fiscus from 
inefficient and loss-making public utilities, and maximise revenue generation by the sale 
of state assets. The first reason for the implementation of a managed liberalisation strategy 
was debt reduction: a development and more prominent goal in southern Africa as 
countries wanted to reduce government debts. The goal has its roots in the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) structural adjustment policies, which have the same objective: 
reducing the public debt.  
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1.5 Some preliminary considerations on the failure of regional 
initiatives in Africa 
Although there have been many efforts to regionalise African national economies, there is 
growing consensus regarding the failure of such initiatives. Alemayehu and Haile (2002) 
investigate the reasons for unsatisfactory results in terms of regional integration in the 
African context. They argue that government unwillingness to delegate macroeconomic 
policy-making power to regional authorities is one of the main causes of the failure of 
regional integration, together with a lack of political commitment (Lyakurwa et al., 1997, 
in Alemayhu and Haile, 2002). Further, governments fear an unequal distribution of gains 
and losses resulting from integration agreements. Mugabe (2006) asserts that many factors 
contributed to the failure of regional integration in Africa. He specifically mentions weak 
regional institutions, strong nationalism ideology at a leadership level, intra-state conflicts 
and wars, and structural barriers to trade and industrialisation. Further, the Cold War split 
the continent across an east-west divide.  
African RIAs failed to achieve the primary development objectives of eliminating 
barriers and obstacles in order to realise a regional free-trade area. This constituted the 
most important element in their motivation. Regional trade is further complicated by 
overlapping RECs with different regimes, that make trade facilitation difficult and have 
negative effects on FDI. In addition to inadequate resources, the failure of regional 
cooperation is compounded by the lack of political will at national government level. 
Another problem identified by the ECA (2006) is the lack of supranational 
authority to enforce commonly-agreed decisions. Under these circumstances, sanctions 
are seldom imposed on member states who are in breach of agreements. Furthermore, the 
gap between the aspirations of member states, as expressed in protocols and treaties, and 
the actual implementation of programmes is widening.  
Furthermore, although a multi-stakeholder constituency is considered a relevant 
element for regional integration, governments are the main actors advocating regional 
integration in the African context (ECA and AU, 2006). African civil society and the 
business constituency have shown little interest in regional integration. 
1.6 SADC regional ICT infrastructure 
1.6.1 Regional competitiveness and technological readiness  
The World Economic Forum (WEF) compiles a Networked Readiness Index (NRI) every 
year for countries around the world, including SADC countries. The index measures not 
only access to and use of information and communication technologies, but also the 
usefulness of the political and regulatory environment as well as the economic and social 
impact of ICTs. The aim of this index is to provide policy and decision makers with an 
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instrument to evaluate the impact of ICT at a global level and to benchmark ICT readiness 
and use in different countries. The index includes features related to access and use that 
take into consideration affordable ICT infrastructure and digital resources, including 
software and skills. The index also includes proxies used to assess the economic and 
social impact of ICTs, how countries leverage ICTs, and the benefits in terms of enhanced 
competitiveness and well-being.  
The WEF also releases a Global Competitiveness Report which measures 
“competitiveness as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of 
productivity of a country” (WEF, 2014:4). The report studies and benchmarks many 
factors underpinning national competitiveness. The main goal of the report is to provide 
insight and stimulate discussion about the best strategies and policies to help countries 
overcome obstacles to competitiveness.  
A more specialised report on ICT sector performance and on the development of 
the information society is the ITU “Measuring the information society” report. This report 
contains the ICT Development Index (IDI) which ranks 157 countries’ performances in 
terms of ICT infrastructure and uptake. The IDI explains differences among countries and 
within regions with regards to ICT development. 
 
Table 1.4: Global ICT Indexes (IDI, GCI, and NRI) 
Country Global ICT indices 
ICT Development Index 
(IDI), 2011 
GCI WEF, 2013-2014 NRI WEF, 2014 
Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score 
Angola 139 1.68 142 3.15 144 2.52 
Botswana 108 3.00 74 4.13 103 3.43 
DR Congo 147 1.31 -- -- -- -- 
Lesotho -- -- 123 3.52 133 2.88 
Madagascar 149 1.28 132 3.42 139 2.74 
Malawi 145 1.43 136 3.32 132 2.90 
Mauritius 72 4.55 45 4.45 48 4.31 
Mozambique 148 1.31 137 3.30 137 2.77 
Namibia 109 2.85 90 3.93 105 3.41 
Seychelles 64 4.75 80 4.10 66 4.02 
South Africa 84 3.95 53 4.37 70 3.98 
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Table 1.4: Global ICT Indexes (IDI, GCI, and NRI) 
Country Global ICT indices 
ICT Development Index 
(IDI), 2011 
GCI WEF, 2013-2014 NRI WEF, 2014 
Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score 
Swaziland 117 2.44 124 3.52 126 3.00 
Tanzania 142 1.65 125 3.50 125 3.04 
Zambia 132 1.77 93 3.86 110 3.34 
Zimbabwe 115 2.52 131 3.44 117 3.24 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2014. ITU, 2012. WEF, 2014 
 
Island countries in the SADC region such as Mauritius and Seychelles are at the top 
of SADC ranking in all three global indexes although not higher than the 45th position 
globally. In Seychelles, with the landing of the Seychelles East Africa System (SEAS) 
fibre-optic cable, available international internet bandwidth almost tripled in 2012 (ITU, 
2013). Madagascar, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are at the 
bottom end of the IDI, GCI, and NRI indexes for SADC. In Mozambique, the monopoly 
over fixed-lines and ADSL (asymmetric digital subscriber line) services controlled by 
Telecomunicações de Moçambique, a 100% state-owned company, has kept prices high 
for fixed lines in the last three years. Also, the incumbent is unable to compete with 
mobile internet. ADSL is still offered at narrowband speed of 126kbps, and becomes very 
expensive above 1Mbps speed. 
Seven out of fifteen countries (namely Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) are factor-driven economies, meaning that they are in 
the first stage of economic development. Maintaining competitiveness at this stage of 
development depends primarily on well-functioning public and private institutions, a 
well-developed infrastructure, a stable macroeconomic environment, and a healthy 
workforce that has, at least, a basic education (WEF, 2014). Falling between factor-driven 
and efficiency-driven economies are Angola and Botswana, which are transition 
economies. Weak institutions, absence of efficient higher education and training, and 
under-developed infrastructures are the main obstacles to economic development in 
Angola. In contrast, Botswana has stronger institutions and a sound macroeconomic 
environment, but lags behind in terms of infrastructure, market size and technological 
readiness. Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland are ranked by the GCI index 
as efficiency-driven economies. According to the World Economic Forum (2014), these 
countries should begin to improve production processes and increase product quality 
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because wages have grown and they cannot increase prices. At this stage of economic 
development, competitiveness is driven by higher education and training, efficient goods 
markets, well-functioning labour markets, developed financial markets, the ability to 
harness the benefits of existing technologies, and a large domestic or foreign market. 
Finally, Seychelles is in transition between an efficiency-driven and innovation-driven 
economy. Poor access to financing coupled with inefficient government bureaucracy are 
amongst the problems keeping the country from being an innovation-driven economy 
(WEF, 2014). 
 
Table 1.5: GCI WEF indicators for the SADC region, 2013-2014 
 Overall infrastructure Technological readiness 
Rank Score Rank Score 
Angola 142 3.15 138 2.47 
Botswana 74 4.13 104 3.11 
DR Congo -- -- -- -- 
Lesotho 123 3.52 140 2.45 
Madagascar 132 3.42 131 2.63 
Malawi 136 3.32 144 2.40 
Mauritius 45 4.45 63 3.90 
Mozambique 137 3.30 123 2.77 
Namibia 90 3.93 90 3.34 
Seychelles 80 4.10 65 3.87 
South Africa 53 4.37 62 3.92 
Swaziland 124 3.52 124 2.72 
Tanzania 125 3.50 126 2.70 
Zambia 93 3.86 115 2.97 
Zimbabwe 131 3.44 112 2.98 
Source: WEF 2014 
 
Table 1.5 above depicts the quality of national infrastructures in the SADC region 
and the technological readiness of SADC countries. The evaluation refers not only to 
telecommunications but also includes other facilities such as transport and energy 
networks. It reveals regional trends regarding overall infrastructure development. South 
Africa and Mauritius are the leading countries in the region in terms of the quality of 
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overall infrastructure (they rank 53rd and 45th, respectively), while all the other countries 
are below the 74th position (led by Botswana), suggesting an overall poor level of regional 
infrastructure development (WEF, 2014b).  
One of the biggest challenges in SADC countries is that, unlike mature markets 
from which reform models are derived, most developing countries have to implement 
telecommunication reforms in situations where telecommunication networks are poorly 
developed, and access to and use of ICT is low. In most countries, regulatory agencies 
lack independence, and the executive overtakes parliamentary roles and responsibilities. 
In addition, government organisations and regulatory agencies do not have enough 
technical and financial resources to effectively regulate the sector.  
This specific regional context of constraints results in poor technological readiness 
in most SADC countries. Technological readiness refers to the agility with which 
countries adopt existing technologies to improve the productivity of their own industries, 
with specific emphasis on their capacity to leverage ICT in daily activities and production 
processes. In the SADC region, it appears that only Mauritius, Seychelles and South 
Africa rank above 65. This shows that, save for these three countries, SADC is overall not 
a region able to leverage ICT to improve business efficiency and thereby increase 
productivity. According to ITU (2013) data, Seychelles has the highest number of 
individuals using the internet (47%) and fixed (wired) broadband penetration (12%). With 
the landing of the Seychelles East African System (SEAS) fibre-optic cable,29 available 
international internet bandwidth almost tripled in 2012. Mauritius experienced strong 
growth in the number of wireless broadband subscriptions, penetration reaching 22 per 
100 inhabitants in 2012 so that its penetration of households with internet access reached 
42% by the end of the year (ITU, 2013). The country also has a relatively high level of 
fixed (wired) broadband penetration (10.5%) in comparison to other SADC countries, and 
most African countries (ITU, 2013). South Africa has the characteristics of both a 
developed and a developing economy: it is the strongest economy in the region, it has a 
relatively high level of access to ICT, it has sophisticated institutions including research 
bodies and universities, and it has a strong private sector and financial services.  
Table 1.6 below compares a few pillars of the Networked Readiness Index (NRI) in 
SADC countries: the political and regulatory environment; the business and innovation 
environment; and infrastructure and digital content.  
  
                                       
29 SEAS was implemented under a private-public partnership between the Seychelles Government and the 
archipelago’s two main telecommunication operators, Airtel and Cable Wireless.  
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Table 1.6: NRI WEF 2013-2014 for the SADC region 
Country The Networked Readiness Index 2014 






Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score 
Angola 145 2.52 147 2.65 146 1.55 
Botswana 40 4.26 107 3.84 109 3.01 
DR Congo -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Lesotho 90 3.48 108 3.84 131 2.37 
Madagascar 129 2.90 94 3.97 144 1.57 
Malawi 69 3.70 130 3.43 126 2.43 
Mauritius 33 4.48 43 4.75 76 3.88 
Mozambique 113 3.22 126 3.49 137 1.86 
Namibia 37 4.38 112 3.81 106 3.10 
Seychelles 49 4.07 90 4.02 43 4.91 
South Africa 20 5.05 53 4.48 68 4.21 
Swaziland 84 3.55 129 3.44 118 2.79 
Tanzania 85 3.54 132 3.39 120 2.70 
Zambia 59 3.82 63 4.33 130 2.37 
Zimbabwe 122 3.06 133 3.35 128 2.42 
Source: WEF, 2014. 
 
While Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe are all below the 113th 
position, indicating a not-conducive political and regulatory environment, Botswana, 
Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa are all above position 40, with South Africa leading 
the region in the 20th position. The heterogeneity of political and regulatory environments 
among SADC countries is an obstacle to integration of national policy and regulatory 
frameworks at a regional level, as different countries have different institutional 
arrangements, different political environments and different legislative frameworks in 
place. 
Mauritius has also the higher score in the business and innovation environment, and 
together with South Africa and Zambia, is above the 63rd position in the region. The 
overall poor performance of the SADC region reveals that as a bloc, SADC does not have 
the characteristics of an innovation-driven economy. Also indicators such as infrastructure 
and digital content score poorly throughout SADC countries. Only Seychelles ranks in the 
top 50 countries in the infrastructure and digital content indicator. 
According to the ITU, which measures the performance of 157 countries in terms of 
ICT infrastructure and uptake through the ICT development index (IDI), SADC countries 
are characterised by low levels of access to and use of ICT, high prices and poor quality 
of service. Seychelles and Mauritius are once again the best performers in comparison to 






Table 1.7: IDI ITU 2012 for the SADC region 
Country The ICT Development Index (IDI) 
ICT Development 
Index (IDI), 2012 
IDI access sub-
index, 2012 
IDI use sub-index, 
2012 
Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score 
Angola 139 1.68 143 1.83 122 0.62 
Botswana 108 3.00 101 3.58 113 1.00 
DR Congo 147 1.31 155 1.33 154 0.06 
Lesotho 126 1.95 129 2.26 126 0.48 
Madagascar 149 1.28 152 1.48 151 0.07 
Malawi 145 1.43 145 1.72 138 0.26 
Mauritius 72 4.55 71 5.17 67 2.69 
Mozambique 148 1.31 147 1.69 140 0.23 
Namibia 109 2.85 110 3.09 99 1.55 
Seychelles 64 4.75 53 6.10 71 2.52 
South Africa 84 3.95 85 4.14 75 2.35 
Swaziland 117 2.44 124 2.43 111 1.11 
Tanzania 142 1.65 140 1.87 125 0.49 
Zambia 132 1.77 130 2.12 127 0.48 
Zimbabwe 115 2.52 120 2.54 98 1.59 
Source: ITU, 2013 
 
1.6.2 SADC cost of communications 
In terms of prices, most SADC countries rank at the bottom of Research ICT Africa’s 
index on mobile prepaid voice. The index is based on OECD (2010) baskets 40 calls/60 
SMS.30 Generally, SADC countries are more expensive in comparison to other African 
countries. In particular, Seychelles, Lesotho, Zambia, Swaziland, Angola, Madagascar, 
and Zimbabwe are all below the 32nd position in the RIA index for dominant operators in 
a country.  
On a positive note, Mauritius ranks 3rd in the index. The country is characterised by 
a competitive telecommunications environment with two fixed-line operators (Mauritius 
Telecom and MTML, the second providing CDMA2000 services) and three mobile 
operators (i.e. Orange, Emtel, and MTML), serving a relatively small population. 
Government ownership in the incumbent fixed-line operator is 33.5% and other 
shareholders are France Telecom (main shareholder with 40%), State Bank of Mauritius 
(19%), and National Pensions Fund (6.6%). The level of foreign direct investment in the 
telecommunications market is significant. France Telecom/Orange is the main shareholder 
of the incumbent fixed-line operators and it also has the main market share (43%) in the 
mobile market (Mauritius Telecom, 2013). Namibia and Botswana, two countries with 
small populations, have also managed to reduce prices and are placed above the 20th 
                                       
30 The OECD (2010) price baskets methodology applied in this research paper is based on 40 calls/60 SMS 
which have been distributed among on-net, off-net, peak, off-peak, and off off-peak calls and SMSes. The 
basket method allows benchmarking of countries, operators and products, and applied consistently, it allows 
consumers to compare the products of a single operator and between operators (RIA, 2013; OECD, 2010). 
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position in the index (dominant operator). In Namibia in particular, the reduction of 
mobile termination rates since 2009 has brought about a significant reduction in retail 
voice prices.  
Table 1.8: Cost of cheapest products for OECD’s 40 calls/60 SMS basket in USD 
Country name 
Cheapest product 
% cheaper than dominant Dominant operator 
Cheapest in 
country 
USD Rank USD Rank 
Egypt 3.2 1 3.2 3 Dominant is cheapest 
Ghana 3.2 1 3.2 3 Dominant is cheapest 
Sudan 3.2 1 1.2 1 63% 
Ethiopia 4.01 2 4.01 4 Dominant is cheapest 
Mauritius 4.05 3 4.05 5 Dominant is cheapest 
Kenya 4.3 4 1.48 2 66% 
Guinea 5.96 5 5.96 10 Dominant is cheapest 
Tunisia 6.01 6 5.83 9 3% 
Algeria 6.27 7 6.27 11 Dominant is cheapest 
Libya 6.94 8 6.94 13 Dominant is cheapest 
Rwanda 7.24 9 5.24 8 28% 
Nigeria 7.36 10 4.65 6 37% 
Congo Brazzaville 8.16 11 8.16 16 Dominant is cheapest 
Sierra Leone 8.28 12 8.28 17 Dominant is cheapest 
Uganda 9.72 13 7.22 14 26% 
Namibia 9.86 14 9.86 18 Dominant is cheapest 
Mozambique 10.67 15 10.67 21 Dominant is cheapest 
Liberia 11.3 16 11.3 22 Dominant is cheapest 
Botswana 11.41 17 10.37 20 9% 
Benin 11.45 18 11.45 23 Dominant is cheapest 
South Africa 12.06 19 5.2 7 57% 
Mauritania 13.01 20 12.58 25 3% 
Cote d'Ivoire 13.3 21 13.3 26 Dominant is cheapest 
Senegal 13.32 22 13.32 27 Dominant is cheapest 
Central African Republic 13.74 23 13.74 28 Dominant is cheapest 
Sao Tome and Principe 14.43 24 14.43 31 Dominant is cheapest 
Malawi 14.95 25 14.5 32 3% 
Tanzania 15.4 26 7.34 15 52% 
Burkina Faso 15.6 27 15.36 33 2% 
Mali 15.84 28 15.84 34 Dominant is cheapest 
Togo 16.2 29 16.2 35 Dominant is cheapest 
D.R. Congo 17.1 30 10.1 19 41% 
Chad 17.54 31 17.54 38 Dominant is cheapest 
Seychelles 18.02 32 18.02 40 Dominant is cheapest 
Cameroon 18.08 33 18.08 41 Dominant is cheapest 
Lesotho 18.13 34 13.83 30 24% 
Zambia 18.72 35 17.55 39 6% 
Swaziland 19.85 36 19.85 42 Dominant is cheapest 
Niger 20.2 37 17.05 36 16% 
Angola 22.13 38 19.92 43 10% 
Madagascar 22.55 39 21.83 45 3% 
Zimbabwe 22.75 40 21.78 44 4% 
Cape Verde 31.57 41 31.57 46 Dominant is cheapest 
Morocco 46.62 42 12.25 24 74% 
Source: RIA Africa Price Transparency Index, 2014 
 
 46 
In Mozambique, the entry of the new operator, Movitel, into the market in 2012, 
has shaken up the duopoly mobile and fixed monopoly markets, which previously 
delivered poor services primarily to the major cities at high prices. In 2012, the reduction 
in mobile termination rates led to the market becoming more competitive. Both mCel and 
Vodacom Mozambique were under pressure to reduce their mobile prepaid voice tariffs.  
South Africa, with a relatively high level of access to and use of mobile phones, is 
characterised by an oligopoly in the mobile market, with MTN and Vodacom, the two 
main operators, matching their prices which are relatively high compared to other African 
countries. On the other hand, Cell C and 8ta have been reducing their retail prices and that 
has translated into a very good ranking in the RIA mobile cheapest in the country index 
(7th).  
 
Figure 1.3: Cheapest prepaid 1 GB basket for Q1 2014 in USD 
Source: RIA broadband price transparency index, 2014 
 
With regards to broadband prices, Figure 1.3 above depicts the cost of 1GB basket 
for Q1 2014 in USD in selected African countries including some SADC countries. 
Among SADC countries, South Africa is the cheapest in the mobile broadband mini-index 
and 1 GB of data costs USD13.7. On the other hand, Namibia and Botswana, which were 
relatively cheap in terms of mobile prepaid voice tariffs, turn out to be more expensive in 
the data market. Botswana is a landlocked country characterised by a low level of 
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1.7 Problem statement 
The overriding problem, as it emerged from the literature review and secondary empirical 
data, indicators and global indices, is that SADC structures and processes have failed to 
achieve stated objectives of integrating national ICT policy and regulatory frameworks 
through harmonisation. 
A close examination of SADC ICT infrastructure in terms of access and prices 
reveals that in southern Africa, regional ICT policy and regulatory structures and 
processes have failed to achieve the main protocol’s objectives of establishing efficient, 
cost-effective, and fully-integrated infrastructure and operations, in order to promote 
economic and social development.31 In the region, policy and regulatory procedures and 
ICT legislation and regulatory environments are fragmented. Further, a 
telecommunications backbone is limited (Williams, 2007 and 2009). Poor infrastructure 
quality (Chetty et al., 2013), high costs of services (Research ICT Africa, 2013 and 2014), 
and limited bandwidth are recognised as the main factors inhibiting internet take-up, 
adoption and use in the region (Gillwald and Stork, 2008).  
Weak regional enforcement mechanisms, together with poor institutional 
arrangements, lack of skills, and limited financial resources of national member states, has 
inhibited their full participation in the formulation of effective and evidence-based 
regional policies. This is compounded by a lack of capability in regional organisations to 
recognise national needs and create the conditions for telecommunication market growth 
and consequently, economic and social development. These are some of the reasons why 
regional organisations fail to integrate national policy and regulatory frameworks in a 
comprehensive regional strategy which could catapult the region into an information-
based economy, as theoretically anticipated and empirically determined in other parts of 
the world, particularly in the Asian tigers.32 It appears that this situation is the result of a 
regional ICT agenda, that was mostly driven by international organisations and donor 
communities and which did not always have national buy-in. This is likely to have 
concrete impact on the performance of telecommunications markets at a national level. 
                                       
31 The 1996 SADC Protocol on TCM, Article 2.3. SATCC-TU telecommunications policy objectives are (a) 
Affordable, Efficient and High Quality Services, (b) Influencing Global Trends and active participation in 
Global Information Society, (c) Building a Competitive Regional Telecommunications Sector, (d) Creating an 
Environment for Sustainable Info-Communications Development, (e) Creating Partnerships, (f) Developing a 
code of Conduct and Business Practices, and (g) Gender and Telecommunications Development. 
32 The economic literature on “Asian Tigers” refers to Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South 
Korea and Thailand. The economies of these countries have drastically changed over the last thirty years from 
traditional agriculturally-based societies to growing industrialised nations. Economic growth in these 
countries was accompanied by substantial structural changes (Davis and Gonzalez, 2002).  
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Certainly, it is evident that regional ICT programmes and protocols have not achieved the 
regional and national objectives of reducing prices, improving quality of service, and 
increasing access to and use of ICT across the region.  
1.7.1 Research gap on regionalism and ICT policy and regulation 
Although the topic has encouraged research from many perspectives, the contribution of 
regional ICT policy and regulatory frameworks for the improvement of national ICT 
markets still has great scope for further investigation, especially in the African context. 
There is very little literature on regionalism and ICT sector development in Africa and 
almost none on SADC. Filling this gap is one of the major contributions of this thesis. For 
instance, in the literature related to regional competitiveness (Kitson, Martin and Tyler, 
2004; Johansson et al. 2002; Storper, 1997; Malecki, 2002; Porter, 1998a and 1998b), 
despite regional telecommunications infrastructures being acknowledged as an enabler for 
economic growth and social development, there is little research that analyses the role of 
regional policy, regulatory structures and processes in the creation of such conditions. In 
particular, there is space for further studies on why regional institutional arrangements in 
Africa, in charge of creating harmonised and integrated regional policy and regulatory 
conditions for the provision of universal access to telecommunications services, have not 
achieved intended ICT policy objectives as stated in protocols and declarations.  
Taking into account this evidence gap, this thesis highlights the main problems 
encountered by a Regional Economic Community (REC)33 in Africa, the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), to effectively develop and implement 
integrated ICT policy and regulatory frameworks. Through an examination of regional 
structures and processes, and based on a case study method, this dissertation examines the 
political economy underlying the development and implementation of an integrated ICT 
policy framework in support of regional development and economic growth.  
The political economy perspective adopted to carry out this study is based mostly 
on practical and realistic paradigms. Therefore, final policy recommendations have been 
drafted in order to advise and influence regional organisations on the appropriate policies 
to improve the regional institutional arrangements. The thesis is concerned with the 
description of the relations within the regional political economy, the interplay between 
multilateral, regional and national organisations, and the telecommunication markets in a 
specific historical period.  
The literature survey confirms that there is very little research in the area of 
regional ICT policy-making and regulation in developing countries. There are many 
                                       
33 Regional economic communities are the building blocs of an African Economic Community (SADC, 2004).  
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reasons why the academic literature on this issue, especially in southern Africa, is poor. 
First, the limited academic work in this area has focused mainly on specific national ICT 
policy and regulatory interventions, such as interconnection, spectrum management or 
broadband policy, generally ignoring regional ICT policy and regulatory frameworks. 
Therefore ICT policy research on southern Africa is still in its infancy. An FTA of 
services at the SADC level has yet to be created. The lack of implementation of regional 
protocols on trade in services might have created a sense of disillusionment. Policy 
research and case studies in particular tend to focus on success stories. However, regional 
economic communities and their associations continue to be at the centre of regional, 
continental and multilateral development strategies. Investigation of regional institutions 
through empirical analysis and theorising therefore remains crucial to understanding their 
contribution to national and regional development. With regard to ICT in particular, the 
reform of telecommunication markets at a national level as a result of the WTO process 
through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) framework, has been 
uneven in SADC, with only a few member states undertaking certain commitments. The 
GATS Annexure on Telecommunications, the Annexure on Negotiations on Basic 
Telecommunications, the Fourth Protocol on basic telecommunications, and Reference 
Paper on basic telecommunications have been only partially implemented. However, most 
member states have participated in, and partially implemented GATS-aligned reforms 
proposed by SADC or SADC regional bodies, such as the Communications Regulatory 
Association of South Africa (CRASA). 
Other studies have tried to assess the impact of regional reforms on ICT sector 
development. For instance, Waema (2005) has identified the following challenges to ICT 
policy and regulatory harmonisation: 
- existence of multiple ICT policy and programme initiatives, some of which are 
often in competition with each other; 
- very little ownership of regional ICT policy and regulatory initiatives by 
national African governments: 
- no institutional mechanisms in place on the part of regional organisations and 
institutions to ensure compliance with model policies and frameworks, or to 
monitor and evaluate the implementation. Member states belonging to the REC 
are sovereign states with no obligation to adopt and adjust national ICT policy 
and regulatory frameworks according to policy guidelines issued by regional 
bodies; and 
- different stages of economic, political, and social development inhibit member 
countries from adopting common priorities and common models or frameworks. 
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So while considerable resources have been put into establishing and supporting 
structures for the regional integration of markets and harmonisation of ICT policies, there 
has been limited success in implementing harmonisation frameworks to date (Calandro 
and Moyo, 2010). Moreover, this collaborative and multi-stakeholder effort, aimed at 
developing a seamless electronic communications infrastructure in SADC with the 
associated positive multiplier effects, has failed to achieve the intended results in terms of 
ICT development. As previously described, the performance of the SADC 
telecommunication markets has been poor. In particular:   
(a) In the SADC region, the availability of low-cost backbone network capacity is 
limited, and this constricts the development of broadband connectivity 
(Williams, 2007 and 2009). As a result, market penetration of broadband in the 
region is equal to 1.9 per 100 inhabitants (Kim, Kelly and Raja, 2010). 
(b) Poor network quality (Chetty et al., 2014), high costs of services (Stork, 
Calandro and Gamage, 2013), and limited bandwidth are considered the main 
reasons for an internet penetration rate below 10% amongst households in 
many African countries (Stork, Calandro and Gillwald, 2013b). 
(c) The outcomes of policy and regulatory interventions at a regional level aimed 
at developing a regional ICT infrastructure in the SADC have not met policy 
objectives that have been articulated by the SADC countries (Cohen and 
Gillwald, 2008). 
1.8 Primary and secondary research questions 
The primary question arising from the problem statement is why the regional institutional 
arrangements—including regional structures and processes have not achieved regional 
objectives of integration of ICT policy and regulatory frameworks and therefore not the 
associated positive policy outcomes.  
The research sub-questions that the primary question elicits are: 
2 What are the drivers (national and international) of the development of an 
integrated regional ICT policy and regulatory framework? Do they take into 
account national differences in terms of ICT sector development? 
3 Has ICT policy and regulation in the SADC region achieved the level of 
harmonisation evoked in protocols and declarations? If not, why are regional 
ICT policies, protocols and declarations not always implemented at a national 
level? 
4 What has been the role of international organisations in regional ICT policy 
and regulatory formulation?  
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5 What are the policy outcomes in terms of regulatory instruments, market 
structure and the development of a regional ICT infrastructure in SADC? 
In order to answer the questions, the study explores the interplay between national, 
regional and international structures and processes. It does so by focussing on the political 
economy of regionalism and on the role of RECs in the process of the liberalisation of 
African markets with a specific focus on trade in services. A political economy approach 
to regional ICT policy and regulation-making has been developed to move beyond purely 
economic factors identified in regional frameworks and multilateral agency reports, to 
explain why regional objectives on ICT development may not be realised. Theories on 
regionalism (Haas, 1958; Nye, 1971; Pentland, 1973; Mugabe, 2006; Söderbaum, 2004), 
on the influence of epistemic communities (Haas, 1992; Sundström, 2000); on capacity-
building as a tool for foreign affairs (Hameiri, 2009), and on the relationship between 
state and democracy in developing countries (Khan, 2002 and 2005) have been drawn on 
to develop a conceptual framework. This is used as a lens through which to filter the 
empirical evidence for analytical purposes. The literature on the establishment of a 
regional ICT policy and regulatory framework for the development of the information 
society in southern Africa, with a focus on aspects related to regionalism in Africa and 
regional competitiveness, has been reviewed. In addition to the academic literature related 
to regional organisations as key institutions for improving the competitiveness of regional 
blocs in the global economy, the literature explores how ICT serves as an enabler for 
regional competitiveness; and the linkages between regional integration and infrastructure 
development. 
1.8.1 Contributing to academe and informing regional experts, policy makers and 
practitioners 
This thesis will naturally contribute to the academic body of knowledge on this subject 
and assist those academics interested in exploring the issue in other regions. More 
importantly it will inform policy and decision makers involved in regional ICT policy and 
regulatory processes at national, regional and international levels. From a communication 
policy perspective, it identifies national, regional and international policy and regulatory 
constraints in terms of regional structures and processes for ICT sector development, that 
need to be overcome or improved in order to develop an enabling policy and regulatory 
framework for the development of a seamless SADC telecommunication infrastructure. 
Therefore, it informs all the actors and stakeholders involved in the regionalism project 
about the motivations of the regional ICT policy and regulatory process itself, as well as 
about the shortfalls of the institutional arrangement and of the policy-making process. 
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Finally, it provides solutions for overcoming identified institutional and regulatory 
bottlenecks.   
The stakeholders identified are SADC member states at a ministerial and 
parliamentary level, regional bodies such as SADC, Communication Regulators’ 
Association of Southern Africa (CRASA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), international and multilateral organisations, the donor community, 
any other profit and non-profit organisations supporting this process and those academics 
interested in understanding the issue from an empirical and theoretical prospective. The 
research findings and analysis aim to support them with evidence necessary to improve 
regional processes and relations, in order to improve regional ICT policy-making and ICT 
sector development in general. Sources for the interviews are chosen selectively, based on 
accessibility, validity, reliability and accuracy. 
1.9 Overview of the rest of the dissertation 
Having identified both the problems encountered by RECs to integrate their markets and 
to achieve ICT policy objectives, and taking into account the need for conducting research 
to examine the reasons for this, the following chapter reviews the literature on the 
governance of global and regional telecommunication networks and services, the role of 
these in regional competitiveness, and the linkages between regional infrastructures, 
service integration and national growth and development. 
Chapter Three describes selected theoretical and conceptual issues concerning 
institutional theory and political economy of regionalism. Chapter Four describes the 
methodology applied to collect and analyse the interviews conducted to understand and 
describe how SADC institutional arrangements, including regional structures and 
processes, have shaped ICT policy objectives, as stated in SADC protocols and 
declarations, in respect of regional ICT policy outputs and outcomes. 
Through a document analysis, Chapter Five investigates SADC structures and 
processes responsible for telecommunication policy and regulations against an 
internationally-developed and agreed framework for telecommunication sector reform. 
The Reference Paper of the IV Protocol to the General Agreements on Trade and Service 
(GATS) has been used as the coding framework to assess the compliance of the regional 
framework to principles widely accepted as a solid foundation for effective regulatory 
design. 
Chapter Six analyses the interviews conducted with key stakeholders involved in 
the reform process of ICT policy and regulation in SADC. The information collected 
through the interviews has been integrated with media and press releases, informal 
conversations with representatives from national, regional and international organisations, 
 53 
and presentations attended during regional meetings, in order to build a rich case study. 
Chapter Seven verifies the evidence collected for the thesis, triangulating the 
findings from the document analysis with the interviews, the media coverage, and 
quantitative data. The conceptual framework set up in Chapter Three, which draws from 
Keohane and Nye’s (1975) definition of “institutional integration” in terms of 
governments’ policy outcomes, is used to assess the importance of institutional and policy 
integration, and to analyse such levels of integration against their outputs (i.e. regional 
institutions, formal regional processes and legal documents) and outcomes (i.e. ICT 
penetration, prices, quality of service). In addition, the concept of epistemic communities 
and that of capacity-building as a tool for foreign affairs, is used as a lens through which 
to analyse the evidence collected.  
Chapter eight draws on the evidence and on the analysis presented and provides 
some conclusions on the initial research questions. It also makes some final observations 
and qualifications about the research process and findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter One discussed how the theoretical framework of regional integration has its 
empirical basis in the international relations of Western Europe (Weiss, 1999), 
particularly in studies exploring the European integration process through the creation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) (Laursen, 2008). Haas (1958), the main contributor of the spill-over 
concept, defines integration as a process of political shifting from national states to new 
centres of political activity. Similarly, Lindberg’s studies (1963) on the European 
Economic Community explain integration as a political process whereby nations and 
political actors decide to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process 
to new central organs. The chapter explored regional integration in terms of economics of 
integration through the identification of the main economic objectives: such as the 
removal of artificial obstacles to optimise multilateral trade operations; or policies of 
liberalisation such as free movement of resources, the development of economies of scale, 
encouragement of capital investment and increased competition (Pentland, 1973). It also 
described how regionalism evolved in Africa and why regional trade strategies, including 
trade in services, have failed in the African context. 
The literature and studies surveyed on African telecommunications policy and 
regulatory environments tend to focus on aspects related to the degree of liberalisation and 
competition of telecommunications national markets versus ICT public policy and 
regulatory measures or on the ICT sector performance and market structures. Few works 
specifically address the matter in the context of regional integration processes and 
regional ICT infrastructure development.  
Determinants of these regional reforms for the development of the ICT sector have 
only been explored at a theoretical level and in relation to more mature economies and 
developed regions. Chapter I also examined the SADC ICT infrastructure through the 
analysis of supply-side data. It concluded with a problem statement and with the primary 
and secondary questions that this thesis seeks to answer. The final section of the first 
chapter explained linkages between regional integration and infrastructure development 
by reviewing the economics of telecommunications infrastructures and analysing the 
SADC regional infrastructure. At an infrastructure level, the chapter examined issues 
related to regional connectivity as identified by Williams (2009). According to him, a 
regional infrastructure represents the second layer of a communications supply chain. It 
provides interconnectivity between international connectivity and national (domestic) 
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backbones.34 Regional connectivity is considered to be one of the main aspects hampering 
the development of the internet sector in sub-Saharan Africa, due to the high cost of 
backbone interconnections between countries in the SADC region and with the rest of the 
‘big pipes’ (Singh & Samarajiva, 2008: 164). 
Chapter 2 explores telecommunications policy and regulation in the African context 
by means of an investigation into regional governance initiatives for telecommunications 
infrastructure integration and ICT sector development, with specific focus on SADC. 
Thereafter regional initiatives in ICT policymaking are reviewed. Issues of regional 
competitiveness are discussed, as well as the role that ICT can play in increasing regional 
competitiveness.  
2.1 An African perspective on the governance of global 
telecommunications infrastructures 
Efforts to harmonise national ICT regulatory frameworks in line with developing goals 
are pursued by regional bodies such as the European Union35 and the SADC. At a global 
level, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is in charge of setting general 
guidelines or rules to govern global telecommunications infrastructures. The ITU, 
founded in 1865 at the International Telegraph Convention, remains arguably the most 
important player in infrastructure management, constituting the only specialised agency of 
the United Nations that is empowered to make binding decisions on regulating 
                                       
34 Singh and Samarajiva (2008:163-164) define backbone as “that part of the network used to provide 
communication services”. According to them, it is possible distinguish between national and international 
backbones, cable or fibre radio-based backbones, as well as the level of coverage. Backbones can be classified 
according to the type of technology used to deploy them, such as copper, fibre-optic cable, co-axial cable, 
digital microwave, Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), and satellite transmission. The backbone, 
therefore, includes not only the conduits for carrying traffic, but also the microwave towers and masts.  
Backbone networks represent the “high capacity links” (Williams, 2009:51) that carry data traffic between 
fixed points in the networks. 
35 With regard to regional ICT policy and regulation in the European Union, the Regional Economic 
Community has recently granted new and more responsibilities to the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications (BEREC). As a European independence regulator, it harmonises ICT policy and 
regulatory frameworks at a regional level (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, 
2011). According to Fonteijn (2011), chairperson of Berec, “BEREC is required to play a key role in facing 
the European-wide challenges of the promotion of competition and innovation. This is an important step to 
avoid the risk of many inconsistent approaches to regulation and effectively contributes to the development of 
the single market.” (Berec, 2011: 1). The act of empowerment of the regional regulator further reinforces 
compliance of national regulatory regimes to best practices as endorsed by the members of Berec. The 
regional regulator has also the power to express its formal opinion to the Commission in relation to the market 
definition, the designation of a Significant Market Power (SMP) or the imposition of obligations (Berec, 
2011).  
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telecommunications infrastructures. In particular, the ITU can do so by amending 
(provided there is unanimity) its basic texts (Constitution and Convention), thus making 
any modified rule directly applicable to its signatories. 36  The amendment of the 
International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) through the World Conference on 
International Telecommunications (WCIT) is an alternative avenue that can be pursued to 
obtain similar binding effects,37 provided that the treaty is implemented by member states. 
However, it requires a more comprehensive approach and probably a longer process of 
negotiation. In addition to these hard legislative powers, the ITU has normative value 
through the plenipotentiary resolutions, which carry considerable weight among member 
states despite not being enforceable38 (Calandro et al., 2013). 
It has been noted that developing countries’ participation in the domain of 
infrastructure and service regulation,39 which is largely driven by sector members, is 
hindered by the lack of technical and financial capabilities (MacLean et al., 2003). For 
this reason, the Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference adopted Resolution 123 on “bridging 
the standardisation gap between developed and developing countries”, acknowledging the 
problem of capacity and inviting member states and sector members to endow the ITU 
with a specific fund for that purpose (Calandro et al., 2013). 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which seldom participate in any other internet 
governance forums, and whose only recognition and contact with those responsible for 
global governance of telecommunications infrastructures is through the ITU, see it as the 
                                       
36 The amendment of Constitution and Convention can be done only once every four years when the 
Plenipotentiary Conference takes place to consider such amendments, approve strategic and financial plans, 
adopt general or sectorial policies and elect a number of high-level management positions. 
37 The signing of an ITU treaty is the adoption and the authentication of the text of the treaty, but does not 
imply, for the ITRs, consent by the member state to be bound.. To be bound by the new treaty, a signatory 
member state has to formally notify its consent to be bound by depositing with the ITU Secretary-General an 
instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval (depending on the national procedure applicable). The 
accession is the procedure by which a non-signatory member state notifies the ITU Secretary-General of its 
consent to be bound by the treaty (ITU, 2013). 
38 ITU membership is divided into a four-tiered structure: at the top layer, there are 193 member states, which 
enjoy the right to vote as well as to participate in all the activities of the Union; in the middle, the 637 sector 
members have the right to take part in the activities of their respective sector(s); further down line are the 143 
associates, that have the right to participate in some activities of the sector(s) with which they are associated; 
and finally, the bottom is represented by the 60 academic institutional members, whose participation was 
authorized under Resolution 169 of the 2010 Plenipotentiary Conference for ITU-T activities (different from 
associate members) under rules that are yet to be specified.  
39 The work of the ITU is divided into three areas: telecommunication standardization (ITU-T); radio 
spectrum and satellite orbits allocation (ITU-R); and facilitating telecommunication access and operation in 
developing regions (ITU-D). 
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most appropriate forum for governing the technological and operational aspects of global 
electronic networks, including the internet. In part, this is explained by the fact that ITU 
provides technical support and capacity-building in these countries, particularly relating to 
integrating and harmonising telecommunications policy and regulatory frameworks at a 
regional level,40  as well as technical assistance to translate regional regulation into 
national legislation. Not only do LDCs see the ITU as the forum handling the technical 
governance of the internet, but the national sovereign state membership of the ITU is 
perceived by many governments to be a way of asserting control over a strategic asset 
from whose governance they currently feel excluded (Calandro et al., 2013).  
MacLean (2008) identified some of the main problems with the ITU governance 
model. He claims that ITU governance structures need to be more representative of the 
different stakeholders who have an interest in governing global electronic networks, 
including the private sector, civil society organisations, developing countries and other 
non-state actors. In particular, these actors have not been meaningfully included in 
decision-making processes, even though there are areas where it does not make sense to 
reserve this right for representatives of sovereign states only.  
Regarding the critical resources of the internet, the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)41 has internet governance as its core mandate. 
However, to the extent that ICANN is engaged in managing these critical resources, it is 
also involved in policy-making related to them, establishing a system of rules rooted in 
contracts to order the global supply of domain names (Mueller et al., 2004).42  
                                       
40 For an example of technical assistance and capacity-building provided by the ITU to developing countries, 
see the Harmonisation of ICT policies in Sub-Saharan Africa (HIPSSA) project, available at  
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/ 
41 ICANN is a private, California-based, non-profit entity that was formed in 1998 following a public 
proceeding invoked by the U.S. Department of Commerce to take over the work of the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA), then administered by Jon Postel at the Information Sciences Institute (ISI) of the 
University of Southern California (USC) under a contract with the United States Department of Defence. 
Since 1998, ICANN operates under a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and has the authority to set policy for, and manage the allocation and assignment of, Internet 
protocol addresses (United States Department of Commerce, 1998). This includes adding new names to the 
top level of the internet domain name hierarchy as well as maintaining responsibility for operating root servers 
that distribute information about the content of the top level of the domain name space (Mueller, 2002). 
42 For example, policies currently under consideration at ICANN include: Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) Policy For Allocation of IPv6 Blocks to Regional Internet Registries (Criteria governing 
the allocation of IPv6 address space from the IANA to the RIRs); Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA) Policy for Allocation of Autonomous System Number (ASN) Blocks to Regional Internet Registries 
(Criteria governing the allocation of ASN Blocks from IANA to RIRs); Global Policy for Post Exhaustion 
IPv4 Allocation Mechanisms by the IANA (Criteria governing the allocation of IPv4 address space from the 
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Due to the poor participation of African stakeholders in ICANN, which is 
confirmed by the small number of African Registrars and only 17 new gTLD 
applications, 43  a ministerial meeting, held alongside the ICANN Dakar meeting in 
October 2011, issued a communiqué that called on ICANN to increase its presence in 
Africa and to be more relevant to the specific needs of the region. Subsequently, in 
August 2012, ICANN proposed the so-called ICANN-Africa Strategy Working Group 
(ASWG) Initiative44 to support a stronger presence for ICANN in Africa and to increase 
Africa’s participation in ICANN. It also wanted to foster the promotion of a multi-
stakeholder model in Africa for larger involvement at the government, civil society and 
private sector levels. This effort has been hailed as a step towards stronger global 
engagement by ICANN, with special focus on developing countries. To contribute to the 
realisation of the new strategy, a working group was created and endorsed by African 
community members attending the 44th ICANN meeting in Prague in June 2012. The 
core community and constituency of the African strategy include key players in internet 
governance from different regions in Africa (Calandro et al., 2013).  
The implementation of the Africa Strategy Financial Year 14 (FY14) started in 
January 2013. The main objective of the strategy is capacity-building in order to increase 
African awareness of market opportunities in relation to domain name registration. This is 
in line with the African Ministers' declaration and request to ICANN at the ICANN44 in 
Dakar, Senegal.  
However, challenges to implementing the strategy have already been found. “The 
ICANN wants to show that they are doing something for Africa, but it is different than 
doing something with Africa” claimed Alice Munyua during an interview conducted 
during the Durban 47 ICANN meeting in July 2013. “For instance, the initiative on the 
prizes for African Registrars during ICANN47 in Durban is premature, since at the 
moment there are only seven Registrars across the continent. Although there is a need for 
growing an African domain name space, we need to take into account that in Africa there 
are not enough ISPs. Therefore, a strategy should encourage Africans to apply for the new 
gTLDs or to be become registrars of ccTLDs. We should stimulate the growth of the 
                                                                                                         
IANA to the RIRs); and Criteria for Establishment of New Regional Internet Registries (Criteria governing 
the creation of new RIRs). For an up-to-date list of the policies under consideration, visit 
http://aso.icann.org/global-policies/ 
43 Worldwide applications came from 60 countries. Out of 1930 applications, less than 1% were from Africa 
(i.e. 17); 1.23% from Latin America and the Caribbean (i.e. 24); 16% were from Asia-Pacific region (I.e. 
303); 35% were from Europe (i.e. 675); and 47% from North America (i.e. 911).  
44 For more information about the ICANN-ASWG Initiative, see http://www.afrinic.net/en/community/icann-
aswg and http://www.africanncommunity.org. 
 59 
sector and then award it” (Munya, interview 2013). Difficulties related to the 
implementation of the strategy might also arise from the lack of African partners, 
including policy-makers and the AU. In addition to that, what matters in terms of 
successful implementation of the strategy is the ability of the population to own the 
process. Currently, the ICANN has set up a website on African Strategy45 and it wishes to 
publicise more information about it. It is seeking to attract members of the community 
with expertise in different areas (Dangjinou, 2013). In addition, “although the ICANN in 
the past has assumed that one solution fits all, the approach pursued for the African 
Strategy is different. The call for a change came directly from the GAC (Government 
Advisory Committee) where African representatives called for a specific approach 
tailored to African needs. The new ICANN CEO Fadi Chehadé understood the need for a 
different approach and the process started” (Munya, interview 2013). The strategy is 
perceived and welcomed as a sound strategy for the African continent, but due to the 
failure of many strategies pursued by international organisations to improve African 
participation in global policy-making mechanisms, there is a perception that at an 
implementation level the African strategy has flaws. “In five years time, we will assess 
what has been achieved, and we would like to expect more than organising conferences 
and ICANN fellows. We would like to see more real African Internet policy issues in the 
ICANN policy agenda” (Munya, interview 2013).  
One reason for this lack of engagement within the ICANN process can be explained 
by legacy issues. Internet, as developed in North America and Africa, has been 
marginalised from its inception. In addition, African countries have not perceived the 
internet as a priority compared to other pressing policy issues affecting the continent. 
African civil society, industry and users are totally absent and do not participate in the 
ICANN process. However, it is expected that with increased access to the internet, the 
level of engagement will grow (Munya, interview 2013). 
2.2 Regional governance of telecommunications infrastructures 
Throughout Africa, regional economic communities (RECs) have increasingly focused on 
ICT policy and regulatory development as part of regional growth strategies. In the case 
of Africa, one of the main objectives of regional bodies is to harmonise national ICT 
policy and legal frameworks within regional blocs (Calandro et al., 2010).  
Multilateral negotiations on basic telecommunications service in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), under the auspices of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) (McLarty, 1998), had a profound impact on global telecommunications markets. 
Since international trade in services is considered an important factor contributing to their 
                                       
45 See https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2012-08-10-en for more information. 
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development, many developing countries entered into various bilateral and regional trade 
agreements and followed the dual path of multilaterialism and regionalism (Bilal and 
Szepesi, [2004]). Regarding the SADC, only four countries made special commitments to 
telecommunications with the WTO process (Hodge, 2002). 
SADC countries began the process of negotiating trade on services during the 
meeting of the SADC Industry and Trade Committee of Ministers for Trade in Maseru in 
June 2000. During that meeting, SADC members were required to work towards the 
liberalisation of trade in services. The aim of a regional strategy on trade in services was 
to serve as a basis for effective participation and integration of SADC members in the 
WTO negotiations. Furthermore, the SADC Trade Ministers, meeting in Mauritius in May 
2001, identified communications services as a priority area and as a key service46 that 
would contribute to the development of SADC countries and to the strengthening of other 
sectors of services. 
Regional harmonisation of ICT policy and regulation is thus recognised by regional 
communities and the international donor community as essential to regional economic 
integration (Kessides, 2012), and to the integration of regional economies into the global 
economy. The underlying principles around which harmonisation is being pursued are: 
effective competition in the telecommunications market; the interconnection of national 
networks for the development of a seamless African backbone infrastructure; and the 
promotion of regional and foreign direct investments into telecommunications. However, 
as it stands, regional economic integration based on single markets with harmonised ICT 
policies has yet to be realised. In order to establish common ICT policy goals, RECs 
created model policy guidelines as a starting point for regional harmonisation. Member 
states are expected to use these guidelines to create their own national policy frameworks 
(Maitland and van Gorp, 2009). 
At a continental level, the African Union (AU) leads the process of harmonising the 
ICT policy and regulatory framework. The Reference Framework for Harmonisation of 
Telecommunication and ICT Policies and Regulations in Africa was adopted in May 2008, 
and endorsed by a summit in July of the same year. During the AU assembly in Addis 
Ababa in February 2010, the commitment to intensify activities to implement the 
Reference Framework were once again renewed. The Reference Framework is 
implemented through the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) /European 
Commission (EC) project on the Harmonisation of the ICT Policies in Sub-Sahara Africa 
                                       
46 The other key sectors identified were construction services, financial services, transport services, tourism 
services and energy services. 
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(HIPSSA).47  
RECs are considered the “building blocs” of the African Union and they are 
instruments for the further integration of Africa.  RECs usually follow an identical 
policymaking structure where sector-specific committees or associations address issues 
related to ICTs, with the aim of implementing harmonised ICT policy and regulatory 
frameworks at a national level. However, the main activities of these regional committees 
of Ministers Responsible for Communications and ICT are limited to knowledge-sharing 
and capacity-building rather than legally-binding harmonisation of policies. Furthermore, 
they have little or no implementation powers, which lie with national regulators (Calandro, 
Gillwald, Moyo and Stork, 2010). 
2.2.1 Regional initiatives on ICT policy-making 
At a regional level, many African RECs have already established legal and regulatory 
measures to harmonise their own ICT policy frameworks.  
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
In the ECOWAS, the ITU supported the REC to develop best-practice guidelines with the 
aim of encouraging the establishment of an integrated ICT market in West Africa. At the 
infrastructural level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
features a Department of Transport and Communications which is assigned the tasks, 
among others, of developing common transport and telecommunications policies, laws 
and regulations; and encouraging the establishment and promotion of joint ventures and 
the participation of the private sector in the areas of transport and telecommunications.  
Pursuant to the mandate of its Department of Defence and Security, ECOWAS also 
adopted a Directive on Fighting Cybercrime (2009) that provides a legal framework for 
the member states, and which includes substantive criminal law dealing with offences 
specifically related to ICT. This Directive sets up the framework within which member 
states are required to act for implementation at national level. In a similar fashion, the 
37th session of Authority of the Heads of State of ECOWAS on 16 February 2010, 
                                       
47 The decision to implement regional policy and regulatory reform was formalised during the SADC meeting 
for Ministers responsible for Telecommunications, Postal and ICT, held in Namibia in June 2009. The first 
activity launched by the HIPSSA Project Team and by the SADC Secretariat was the ambitious project of 
reviewing and updating the “SADC ICT Policy and Legal Framework”. The consultants’ team presented 
country profiles, which were reviewed, discussed and validated by member states. The assessment identified 
gaps in some countries where regional policy objectives were not achieved, as well as regional, continental 
and international benchmarks, and recommended best practices from the region to adjust national policy and 
regulatory frameworks. Based on the assessment, proposed changes included the SADC Protocol on TCM, the 
Telecommunications Policy in SADC, and the Telecommunication Bill Model for SADC.  
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adopted the Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection, which establishes a 
framework for the collection, processing, transmission, storage and use of personal data to 
be implemented by ECOWAS members. So far there has been limited action at the 
national level for the implementation of both frameworks. 
Finally, in April 2012, participants at a workshop on cybercrime, convened by the 
Economic and Financial Commission (EFCC) and the Australian Federal Police, urged 
ECOWAS to establish a regional convention on cybercrime (Mutum, 2012; Niel, 2013). 
However, no further steps have been taken in this respect. 
The East African Community (EAC) 
Members of the East African Community (EAC) have already discussed plans for 
regional ICT policy harmonisation. However, the process of harmonising ICT policies in 
that region has been retarded by a sentiment among members that such a policy 
framework would favour the leading country of the region: Kenya. Since 
telecommunications markets in the EAC were amongst the earliest to open up to 
competition and become integrated in Africa, the REC is now in the process of 
determining if and how a single regulation policy can be applied uniformly. 
According to the EAC’s official website, EAC has set four major strategic 
objectives underpinning projects and programmes in the ICT sector:  
(a) Harmonisation of ICT policies, laws and regulations among the EAC partner  
states;  
(b) Promotion of the establishment of communications infrastructure and services; 
(c) Standardisation of technologies and services to allow internetworking and 
interoperability;  
(d) Communications markets - investment strategies, competition management, 
quality of service and consumer welfare. 
In line with this agenda, two reference instruments for the harmonisation of ICT 
policy have been developed: (1) a Regional Framework for Harmonisation of National 
ICT Policies and (2) a Study on the EAC Communication Regime. 
Since 2004, EAC countries have hosted three workshops, identifying cyberlaws, e-
justice and information security as key cross-cutting issues that need to be in place for the 
successful implementation of e-government applications and e-commerce in East Africa. 
Furthermore, the Regional e-Government Framework, adopted by the Council of 
Ministers in November 2006, emphasised the urgency of this undertaking, identifying the 
creation of an enabling legal and regulatory environment as a critical enabling factor for 
effective implementation of e-Government strategies at national and regional levels. To 
that end, the EAC secretariat requested capacity-building by UNCTAD for policy and 
legal experts from the EAC. 
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The first training workshop on “The Legal Aspects of e-Commerce” was jointly 
organised by the EAC and UNCTAD secretariats (Kenya, December 2006). Following the 
defined roadmap toward a harmonised legal framework in the EAC, the EAC partner 
states appointed members to the Regional Task Force on Cyberlaws formed in December 
2007. 
The Framework for Cyberlaws was prepared in November 2008 by the EAC Task 
Force on Cyberlaws, comprising representatives from the partner states and the EAC 
Secretariat, with the support of UNCTAD. The Framework, which currently awaits 
consideration and adoption by the Council of Ministers, contains a series of 
recommendations made to the governments of the partner states about reforming national 
laws to facilitate electronic commerce: facilitating the use of data security mechanisms; 
deterring conduct designed to undermine the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information and communication technologies; protecting consumers in an online 
environment; and protecting individual privacy (UNCTAD, 2008). 
In addition, and in line with its stated objectives, the EAC has engaged, since May 
2009, at infrastructure level with the study of pre-investment analysis and technical design 
for the creation of a cross-border broadband network within the EAC. The Final Report 
was expected by the end of February 2010, but no further communication has been issued 
on the official website. 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a regional 
organisation overlapping with the SADC, both from a membership point of view and on 
policy and regulatory issues, identified the strategic importance of the ICT sector back in 
1998, during the Third Summit of Heads of State under the theme “Information – A Tool 
for Increased Trade and Investment in COMESA”. The COMESA Treaty identifies the 
strategic importance of interconnecting member states through a seamless 
telecommunications infrastructure, in order to facilitate the implementation of the treaty 
and to realise a free trade economic area. Further, the treaty emphasises the importance of 
setting technological standards at a regional level (James, 2001).  
 The COMESA adopted an ICT policy in 2003, with the aim of providing direction 
on ICT and telecommunications policy to its member states. A model bill and guidelines 
for harmonising institutions, policy and regulation in the region accompany the policy. 
Member states were requested to implement the strategies set out in the ICT policy 
document within a period of five years, following approval by the Council. In order to 
support development, to monitor the implementation of ICT policy guidelines and 
strategies, and to monitor the e–readiness status, the European Union (EU) provided 
financial support for the development of a Regional Information and Communications 
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Technologies Support Programme (RICTSP). The RICTSP was part of the 2002-2007 
joint Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP). The 
overall aim of the programme was to contribute to the process of regional integration 
through the development and creation of an effective and functioning ICT environment. 
Although it seems that the programme’s specific objectives were achieved (Miller et al., 
2011), the main problem in the realisation of an efficient ICT policy development process 
at government level in the region, is the slowness of government procedures. Therefore, in 
most countries, guidelines and proposals have not been translated into national legislation. 
Moreover, the soft form of legislation, based purely on a guidelines approach, does not 
have any binding effect and it has been considered ineffective at harmonising regulations 
at a regional level (ITU, 2009). 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) 
In 2009, the ECCAS drafted a regional ICT development policy for Central Africa. 
However, its implementation has some flaws. It is not legally binding because it is a 
regional strategic plan. Moreover, in order to provide guidance to member states, the 
guidelines need validation by the specialised technical committee on telecommunications, 
the Consultative Commission of Experts and the Council of Ministers and Heads of State 
of ECCAS (ITU, 2009), a process that has not been fully completed as yet. Also, the 
regional ICT development policy is accompanied by recommendations for the 
harmonisation of national policies and regulations with no binding requirements for the 
member states. Due to the late issuing of ECCAS initiatives in ICT and 
telecommunications, and to members overlapping with the CEMAC and the COMESA 
regions, member states may favour the respective initiatives of those regions. 
 CEMAC was founded as a regional organisation devoted to encouraging, 
developing and maintaining integration among its six member states. Despite the regional 
organisation nominating a commissioner specifically in charge of the Department of 
Infrastructures and Sustainable Development, the outcomes in the area of ICT policy 
development appear negligible. A few weak enforcement mechanisms, lack of follow-up 
and delays in implementing strategies have been mentioned as the main obstacles 
preventing harmonisation of ICT policy and regulatory frameworks at a regional level 
(ITU, 2009). Nevertheless, in December 2008, the regional organisation adopted a 
regulation on the Harmonisation of Regulations on Electronic Communications of 
CEMAC member states. The regional regulatory framework was designed with the triple 
objective of facilitating the completion of the internal market, progressively creating a 
competitive market for electronic communications and services, and pledging support for 
the fight against poverty (CEMAC 2008, art. 3). 
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Despite this trend of regional integration, the ITU recognises that “there is a high 
degree of heterogeneity among the regions in terms of advancement in the harmonisation 
process” (ITU, 2009).  
2.2.2 Regional ICT regulation in the SADC 
Specifically analysing the SADC, the increasing attention of the REC on ICT-related 
issues is also reflected in the number of institutions and bodies involved in ICT-related 
activities: the SADC secretariat (based in Gaborone, Botswana); the SADC Parliamentary 
Forum, based in Windhoek, Namibia; the SADC Human Resources Development Sector, 
based in Swaziland; the Southern African Transport and Telecommunications 
Commission (SATCC) based in Maputo, Mozambique; the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority of Southern Africa (TRASA, now CRASA); the Southern African 
Telecommunications Association (SATA), and the Southern African Broadcasting 
Association (SABA), (James, 2001). 
One of the main objectives at the origin of the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) was to create equitable regional integration through 
co-operation in key sectors, such as infrastructure development (Mulaudzi, 2006). 
Harmonisation of policy and regulation represents the regional integration strategy, 
universally embraced in Africa, for the regional economic development of the 
telecommunications sector. At a regional level, the 1997 SADC Protocol on Transport, 
Communications and Meteorology represents the first legal and policy framework for 
harmonising ICT policy at a regional level. It seeks “to establish [...] communications [...] 
systems which provide efficient, cost-effective and fully integrated infrastructure and 
operations, which best meet the needs of customers and promote economic and social 
development while being [...] economically sustainable” (Art. 2.3, SADC Protocol on 
Transport, Communications and Meteorology, 1997). With this Protocol, SADC member 
states expressed the will to enhance service interconnectivity in the region and globally 
(Art. 10.1, p. c, SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology, 1997). 
Although the document represents a start in the harmonising of ICT policy at regional 
level, it has not been reviewed for over a decade. 
Since then, many other regional policy initiatives have been undertaken to develop 
a regional telecommunications infrastructure in the SADC. In 1997, the 
Telecommunication Regulators Association of Southern Africa (TRASA), now CRASA, 
was set up. The association, while providing regional guidelines for national network 
interconnection, emphasised that “harmonisation should remain a key objective as far as 
practicable in the building up of regional integration” (SATCC, Guidelines on 
interconnections for SADC countries, 2000:3). In 1998, the SADC Secretariat established 
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a Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC). The 
Commission is based in Mozambique and coordinates the use of existing systems and 
infrastructures, and finances the construction of additional facilities. It approved the 1998 
Telecommunication Policies for SADC, which provided a common policy guideline for 
the harmonised adoption and implementation of ICT policies at national level. The 
SATCC was also responsible for drafting the Model Regulatory Framework for 
Telecommunications (James, 2001). The Southern Africa Telecommunications 
Association (SATA) was created as early as 1980.  
The priority to harmonise ICT policies, legislation and regulation was re-
established in 2001 with the SADC ICT Declaration under section 2.a.iv, which called for 
an evolution of regional and national regulatory frameworks to harness the opportunities 
of convergence between telecommunications and the internet to encourage widespread 
electronic communications.  
Subsequently, in 2003 a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 
was endorsed by Summit. The plan provides strategic directions for regional programmes 
and actions.  It indicates that “the development of infrastructure and services is critical for 
promoting and sustaining regional economic development, trade and investment” (Art. 
3.3.1, SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, 2003). The RISDP also 
sets as an objective, the development of communications systems in order to catapult the 
region into an information-based economy. 
A predominant role in supporting regional initiatives has been played by 
international and development organisations, which have been providing support, 
capacity-building and technical assistance to national governments and regional 
organisations in their formulation and implementation of ICT policies for the deployment 
of a regional ICT infrastructure. For instance, in 1996 the UN Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA) Conference of Ministers launched the African Information Society 
Initiative (AISI).48 Through this programme, UNECA planned to realise several objectives, 
                                       
48 The African Information Society Initiative (AISI) is one of UNECA’s biggest projects. It was launched in 
1996 to establish a high-level work group to develop an action plan for ICTs to accelerate socio-economic 
development in Africa. Not surprisingly, a ten-year review of UNECA’s execution of the project confirmed its 
success, as evidenced by the existence, in three quarters of UNECA’s member states, of national e-strategies 
complementing their development efforts (UNECA, 2006b). However, the objective of the programme was to 
realise a sustainable information society in Africa by 2010, where “every man and woman, schoolchild, 
village, government office and business can access information knowledge resources through computers and 
telecommunications” (Soul Beat Africa, 2004) and this is far from being met. Just recently, the Conference of 
African Ministers of Communication and Information Technology (CITMC) called for the cooperation of the 
African Union (AU) Commission and UNECA’s AISI project for the finalisation of the draft Convention on 
Cyber Legislation and for the support of its implementation by member states on or before December 2012. 
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including the National Information and Communication Infrastructure (NICI) plans, and 
an infrastructure development and internet connectivity programme. As part of the 
implementation of the AISI, UNECA and the SADC Secretariat agreed on a joint strategy 
called e-SADC, a fully-fledged regional ICT development programme that would address 
convergence issues and harmonisation of ICT indicators, to enhance connectivity and 
access to ICT services (UNECA, 2009).   
It is worth noting that ICT-related issues are not central to the SADC agenda, since 
the Secretariat has a broader mandate, encompassing developmental and political 
dimensions. Due to staff constraints, insufficient financial and technical means and 
absorption capacity, compounded by a growing regional agenda, it is very difficult for the 
SADC Secretariat to contribute significantly to the strengthening of ICT policy and 
regulatory frameworks in its 15 member states. 
The efficacy of SADC policy-making and implementation processes has been 
criticised.49 It has been argued that the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP)50 lacks concreteness: it does not prioritise targets, it does not estimate costs and 
time-frames, and it has not been followed by a practical implementation plan. There are 
two main reasons for the failure of the plan. First, SADC follows a decentralised approach 
whereby each member state is responsible for a particular sector. As a result, projects 
have national characterisation as opposed to regional scope; secondly, the relatively 
powerless Secretariat has not been able to create a common regional identity and this 
contributes to its failure to deliver on targets. 
In 2008 (with technical assistance by the ITU) SADC embarked on a process of 
updating the Protocol on TCM and SADC policy and legislative guidelines to align them 
to industry developments, such us the convergence of broadcasting and 
telecommunications licensing models, taking into account technology-neutral licensing, 
Next Generation Networks (NGN), roaming, interconnection and tariffs. It also aimed to 
create new additional guidelines related to cyber-security, a regional digital broadcasting 
migration plan, model dispute resolution and competition policy. 
                                                                                                         
Yet this objective has not been accomplished to date (AU, 2012). 
49 Hoste and Anderson (2010) identified some general problems related to regional policy-making processes 
and regional structures. At a policy level, they mentioned conflicts between supranationalism and national 
interests. At a structural level, staffing and expertise are limited. Secretariats often lack the capacity to 
promote and develop common goals and strategies, and over-rely on funds from external actors instead of on 
regional funding.  
50 The RISDP is a “development and implementation framework guiding the regional integration of the SADC 
over a period of fifteen years (2005-2020) (SADC, 2014). Its main objective is to “deepen integration in the 
region with a view to accelerate poverty eradication and the attainment of other economic and non-economic 
development goals (SADC, 2014). 
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The project is part of the ITU/EC HIPSSA programme. HIPSSA was completed 
and the following documents have been produced: (a) SADC policy guidelines on 
convergence; (b) a revised TCM protocol; (c) a SADC Telecommunications Model Bill; 
and (d) SADC Guidelines on Universal Access and Service (UA/S) and (e) a Toolkit of 
Best Practices, using UA/S Funds (ITU, 2013). However, although the SADC meeting of 
ICT ministers adopted the new regional ICT policy and regulatory framework, the 
Protocol has not been endorsed by the Summit and therefore has not been updated.  
The following table summarises the main ICT policy initiatives across African 
regional organisations. 
Table 2.1: Main regional documents in Sub-Saharan Africa on ICT policy and regulation 
Regional organisation Document Year 
ECOWAS Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/07 on the 
harmonisation of policies and regulatory 
framework for the ICT sector 
2007 
Directive on Fighting Cybercrime 2009 
Supplementary Act on Personal Data 
Protection 
2010 
Proposal to establish a regional convention on 
cybercrime 
2012 
EAC Regional e-government framework 2006 
Framework for cyberlaws 2008 
Guidelines on Interconnection and access for 
telecommunications networks and services 
within the East African Community 
2008 
COMESA ICT policy 2003 
Regional Information and Communications 
Technologies Support Programme 
2002/2007 
ECCAS Regional ICT development policy for Central 
Africa 
2009 
CEMAC Regulation on the harmonisation of 
Regulations on Electronic Communications of 
CEMAC member states 
2008 
SADC SADC Protocol on transport, communications 
and meteorology 
1997 
Telecommunication policies for SADC 1998 
SADC ICT Declaration 2001 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan 
2003 
Support for harmonisation of the ICT Policies 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
2009 
Source: Author’s own tabulation 
 
2.3 Regional competitiveness 
It is widely recognised and accepted that regions are key loci in the organisation and 
governance of economic growth and social development (Kitson, Martin and Tyler, 2004). 
Since regions are political and economic organisations of trading activities, interest in the 
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‘competitive performance’ of individual regions is growing, especially within 
governmental circles. At an academic level, studies have focused on identifying key 
determinants of regional competitiveness (Kitson et al. 2004, Johansson et al. 2002), with 
the objective of formulating policies to promote and foster those determinants.  
Kitson et al. (2004) define regional competitiveness as the capacity of regions to 
compete with one another in some way, for instance, attracting capital or workers. 
Similarly, Storper’s (1997) definition of ‘place competitiveness’ links the concept of 
competitiveness to attractiveness. According to his definition, a place is competitive when 
it is able to attract and maintain firms with stable or rising market shares while 
maintaining or increasing standards of living for those who live in it.  
Within the theoretical framework of competitive performance, economic density 
can be the result of intra-regional accessibility, considering a region as a functional region. 
A region is functional on the basis of the density of its economic activities, social 
opportunities and interaction options (Ciccone and Hall, 1996, in Malecki, 2002). The 
authors, however, observe that what really matters for the competitive advantage of a 
region is not density per se but the degree of accessibility to resources and economic 
agents. From this perspective, accessibility is a combination of density and infrastructures 
and the combination of these three elements is key to regional development. Therefore, if 
accessibility is reduced, economic density decreases. On the other hand, infrastructure 
without economic density is a worthless opportunity.  
Parallel to the notion of competitive advantage, another paradigm has arisen within 
the regionalism discourse. According to this paradigm, nations can improve and develop 
their competitive positions. The theory focuses more on key factors that would allow 
firms to create and support a competitive advantage in a particular field. Porter (1992), 
one of the main exponents of this concept, supports this view by linking productivity to 
the notion of competitiveness. He states that policy-makers should consider 
competitiveness as a function of dynamic progressiveness, innovation, and the ability to 
change and improve. Therefore, at the foundation of sustainable productivity growth he 
places an economy that continually upgrades itself.  
Furthermore Porter (1998a) identifies infrastructures as determinants of competitive 
advantage. Although he refers mainly to the national level, his analysis can be extended to 
the regional level. He states that infrastructure is a tool to improve general 
macroeconomic capacity. In his studies on the formation and operation of clusters, he 
argues that to reinforce and to build upon existing clusters, seeded and reinforced by 
inbound foreign direct investment (FDI), obstacles and inefficiencies that impede the 
cluster’s productivity and innovation need to be eliminated. In particular, he considers the 
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formulation of policies to enhance specialised communications infrastructures as the key 
tool for governments to foster productivity and innovation.   
At a regional level Porter’s argument is equally pertinent. Since regions are 
organisations in charge of formulating policies to promote and foster economic growth 
and social development to improve their competitive position within the global economy, 
they are called upon to formulate policies enabling a favourable environment for the 
economy to emerge, develop and improve. In particular, it is the contention of this 
research that communication infrastructures drive increased and sustainable regional 
productivity, and that removing regulatory and policy obstacles developed at a regional 
level, would create an enabling environment to allow the development of a seamless 
regional ICT infrastructure.  
2.3.1 Role of ICT for regional competitiveness 
In the context of regional competitiveness, the most relevant role played by ICT is 
revealed when analysing the existence of geographical interaction costs in a regional 
market place. The interaction in the market place between demand and supply gives rise 
to various forms of interaction costs. In particular, communication costs include 
producing, storing, computing and retrieving information, acquiring and storing 
communication devices, rolling out networks, plus other costs related to interactive 
models, such as search costs and other costs for exchanging information. Furthermore, 
with the emergence of new information-based services, such as distance-learning, remote 
banking, e-government administration, 24/7 health care, IP TV and video-calls, 
interaction costs are also estimated to rise, mainly due to the high volume of data, and 
therefore bandwidth, required to carry this increasing amount of data traffic. According to 
Malecki (2002), the normal method of reducing transaction costs is to standardise 
transaction procedures. Standardisation is facilitated on the one hand when demand 
becomes sufficiently large and the relevant technology is subsequently exploited. On the 
other hand, standardisation is encouraged when converging interests collide in a 
competitive environment and an enabling regulatory environment sets the standards . 
Malecki (2002) further stresses that geographical transaction costs are determined 
by national and regional communication policies. Lower geographical transaction costs 
widen the borders of functional regions and hence provide space for the economy to grow, 
as they create conditions for the growth of economies of scale. He also argues that the 
central point of the new functional economic geography is that dynamic interaction 
between geographical market potentials and firms creates a comparative advantage for 
regions, in the form of localised increasing returns of scale.  
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Modern theories for endogenous regional growth, support Malecki’s theoretical 
framework. These theories are based on the assumption that regional policies can 
influence regional growth by intervening in internal conditions. Therefore, regional 
development policies should deal with conditions that must be developed and 
implemented, with local and regional knowledge at the foundation of regional 
development programmes, even though financial support can be sourced from outside the 
region. This approach, however, requires capacity adaptation of material and immaterial 
resources, such as human capital, real capital, infrastructure capital and so on. In regions 
where the scope of adaptation is large, endogenous development processes progress at a 
slow pace. In those cases, Malecki (2002) observes that opportunities to fight delays in 
capacity adaptation and to create conditions for economic growth should be found in long-
term credible regional development policy, based on policies formulated to create regional 
growth conditions able to reduce the market’s uncertainty.  
Finally, Oinas and Malecki (1999) underline the point that the strength of any local, 
regional or national innovation system, lies not only in its internal synergies and 
interactions, but also in its high level of access to knowledge elsewhere. 
New technologies provide the infrastructure for global networks of communication 
and have led to the formation of a global economy based on networking. Castells and 
Himanen (2014) refer to networking as the organisational transformation which 
characterises informationalism. Networking creates unprecedented flexibility and 
efficiency in processes such as management, production, distribution and exchange, which 
have resulted in increased productivity growth from the mid-1990s onwards, and the rise 
of the so-called “new economy” which had its structural crisis in 2008.  
Competitiveness of territories became largely dependent on their ability to follow 
the rules of the informational economy, such as creating value through transforming 
information into knowledge. Informationalism created a new geography of production and 
appropriation of wealth around the world, based on the ICT revolution (Castells and 
Himanen, 2014). Although a substantial body of academic literature provides evidence of 
the positive relationship between informationalism, productivity and competitiveness for 
countries, regions and business firms, Castells and Himanen (2014) believe this 
relationship only functions if organisational change takes the form of networking, and if it 
is accompanied by an improvement in the quality of human labour, which is dependent on 
education and quality of life. 
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2.4 Regional integration and infrastructure development 
Although there has been increased academic interest in the relationship between SADC 
regionalism and infrastructure development (see, for instance, Mulaudzi, 2006), few 
studies specifically address the matter in the context of ICT infrastructure development.  
Studies on regional infrastructure and market integration in the East African 
Community (EAC) argue that inadequate or poor regional infrastructure networks 
represent a barrier to economic regional integration because they raise cross-border 
transaction costs, and therefore limit competitiveness and economic growth (Kessides, 
2012). Furthermore, the success of trade policy reforms is linked to the effectiveness of 
measures to remove infrastructure bottlenecks, which represent “supply-side constraints” 
(Kessides, 2012). 
Ndulo (1999) asserts that SADC’s approach to integration is not based on the 
development of infrastructure and production any more than orthodox trade liberation 
strategies are based on the elimination of tariffs. In SADC’s view, the greatest barrier to 
trade in Africa is lack of infrastructure.  
Asante is one of the few scholars who have studied this relationship. In his study on 
regionalism (1997), he considers the SADCC approach to the allocation of resources for 
infrastructure development a successful example of policy formulation and regional 
ability to prioritise objectives and actions, as opposed to market integration. 
Maimbo, Strychacz, and Saranga (2010), in their study on facilitating cross-border 
mobile banking in southern Africa, point out that the development of the 
telecommunications sector in southern Africa is uneven. According to them, South Africa 
and Namibia are relatively developed. In those countries, the fibre-optic terrestrial 
backbone is widespread and they have direct access to sub-marine cables. In other 
countries, such as Zambia, Angola and Malawi, the telecommunications sector is still 
characterized by the monopoly of state-owned operators and service providers. 
Furthermore, their telecommunications infrastructure is very limited, since they have to 
rely on expensive satellite links for international bandwidth. 
As a spill-over of the policy objective of continental integration, African leaders 
acknowledge that to be successful, economic integration also requires physical integration. 
Therefore, a key component of the NEPAD is to support Africa’s infrastructure 
development (ECA and AU, 2006). In particular, NEPAD emphasises the importance of 
regional economic communities to achieve African integration. In addition, NEPAD 
stresses the importance of pooling resources to provide regional public goods and 
rationalising the institutional framework for regional integration in Africa (ECA and AU, 
2006). 
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2.4.1 Economics of ICT infrastructure industries 
Extensive and efficient infrastructure is an essential driver of competitiveness (World 
Economic Forum, 2014). Development economists assert that the reinforcement of the 
existing regional infrastructure would create conditions for the development of the 
economies of member states that belong to an economic community (Ndulo, 1999). In a 
geographically isolated region such as the SADC, a seamless telecommunications 
infrastructure reduces the effect of distance between countries, fostering the integration of 
national markets at a regional level and connecting them to markets in other regions all 
over the world at a low cost. In addition, the quality and extensiveness of infrastructure 
networks significantly impact economic growth and reduce income inequalities and 
poverty in a variety of ways (World Economic Forum, 2014). In this regard, a reliable 
communications infrastructure is considered a prerequisite for low-income communities 
to connect to core economic activities and basic services. 
A solid and extensive telecommunications network allows for a rapid and low cost 
flow of information, which increases overall economic efficiency by helping to ensure 
that businesses can communicate, and that decisions made by economic actors take into 
account all available relevant information.  
Most African policy-makers recognise the need for reforms to attract foreign direct 
investment, especially in the infrastructure sector. Investment in telecommunications 
infrastructure in particular has a positive effect on economic growth in many ways. For 
instance, Canning (1999) shows that investment in telecommunications is substantially 
more productive than investment on average, due to the existence of externalities. As it 
has a direct and indirect effect on production-making, its multiplied effect on GDP is 
bigger. Norton (1992) argues that both the fixed costs of acquiring information and the 
variable costs of participation in the market are lowered by an improvement in the ICT 
sector. 
Jipp (1963) identifies a positive association between telecommunications 
infrastructure and economic growth. Hardy (1980), using two different groups of 45 
countries in his sample, and dividing them into developed and less developed countries, 
estimates that there is a larger benefit for less-developed countries than developed 
countries. 
Dholoakia and Harlem (1994) also investigated the relationship between the two 
variables, finding empirical evidence for a strong and positive relationship, with great 
returns in developing countries. However, according to Röller and Waverman (2001), 40 
percent of the population connected to voice services is the critical mass threshold that 
must be reached before the network effects are realised, allowing viable commercial 
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innovations such as mobile banking and employment of agricultural information services, 
to drive economic growth and development.  
More recently, Koutroumpis (2009), through econometric modelling, demonstrates 
the existence of several levels of return from broadband infrastructure, based on the level 
of penetration. He asserts that there is evidence of a critical mass phenomenon in 
broadband infrastructure investments, and the penetration level that he identifies is a 
critical mass of 20 percent of the population connected to the network. His study refers to 
OECD countries, but it can be extended to the African context since he uses standard 
parameters to calculate it, such as GPD, level of education, broadband penetration and 
prices, etc. According to him, this percentage creates a vision for countries to capitalise 
the beneficial effects that the network can provide and it also implies a 0.89% aggregate 
growth rate due to broadband externalities. Moreover, the World Bank asserts that in low- 
and middle-income countries, every 10 percentage point increase in broadband 
penetration accelerates economic growth by 1.38 percentage points. The economic growth 
associated with the increase in broadband penetration is even higher when compared with 
the penetration of other telecommunications services, such as fixed or mobile phone (Kim, 
Kelly & Raja, 2010). 
Broadband access improves the productivity of businesses, supports the creation of 
new products and services and accelerates innovation. Katz (2012) describes the direct 
and indirect economic impact of broadband deployment: directly through jobs created by 
deploying broadband infrastructure, and indirectly as a result of “spill-over” externalities, 
such as increased productivity and new products and services. 
According to Williams (2009), many policy-makers in sub-Saharan Africa consider 
access to broadband a key driver of economic and social development. He remarks that 
the limited availability of low-cost backbone capacity is one of the factors constraining 
sub-Saharan Africa’s development of broadband connectivity. Williams (2009) describes 
the process of providing communications services as a supply chain. He splits the supply 
chain of communications infrastructure into six layers, where each layer of the chain 
interconnects with the above layer in order to provide communications service.  
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Figure 2.1: The Supply Chain for Communications. Source: Williams, 2009. 
 
At the top of the chain he puts international connectivity, which provides 
connectivity to the rest of the world. At the second and third level are the regional and 
national (domestic) backbones. While the regional link connects from the border to the 
nearest connection to the rest of the world, the domestic backbone provides 
communications service at a national level. The fourth level represents the intelligence of 
the network, and it has the role of routing traffic through the national network. At the 
downstream of the chain, the access layers, usually through xDSL, cable or wireless 
networks, link the customers to the networks and the bottom of the chain.  
2.4.2 Convergence and ICT ecosystem 
The OECD (2007) observes that the converged and next generation network (NGN) 
environment will bring about a radical change in the relationship between network layers 
(transport infrastructure, transport services and control, and content services and 
applications). According to the organisation, in a NGN environment, services will be 
independent of the underlying transport infrastructure. In this converged network, 
applications are disconnected from the physical infrastructure and applications are 
provided directly at service level, allowing multiple service providers to enter the market 
on a technologically non-discriminatory basis. Kim, Kelly and Raja (2010), extend the 
definition of broadband beyond the traditional notion of a specific network. They suggest 
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that broadband can be viewed as an “ecosystem” that includes not only networks but also 
applications and services that the network carries, and more active users. 
Research ICT Africa (2012) expands the eco-systemic perspective to ICT in general, 
and links access and affordability of ICT to policy and regulatory constraints, to 
institutional arrangements, up to global and regional governance, structure and processes.  
 
Figure 2.2: ICT ecosystem. Source: Research ICT Africa, 2013 (adapted from Gillwald, 
2012). 
 
RIA’s ICT ecosystem (adapted from Gillwald, 2012) “places users, citizens and 
consumers at the centre of the system. Access by them, and their ability to afford the 
networks, services, applications, and content, determines the degree of their inclusion in 
the ecosystem or their exclusion from it. The factors that link these elements and affect 
access and affordability are pricing and quality of service (QoS). These, in turn, are an 
outcome of market structure and regulation, which are themselves determined by the 
policy and legal framework. The framework is the product of the state at a national level, 
and increasingly of international governance institutions such as the ICANN, the ITU and 
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2.4.3 Financing public or common goods 
Chaponda (2011, in CABRI, 2011) investigates regional telecommunications 
infrastructures in terms of Regional Public Good (RPG).51 In public finance, a public good 
is defined as being both non-competitive and non-excludable with respect to the benefits it 
offers.52 This definition applies only to ‘pure public goods’. However, there are also 
impure public goods where benefits generated are shared between two or more countries, 
but where the good is only partially non-competitive, or displays only partial non-
excludability, or both. In this case, we refer to club goods or joint products. For instance, 
supply internet connectivity is a joint product.  










Fish stocks, timber, coal 
Non-rivalries Club goods Cinemas, private parks, satellite 
TV 
Public goods 
Free-to-air television, air, 
national defence 
Source: Buchanan, 1965; Samuelson, 1954; Water, 2004. 
Similarly, the undersea cable Eastern African Submarine Cable System (EASSy) is 
a club good. It is possible to exclude users from accessing the cable (excludability) and it 
partially displays non-rivalry (Chaponda, 2011, in CABRI, 2011). The infrastructure was 
developed by a public-private partnership (PPP) involving governments and 
telecommunications operators, and Development Finance Institutions (DFI) substantially 
finance it.53  
With regard to issues of funding the development of impure public goods, the 
exclusion of benefits is a key determinant in financing the good (Chaponda 2011, in 
CABRI, 2011). Club-like structures support monitoring users and allow the charging of 
usage fees. However, where exclusion is only partial, the public sector may play a role in 
                                       
51 Regional Public Goods are the anchor for the economic integration agenda in Africa (Chaponda, in CABRI, 
2011). They are defined as ‘any good, commodity, service, system of rules or policy regime that is public in 
nature and that generates shared benefits for the participating countries and whose production is the result of 
collective action by the participating countries (Estevadeordal et al., 2004, in CABRI, 2011). 
52 Non-excludability means that when a pure public good is created or supplied, it is not possible to exclude 
additional users from the benefits it generates. Non-rivalry means that the additional user or beneficiary of the 
service does not reduce the benefit enjoyed by existing users. 
53 EASSy is 90% African-owned and it is financed by substantial investment from Development Financial 
Institutions (DFIs) including World Bank/IFC, EIB, AfDB, AFD and DfW. Total DFI investment is 
apparently $70.7 million, with $18.2 million coming from IFC and 14.5 million from AfDB (Song, 2012). 
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providing some initial grant-funding to counter the perceived risk. When there is a large 
share of excludable benefits, it appears to be easier to finance a regional good. In 
particular, the greater the country-specific benefits derived from the commodity or service, 
the greater the likelihood the country will finance it. When exclusion from the benefits of 
accessing the good is inadequate and private provision is not feasible, public provision 
and public financing is applicable (Chaponda, 2011, in CABRI, 2011). Therefore, donors 
and multilaterals should focus on non-excludable RPGs, where the overall level of the 
public good supplied equals the sum of the country’s contributions.  
The Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation (RASCOM)54 is an 
intergovernmental treaty-based organisation which was established in 1993. Its prime 
objective is to provide, on a commercial basis, the satellite capacity required for national 
and international public telecommunications services, including radio and television 
broadcasting in Africa. However, since its inception, the project has been characterised by 
both technical and financial problems. Private participation in the project was limited to 
ALCATEL’s 12% shareholder participation, representing a limited financial risk. 
According to Chaponda (2011, in CABRI, 2011), there is a need to inject greater private 
sector participation in order to improve the technical and financial performance of the 
project. This can be done through revamping the capital structure to introduce more 
commercial sources of finance, to improve skills and to leverage more developed African 
countries. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The previous sections have highlighted that regional ICT infrastructure represents a 
determinant of regional competitiveness. Regional ICT infrastructure improves general 
macroeconomic capacity (Porter, 1998), as it is a factor of production. It cuts interaction 
costs in a regional marketplace when transaction procedures are standardised, and the 
relevant technology is exploited. It creates conditions of economic growth as it supports 
economies of scale (Malecki, 2002). However, geographical transaction costs, the 
standardisation of transaction procedures and the exploitation of the relevant technology 
are also determined by national and regional communications policies (Gillwald and Stork, 
2008).  
The next chapter discusses theories of regionalism and the main concepts that have 
been used to construct the conceptual framework for this dissertation. The conceptual 
                                       
54 The system is partially competitive in nature since there would be a limit to the number of new beneficiary 
countries. Further, it is possible to exclude countries/users due to the membership nature of the organisation. 
However, once a country has joined RASCOM, the citizens benefit only if local infrastructure and access 
points are in place at a national level. 
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framework has been developed to analyse the empirical evidence collected by means of a 




CHAPTER 3 – AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES ON 
REGIONALISM 
This chapter describes the theories and concepts that have been used to build the 
theoretical and conceptual framework, including the epistemological and ontological 
approaches. It identifies the theories used to build the conceptual framework.  
While the conceptual and theoretical framework of this thesis draws on institutional 
theory in the political economy tradition it aligns more with international political 
economy that has emerged from the more classical focus on state and market relations, 
The study is concerned with the investigation of what is the role of regional institutions in 
shaping regional telecommunications market structures and outcomes (Palan, 2013).  
Ontologically, the research approach adopted is that of praxis in the sense that the 
paradigm adopted is realistic and practical. The focus of the analysis is on how regional 
public policy in the realm of telecommunications infrastructure development is created 
and implemented. In this sense, the SADC has not being studied in terms of its 
‘territoriality’, although references have been made to it; but rather as a ‘policy-driven’ 
framework. A political economy approach has been adopted first to explore how southern 
African regional institutions developed in a specific political economic system of 
regionalization within the global economy, which in Chapter 1 has been referred to as 
“regionalism” (Söderbaum, 2004; Mugabe, 2006); and second, to study the interplay 
between regional institutional arrangements and telecommunications markets (§1.2, § 1.4, 
§ 1.6). The Ph.D. thesis relates policy developments in the SADC case to the international 
developments in the telecommunication area with respect, first and foremost, to the WTO 
trade agreements and the influence of EU policies. The objective is not to compare 
telecommunications policy developments in the EU to the SADC case, but to explore how 
the EU model has influenced SADC structures and processes. 
In order to understand the complex nature of economic, legal and political relations 
of a developing region, and how regional institutions have developed in a specific social 
and economic system, the thesis has built a conceptual framework which draws from 
different theories on regionalism, institutional arrangements, and epistemic community.  
First, theories on new institutionalism (Immergut, 1998; Spruyt, 2013) have been 
used, from a theoretical point of view, to problematise the nature of regional institutions 
in a developing countries context, and in particular to provide a framework to understand 
how regional institutions have failed to create opportunities for the telecommunications 
sector to grow and expand in the SADC. In that context, institutional arrangements 
analysis (North, 1990) critically revealed why there is a discrepancy between institutional 
rules (i.e. constitutional, policy and regulatory framework) and the implementation of 
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these rules at an organisational level. Levy and Spiller’s approach (1994) to the 
investigation of the determinants of the performance of privatised telecommunication 
utilities has been used in order to contextualise the analysis in specific political 
circumstances. 
Second, theories on democracy and market reform/performance in developing 
countries context (Khan, 2002, 2005) and specifically in the regional integration 
arrangements of southern Africa (Taylor, 2002), were used to assess why SADC countries 
are characterised by weak factor-driven elements, and why the interaction between 
political and regulatory institutions has affected the conditions for investment in 
telecommunications market (Levy and Spiller, 1994).  
Third, an epistemic community approach (Haas, 1992) to regionalism has been 
adopted to understand the role played by external experts in shaping regional policy and 
regulatory processes. The relationships between regional structures and external 
communities of experts have not been merely explained as technical assistance and 
capacity building programmes, but as a political project for foreign affairs in regional 
cooperation. 
The following section summarizes Pentland’s efforts to theorise the process of 
regional integration within the political science subfield of international relations. His 
approach to the theory of integration allows an analysis of the SADC as a policy-induced 
process of integration in terms of structures and processes.  
3.1 Theories on regionalism 
Policy-induced regionalisation, or regionalism (Mugabe, 2006), has played an important 
role in the creation of regional integration agreements. Pentland (1973) describes the 
policy-induced process of integration in terms of structures and processes. In particular, 
he distinguishes four approaches to integrative structures and processes. The first one is 
the pluralist approach. According to this framework, a pluralist community of states 
mutually regulates behaviours among independent ‘subsystems’ within an international 
system. The integration process relies on its ability to sustain the growth of interdependent 
relationships and informal structures through a high degree of communication and 
interaction at all levels of society. The process requires a firm basis of social, economic, 
and cultural ties amongst stakeholders. Within pluralistic theorisation, it is possible to 
identify a reaffirmation of national sovereignty functions, seen as necessary to regulate 
diplomatic relationships.  
The second approach to integrative structures and processes identified by Pentland 
(1973), is referred to as functionalism. Two exponents of this approach are Mitrany 
(1966) and Claude (1971). They assert that the ultimate goal of integration is the creation 
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of cross-national organisations, which perform most of the traditional welfare functions of 
national-states. Within this cross-national network, sovereignty functions are delegated 
from a national to a regional level. National states establish a regional administrative 
framework in order to fulfil community needs and the objective of peaceful integration in 
the international system. Therefore, according to the functionalist theory, while national 
states are not seen as a barrier to integration, they are considered a hindrance to the 
fulfilment of common welfare needs. The regional integrated system is more appropriate 
to meet most human needs and to respond to technological changes. According to the 
functionalist approach, there is no rigid formula or blueprint for integration. Integration, 
in its functional dimension – particularly economic dimension – gradually but decisively 
influences other dimensions, namely social and political behaviour, and thus induces 
change, first in behaviour and attitudes, then ultimately in decision-making processes and 
structures. In the functionalist approach, the state is challenged, but only in the area 
concerned with the provision of material welfare.  
The third theoretical framework Pentland refers to as neo-functionalism and is 
based on the emergence of regional economic organisations (Nye, 1971). According to 
this framework, relationships between states are subject to bargaining over scarce 
economic resources. In order to manage scarce resources, states create supranational 
institutions. The integration process is directed by supranational states that select an 
economic sector that is politically important to the integration process. Nye (1970) 
investigates the conditions under which such an integration process can arise. He 
identifies the following prerequisites: the development of increasingly functional linkages 
of tasks and flows or transactions; the development of deliberate linkages and coalitions; 
the formation of economic pressure groups at a regional level and the involvement of 
external actors; the emergence of a regional ideology and thus the intensification of 
regional identity; and finally, the socialisation of elites. The theory underlines the 
importance of regional institutions, which are considered more effective in solving 
common problems than national states. Although regional institutions are founded by 
national states through the neo-functionalist process, they develop self-organised interests 
after their foundation. Therefore they become functional for the creation of political spill-
over and establish a new regional group identity (Söderbaum, 2004). 
Neo-functionalism assumes the existence of a regional political culture, which 
permits non-ideological politics to be practiced. Political integration is not a condition but 
a process of change, which leads to some sort of supranational political community based 
on a common understanding among emerging elites, and a shift in attitudes towards a new 
centre of authority. The supranational system is in charge of allocating material benefits 
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and provides internal and external physical security, becoming the prime focus of political 
loyalties and expectations (Söderbaum, 2004: 22). 
The neo-functionalist school of thought (Haas, 1958; Mattli, 1999; Hurrel, 1995; 
Söderbaum, 2004) recognises the importance of non-state actors, such as interest groups 
and social movements, in the process of regional integration.  
The last approach to integrative structures and processes Pentland identifies is 
federalism. According to this theory, integration is considered a political phenomenon, 
generally understood as a formal division of powers between levels of regional 
government and a supranational state. In a federal system, it is up to foreign policy elites 
to decide which form and degree of integration is acceptable. According to the federalist 
approach, integration is no longer a process but an end-state (Pentland, 1973). 
Different schools of thought distinguish between old and new regionalism. 
According to Shaw (2002), new regionalism is characterised by a trio of heterogeneous 
actors. Those actors are: the states, such as official governmental organisations at a local 
and global level including UN agencies; economic structures including not only 
multinationals but also informal and illegal sectors; and civil society organisations and 
grassroots movements, such as indigenous and international NGOs, charities, cooperatives, 
media and professional associations (Shaw, 2002). Within this new structure, states, 
interstate organisations, companies and civil society are bound together in trilateral 
relations. Therefore, according to the new regionalism theory, non-state entities and non-
formal interactions play a determining role in shaping the way a region is organised. 
The SADC region is governed by the 1992 Treaty, which requires it to coordinate, 
harmonise and rationalise SADC countries’ policies and strategies for regionally 
sustainable development (§ 5.1). Although its decisions, policies and agreements entered 
into under the auspice of SADC are legally binding, and the organisation has the 
necessary legal instruments to enforce such decisions, the SADC Secretariat only partially 
acts as a supra-national authority whose decisions that are binding on the member states 
are limited (Balassa, 1961). In fact, as discussed below, only protocols are binding legal 
documents for SADC member countries, and the SADC does not have well established 
infringement procedures in place for national states that not implement protocol 
requirements. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that although the SADC has established 
regional institutions for its governance, in reality the region is a pluralist community of 
states and its integration process relies on formal and informal relationships. In the region, 
national sovereignty functions are reaffirmed, and as emerged from the empirical 
evidence in Chapter 6, they are predominant in the regulation of diplomatic relationships. 
Nevertheless, it is a regional economic organisation as it has established supranational 
institutions in charge of managing regional scarce resources, through an harmonisation 
 84 
process directed by regional institutions that have selected a few key economic sectors 
which are politically important to the integration process. 
As this thesis is concerned with policy and regulatory structures, theories on 
institutional arrangements have been drawn in the conceptual framework to assess their 
impacts on policy reforms. The following paragraph reviews North’s (1990), and Levy 
and Spiller’s (1994) approaches to institutional analysis and discusses how the theories 
have been used in the analysis. 
3.1.1 Institutional arrangements 
North’s (1990) approach to institutional arrangement analysis is more political than the 
traditional economic approach. He suggests investigating institutions in terms of how they 
change over time and considers how that impacts on the economic performance of a 
country. Using the theory of institutional change, North (1990 and 1994) explains the 
impact of institutional incremental changes on policy reforms. North makes an important 
distinction between institutions and organisations. According to him, although both are 
important parts of the structural framework supporting interactions in a society, 
institutions set the rules, while organisations are the players. The main purpose of 
institutions is to define how organisations are supposed to implement the rules set by 
institutions. Organisations include different groups of individuals who have common 
interests, goals and objectives; these include trade unions, government agencies and 
political parties. As North (1990) argues, organisations can be the agents for institutional 
change. 
Levy and Spiller (1994), intheir investigation of the determinants of the 
performance of privatised telecommunication utilities, assert that institutional analysis 
needs to be contextualised in specific political and social circumstances. They conclude 
that in developing countries, the interaction between political and regulatory institutions 
can affect the conditions for investment in privatised telecommunication utilities and 
therefore, sector outcomes. 
The thesis partially adopts North’s approach to institutional arrangement analysis in 
the sense that in-depth interviews have been conducted in order to examine how rules (i.e. 
institutions, protocols, model laws and model bills) have been defined and adopted by 
member states and other regional organisations. In this sense, it is concerned with 
institutional incremental changes as it is expected that the process of legal and regulatory 
harmonisation is incremental as overtime it may bring about changes to the regional 
political economy landscape. Building on this and specifically in relation to 
telecommunications reform, the thesis draws on Levy and Spiller’s investigation of the 
determinants of the performance of telecommunications markets, as it is concerned with 
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the interaction between political and regulatory institutions and on how they affect the 
conditions for investment.  
The next section highlights the value of an epistemic community approach to the 
study of regionalism and specifically of ICT policy and regulatory practices in the SADC 
region. 
3.1.2 An epistemic community approach to regionalism 
Regional structures and processes in low- and middle-income countries are normally 
shaped and supported by a network of developmental practitioners, consultants and 
academics, who share a system of values and beliefs, mostly drawing from Western 
democracies and mature economies (Gillwald, 2014). This community of experts, which 
has a considerable impact in terms of shaping the development of regional policies and 
regulatory frameworks in the global south, is referred to in the literature, as “epistemic 
community”. 
Haas (1992) defines epistemic communities as “networks of knowledge-based 
experts” whose relations are based on a shared and consensual interest and knowledge 
base. According to him, policy and decision-makers have to deal with a broad and 
complex range of issues and therefore look for advice from epistemic communities, under 
conditions of uncertainty, to support the identification of national interests. These 
professionals have recognised policy-relevant expertise and competence in a particular 
domain, based on shared values, beliefs and system of knowledge. 55  Epistemic 
communities provide support in international policy coordination, when uncertainties 
about strategies for solutions of a state’s particular issues require coordination of the 
policy choices of different states. The information generated by the epistemic community 
is neither guesswork nor pure data, but is the result of interpretations of social and 
physical phenomena (Haas, 1992). The influence of epistemic communities grows as 
decision-makers delegate responsibility to them, until they consolidate their bureaucratic 
power through the institutionalisation of their views into broader international politics. 
Transnational knowledge-based networks, at an international organisational level, have 
been involved not only in shaping agendas but also in the definition of state interests 
(Haas, 1992).  
                                       
55 Haas (1992) identifies a few characteristics of epistemic communities, including a shared set of normative 
beliefs providing a value-based rationale for social action; shared causal beliefs; shared notions of validity 
internally recognised; and a common policy enterprise in the form of a set of common practices associated 
with a set of problems. In addition to those, other characteristics are: a shared way of knowledge; shared 
patterns of reasoning; a policy project drawing on shared values; shared causal beliefs; and a shared 
commitment to the application of the production of knowledge. 
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From a regional perspective, policy-makers, especially in developing countries, 
have failed to understand complex linkages between domestic national goals and 
international goals, in a regional space which is increasingly economy-interdependent. In 
this interdependent economic system, policy coordination among countries is required to 
achieve domestic goals, and domestic agendas and regional agendas have become 
increasingly linked. Therefore, in order to fill this knowledge and expertise gap, regional 
policy-makers look for the help of experts who are able to understand interlinkages 
between policies related to different issues, as well as link policy recommendations to 
their expected outcomes. 
Within the broader institutional theory and political economy framework, an 
epistemic community approach to the study of regionalism and ICT sector development 
has been adopted to empirically analyse how the actors involved in regional ICT 
policymaking have concretely shaped concrete policy developments and implementation.  
3.1.3 Capacity-building as a political project for foreign affairs 
Epistemic communities fulfill their role by providing technical knowledge and expertise – 
and less and less financial resources - through technical assistance in the development and 
implementation of policies in different domains, and through capacity-building for policy-
makers, technical and administrative staff from regional organisations and national 
member states.  
In recent years, capacity-building strategies and techniques have been used to 
address state failures in terms of poor governance and weak state capacity (Hameiri, 
2009). However, due to the failure of many state-building programmes, especially in post-
conflict states, normative assumptions on capacity-building have been questioned. Instead 
of establishing a sustainable framework for governance, as many of these programmes 
should do, capacity-building activities often end up as “stopgap measures” (Hameiri, 
2009:56). His studies focus on fragile state-building. The failure of programmes to 
support fragile states has resulted in the focus of these programmes changing from 
capacity-building to improving human security. Structural and political limitations affect 
state-building agendas in their current manifestation. According to Hameiri (2009), state 
capacity, rather than being an objective and technical measure of performance that can be 
“built”, constitutes a political and ideological mechanism to implement projects of state 
transnationalisation, since the notion of state capacity implicitly masks a set of social and 
political relationships and the institutional arrangements supportive of them. 
Contemporary notions of state-building are shaped by a ‘neoliberal institutionalist’ 
concept of state capacity. Also, capacity-building, despite its technocratic attributes, 
constitutes a political project with identifiable political and ideological values that 
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attempts to establish a certain relationship between rulers and ruled (Hameiri, 2009). 
Therefore, it has limited impact on delivering the outcomes sought by those providing the 
intervention in terms of increasing local knowledge and technical skills. 
3.1.4 Regionalism and democracy in developing countries 
Approaching regional ICT policy development from a political economy perspective 
requires an understanding of how power dynamics play out in southern African countries  
which are officially democracies and share some of the characteristics of democracies in 
developing countries, captured in the literature.  
In that respect, Taylor (2002) observes that in the regional integration arrangements 
(RIAs) of southern Africa, it is likely that the dominant state usually drives the regionalist 
project. For instance, he reveals that Pretoria’s elites played a predominant role in 
promoting and rejuvenating the SADCC, while at the same time pressing for an economic 
and political transformation. 
President Thabo Mbeki’s ‘African Renaissance’ dream (Taylor, 2002), was based 
on the idea that economic growth of national economies within southern Africa required a 
regional project based on regional integration, which conformed to notions of good 
governance, democracy and liberalised markets. Mbeki’s regional project was aimed at 
developing the southern African region as an attractive destination for local and 
international capital. Within this project, the regional block could only reach its full 
economic potential through the harmonisation of trade practices, bringing national states 
closer together as a more uniform, larger market. The regional project was supported by a 
strategic partnership between the government of Pretoria, South African-based 
corporations and transnational capital (Taylor, 2002). Bulger (n.d., in Taylor, 2002) points 
out that South Africa’s regional effort was a strategy to attract investment and increase 
trade opportunities. Integrating national economies meant improving the penetration of 
South African capital in neighbouring countries. In this regional project, an implicit aspect 
was to bind national states together in a regional regulatory framework under South 
African leadership (Lieberman, 1997, in Taylor, 2002).  
However, difficulties to achieve the market reform project are related to the fact 
that some state administrations in southern Africa are unattractive to South African and 
international capital, since they are still based upon authoritarian and personalised rules.  
Khan (2005) observes that democracy in developing countries does not result in a 
significant change in the economic characteristics of these countries, which are 
characterised by a large informal economy and widespread non-market accumulation 
processes. In particular, democracy does not ensure the elimination of instability in 
property rights, rent seeking, or political corruption. He warns that in several cases, state 
 88 
failures, such as the inability to set goals for economic growth in developing economies, 
are due to the fact that policy priority given to democratisation has diverted the 
developmental agenda from far more important priorities. The objective of interventions 
related to development should not be democracy per se, but the creation of necessary 
conditions to achieve the wealth “required for making democracy both more sustainable 
and capable of delivering real decision-making powers to societies” (Khan, 2005: 2). 
According to Khan (2005), electoral competition in developing countries has failed 
to include the poor in government preferences because political patronage has superior 
organisational power. In particular, he points out that political patronage is a feature that 
explains the relationship between democracy and market performance in developing 
countries. For instance, internal political stability in a developing country is not sustained 
primarily through fiscal policy, but mainly through accommodating off-budget interests of 
factions organised along political patronage lines. Khan (2005) explains that in 
developing countries, clients agree to provide political support to patrons in exchange for 
payoffs. Features of the relationship between democracy and market performance in 
developing countries include: the personalisation of politics by faction leaders and the 
organisation of politics into a competition between factions.  
In addition, Chabal and Daloz (1999, in Khan, 2005) argue that patrimonialism and 
political patronage in Africa have survived the transition to democracy and that client-
patron networks continue to operate (Khan, 2005). Therefore in developing countries, 
factions in power control state power to generate rents. The patron can therefore divert 
political power to capture public resources. He further stresses that in developing 
countries, the state does not only play the role of service delivery, but also is instrumental 
in allowing different groups, such as contending classes and entrepreneurs, to use 
resources to drive transformation in specific directions (Khan, 2002).  
3.1.5 Regionalism and economic integration 
As indicated above, the conceptual framework also hinges on Pentland’s approach (1973) 
to the policy-induced process of integration in terms of structures and process. Through 
his explanatory framework, it is possible to assess the scope of the regional integration of 
the SADC and to discuss the level of regional integration achieved at a policy and 
regulatory level. In addition, the thesis draws on Shaw’s definition of new regionalism 
(2002), which identifies the main actors involved in regional integration structures and 
processes. 
The research seeks to understand the role of epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) in 
shaping the regional debate on ICT policy and regulation, and the design, implementation 
and evaluation of ICT programmes for the SADC region. It critically examines capacity-
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building programmes through Hameiri’s (2009) lens of foreign policy affairs. The 
political economy analysis of SADC assumes Khan’s (2002) discussion on democracy in 
developing countries, which according to him, does not result in significant changes in the 
economic characteristics of these countries, since it does not assume the elimination of 
political corruption, the elimination of property rights, instability or rent seeking. This 
research partially draws on Balassa’s theoretical framework of stages of economic 
integration, as it does not seek to evaluate the level of regional integration reached by 
SADC, but rather evaluate the political economy dimensions of integrations, focusing on 
institutions, policy and regulatory frameworks to examine the linkages between these 
elements. Therefore, regional macro-economic indicators are only of value in the critical 
examination and discussion of the development of regional regulatory processes within 
their specific political-economic framework. In SADC, policies for the development of a 
regional ICT infrastructure have been formulated with the aim of fostering the integration 
of national markets.56 
The following section presents the theoretical approach adopted by the thesis. The 
chapter concludes with the conceptual framework which has been developed on the 
concepts described above. 
3.2 Theoretical approach 
The selection of a paradigm57 for this research is based on the belief system that has 
guided the planning phase - and was refined during the research phase – which not only 
guided the construction of my theoretical and methodological approach, but also the 
ontological and epistemological aspects. 
Due to the interdisciplinary approach (Choi and Pak, 2006) required for such 
research, and to the practical implications accompanying policy research, the thesis 
assumes a political economy perspective and the approach is praxis in the sense that the 
paradigm adopted is realistic and practical as opposed to theoretical and existential. Praxis 
“refers to human activity and specifically to the free and creative activity by which people 
produce and change the world” (Mosco, 2009:34). The word praxis was used by Aristotle 
to distinguish economic, political and ethical studies from theory and poiesis, and to 
emphasise the goal of action.  
Praxis is important to the epistemological premises of political economy as it 
guides the theory of knowledge, viewing knowledge as the ongoing product of theory and 
                                       
56 Cooperation in infrastructure development, including telecommunications, is considered one of the main 
methods of the SADC to achieve regional integration (Telecommunications Policies for SADC, 1998). 
57  Paradigms can be defined “as basic belief systems based on ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumptions” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:107).  
 90 
practice. In opposition to more theoretical approaches, such as social change and 
historical transformation, social totality and moral philosophy,58 praxis is more concerned 
with practical activities and with the interactive processes of conception and execution. It 
accommodates the need to understand sources of wealth and productivity in order to 
advise elites, businesses and governments on appropriate trade, welfare and industrial 
policies.  
3.2.1 Epistemological and ontological approaches 
The epistemological principles59 guiding the thesis are based on realist, inclusive and 
constitutive values. The epistemology60 is realist because it assumes that reality is made 
up of concepts and social practices. It is also inclusive in the sense that it rejects the 
tendency to reduce all social practices to a single political or economic explanation. 
Furthermore, the selection of concepts and theories does not pretend that those that have 
been chosen are the only ways to understand reality. The epistemology is constitutive as it 
acknowledges that it is difficult to assert relationships of causal determination. In that 
sense, social life is a set of “mutually constitutive processes, whose units act on one 
another in various stages of formation, and with a direction and impact that can only be 
described in specific research” (Mosco, 2009:128). 
From a theoretical approach point of view, the research adopts a new 
institutionalist 61  approach, specifically that of historical institutionalism. This is to 
overcome limits of analysis when institutional arrangements are viewed purely as 
structures and processes. Thus the thesis focuses on the relations between politics, state 
and society in a specific historical period (Immergut, 1998). According to the historical 
institutionalist approach, representation of the interests of citizens’ preferences is shaped 
by collective actors and institutions. Constitutions, political institutions, state structures, 
state interest, group relations and policy networks structure the political process. In order 
to understand the complexity of the relations between politics, state and society, the 
approach assumes that “political economies are structured by dense interactions among 
economic, social and political actors that work according to different logics in different 
                                       
58 The object of classical theorists like Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx was to 
identify both short-term and long-term cyclical patterns which impacted on fundamental changes in social 
systems, such as the transition from agricultural-based societies to commercial, manufacturing and then 
industrial societies, or to examine dynamic forces behind the growth of capitalism. 
59 Epistemology is an approach that allows one to understand how we know things (Mosco, 2009:128). 
60 Ontology describes a framework to understand the nature of being. 
61 New institutionalists propose different definitions of institution and adopt different research programmes 
and methodology. In that sense, the three main branches of scholarship – rational choice, organization theory 
and historical institutionalism – do not adhere to an overreaching theoretical framework. 
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contexts” (Immergut, 1998:17). In this sense, historical institutionalism stresses the 
importance of power and interests, and it examines how institutional arrangements of 
states and economies, and the connections between them, are affected by the political and 
economic context (Campbell, 2004). 
The construction of my inquiry paradigm is summarised in Table 3.1 below. The 
ontological approach, the epistemological approach and the theoretical approach support 
the development of this conceptual framework for the thesis. 
Table 3.1: Summary of the ontology, epistemology and theoretical approach 
Item Approach Characteristics 
Ontology  Political economy /Praxis Realist and practical 
paradigm; 
Knowledge is viewed as the 
ongoing product of theory 
and practice; 
Practically it is used to 
understand sources of 
wealth and productivity in 
order to advise decision-
makers on appropriate 
policies.  
Epistemology Realist It assumes that reality is 
made up of both concepts 
and social practices. 
Inclusive It rejects the reduction of all 
social practices to a single 
political economic 
explanation. 
Constitutive It acknowledges that it is 
difficult to assert 
relationships of causal 
determination. 
Theoretical approach  New institutionalism, 
historical institutionalism 
It focuses on the relations 
between politics, state, and 
society in a specific 
historical period; 
The representation of the 
interests of citizens’ 
preferences is shaped by 
collective actors and 
institutions. 
Source: Author’s own tabulation; Mosco, 2009; Immergut, 1998 
 
This research has been subject to the widest possible critical examination,62 which 
has facilitated appreciation of the phenomena. However, the reality discussed and 
                                       
62 This thesis not only has widely benefitted from continuous interaction and review meetings with my 
supervisor and with my PhD fellow Cecilia Matanga, formerly also involved in multilateral agency building 
African parliamentary capacity, it has also been presented and discussed in 2010 during the CPRafrica Young 
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analysed, no matter how deep, can only be understood imperfectly. This is due to many 
factors: including a multi-level and mutating regional governance and political and 
economic environment; global forces; complex and evolving international relations; and 
the dynamic nature of national and regional telecommunications markets with the advent 
of a converging environment and a mass mobile internet in Africa. 
Such an approach accommodates the subjective link between the research topic and 
the researcher. Being aware of this subjectivity and being reflective about it, enabled me 
to distance myself from my personal values and beliefs epistemologically. This approach 
is different from a critical theory epistemological approach, according to which the 
researcher is interactively linked to the subject investigated, and consequently the 
researcher’s values influence the subject under investigation. The thesis does not embrace 
a constructivist epistemological approach, which assumes that the findings are derived 
from interactive linkages between the researcher and the matter investigated (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994). Rather, particular attention has been placed on rigour and verification 
associated with critical traditions.  
The methodological approach is an outcome of the ontology and epistemology that 
underpin the dissertation. Information has been elicited through in-depth interaction with 
the main actors involved in the process of reforming regional ICT policies. This was 
possible due to my practical experience at SADC Parliamentary Forum, participating in 
conferences and workshops on policy formulation and regional integration, and through 
in-depth interviews with all the main actors involved in SADC ICT policymaking. The 
effectiveness of processes and structures in developing regional policy frameworks has 
been examined using conventional hermeneutical techniques, including qualitative 
analysis, triangulation, coding of the narrative discourse, and analysis of quantitative 
supply-side and demand-side ICT indicators where available. The intention has been to 
construct a convincing case, that is informed by hermeneutical and dialectical 
interpretations of research findings, coming from different qualitative and quantitative 
sources.  
3.3 Conceptual framework 
The political economy perspective adopted to conduct the research is based on practical 
and realistic paradigms, and it aims to create practical knowledge, in the sense that final 
                                                                                                         
Scholar Programme on ICT policy and regulatory research, Cape Town; twice at the Graduate School of 
Business, University of Cape Town; and it was presented at the International Telecommunications Society 
(ITS) PhD symposium held at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence in 2013. In addition, the 
version of the Ph.D. thesis submitted in February 2015 was reviewed by Dr Andrew Barendse, by Prof. Leo 
Van Audenhove, and by Prof. Anders Henten. All their comments and suggestions were integrated in the final 
thesis. 
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policy recommendations have been drafted in order to advise global, regional and national 
organisations on the appropriate policies to improve regional institutional arrangements. 
The. thesis aims at analysing how the institutions and actors involved in regional ICT 
policymaking influenced concrete policy outcomes and implementation in national 
member states. 
Regional issues are investigated not only conceptually but also practically, and 
regional dynamics are not explained only through a narrow political or economic 
approach. The thesis does not assert relationships of causal determination 63  but is 
concerned with the description of relations within the regional political economy, the 
interplay between multilateral, regional and national organisations, and the 
telecommunications markets in a specific historical period.  
Taking into account that economic integration is a way of fulfilling a political goal, 
and that economic integration is mainly based on political support of national states for 
free trade (Scheingold and Lindberg, 1970), the research builds a case study of regional 
policy-making based on Hameiri’s (2009) concept of state-building exercises as tools to 
transform fragile states. Capacity-building is viewed as a political mechanism of state 
transnationalisation, and therefore an instrument of foreign policy in southern African 
democracies (Khan, 2005). In that sense, technical assistance and capacity-building 
activities are not only technical undertakings, aimed at improving economic performance 
and social development, but are foreign policy tools which are used to advance national 
interests and norms (Pawlak, 2014). The conceptual framework of capacity-building, as a 
tool in foreign affairs, is used as a lens through which to examine the evidence collected 
through interviews with respondents involved in the regional process of developing an 
integrated ICT policy and regulatory framework. Through this conceptual framework, it is 
important to explain aspects of integration, such as institutional and policy integration, 
and relate such level of integration to their outputs. Institutions are created for the effects 
that they have on social and economic conditions, and therefore their mandate is evaluated 
in relation to the outcomes of government policies. This analytical approach goes beyond 
the observation of institutions. It therefore overcomes the limitations of an analysis that 
                                       
63 A few empirical studies investigated sequencing in telecommunications sector reform in terms of what 
comes first - liberalisation or privatisation - in order to obtain market efficiency. De Fraja (1994) asserts that 
the sequence of reforms is strongly influenced by both the economic and political preferences of governments. 
Noll (2000) suggests that the best choice among sequencing options, which most efficiently improves welfare 
and enhances market performance, is country-specific. However, Wallsten (2001) observes that privatisation 
partially improves the telecommunications sector only if supported by regulation, but is unable to test the 
relations between regulation and privatisation due to lack of data (Bagdadioglu and Cetinkaya, 2010).  
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correlates “the political significance of an integration process with its degree of formal 
institutionalisation” (Keohane and Nye, 1975: 375). 
The following figure depicts all the elements of the conceptual framework and it 
shows how they are linked to each other. 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework 
 
Figure 3.1 above shows a multi-level institutional arrangements which include not 
only regional organisations (i.e. SADC, CRASA, SABA, etc), but also multilateral 
organisations (ITU, EC, WTO, etc.) and national organisations (governments, regulators, 
etc). The different levels are linked by a formal set of rules set by policy, regulation and 
legislation and by informal linkages. The epistemic community interacts with both the 
international, regional, and national level, and the main tools used by this group of experts 
are capacity-building and technical assistance. These activities are not merely 
interventions of technical assistance and capacity building, but they are tools used in 
foreign policy-making, as they seek to influence policy outcomes based on shared values 
and beliefs, which promote a reform agenda based on the privatisation and liberalisation 
of telecommunications markets. Therefore, the conceptual framework includes as one 
element, capacity-building as a tool in foreign affairs, to analyse the evidence and to 
explain the role of epistemic communities, which through consulting, technical assistance 
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and lobbying, have infused the region with a reform agenda which is often informed by 
assumptions developed in mature markets and Western political systems. 
Institutional arrangements result in legal instruments that are supposed to help 
member states to efficiently regulate the sector. The outcomes of the institutional 
arrangement so described are ICT penetration, price and quality of service.  
The SADC political economy give rise to the institutional arrangements. The 
political economy approach is concerned with the investigation of what is the role of 
regional institutions in shaping regional telecommunications market structures and 
outcomes. Ontologically, the research approach is praxis in the sense that it aims at 
creating knowledge that can be practically used by policymakers and practitioners. 
3.3.1 Original contribution to the field of knowledge concerned with managing 
infrastructure reform and regulation 
The resulting research provides an original contribution to the fields of knowledge of both 
regionalism and ICT sector reform. Through an examination of the political economy 
underlying SADC policy and regulatory structures and processes the nature of ICT reform 
in a developing region is revealed.  Shaped by epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), and 
institutional capacity building which serve as tools for foreign affairs in determining  
subsequent regional ICT sector development  This framework is used to analyse the 
political, economic, institutional, policy and regulatory constraints hampering the 
development of an information society, from a developing region perspective.  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the theoretical framework, as well as its underlying 
definitional concepts, which has been used in the building of a case study. Through this 
conceptual framework, the empirical data will be assessed. 




CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter describes how the methodology has been applied in the selection and 
collection of relevant data, documents and information, as well as in analysis and 
interpretation. 
The study is conducted through a political economy perspective, which is based on 
practical and realistic paradigms because it aims not only to contribute to the theoretical 
debate on regionalism and ICT policy development, but also to create knowledge that can 
be practically used by policymakers and practitioners.  
The development of a regional ICT policy and regulatory framework for the 
economic growth and social development of southern African countries is investigated 
from the perspective of regional institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements in 
the context of this analysis draw on Levy and Spiller’s investigation into the determinants 
of performance of privatised telecommunications utilities (1994). According to them, 
institutional analysis needs to be contextualised in different political and social 
circumstances. They argue that in developing countries, the interaction between political 
and regulatory institutions can affect conditions for investment and therefore sector 
outcomes. The thesis also draws on North’s (1990) approach to institutional arrangements 
analysis, which suggests investigating institutions in terms of how institutional change 
impacts on the economic performance of a country.  
Specifically, institutional arrangements are defined as “the policies, systems, and 
processes that organisations use to legislate, plan and manage their activities efficiently 
and to effectively coordinate with others in order to fulfill their mandate” (UNDP, 2014).  
The thesis extends the concept of institutional arrangements to include policies, systems 
and processes developed through the support of international and multilateral 
organisations, together with the donor community. This analysis is located and 
contextualised within the political economy of the SADC region, as extensively analysed 
in the first chapter. 
Within this context of regional telecommunications reform, the thesis seeks to 
explain to what degree and how the regional institutional arrangements—including 
regional structures and processes—meet (or do not meet) regional policy objectives, by 
examining regional structures and processes and national policy outcomes. 
 It investigates in detail regional institutional arrangements in the SADC, by 
analysing the interplay between regional structures and international (i.e. multilateral, 
multi-stakeholder and donor) organisations. Policy and regulatory outputs and the 
outcome of regional institutional arrangements, in terms of ICT market performance, have 
been studied. In addition, the research seeks to understand the motivations and drivers of a 
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policy and regulatory process geared towards developing a harmonised regional ICT 
policy and regulatory framework. It does so by investigating the main actors involved in 
the process of regional ICT policy development; the processes and structures they put in 
place to address ICT development issues at a regional level; the resulting outcomes; and 
the reasons for success or failure in creating common regulatory frameworks for the sector 
at a regional level. Where possible, political reasons motivating actors to develop regional 
frameworks are investigated.  
Specifically, the study focuses on three dimensions of regional ICT policy and 
regulatory framework: (1) integrative structures and processes established to develop a 
regional policy and regulatory framework; (2) policy and regulatory outputs, such as legal 
documents that have been produced and institutions that have been created; and (3) 
regional ICT market performance, including infrastructure expansion, as an outcome of 
regional policy formulation and implementation.  
4.1 Case study research method 
The research method that is applied uses primary as well as secondary sources, with an 
emphasis on qualitative data and analysis, to examine how SADC institutional 
arrangements have shaped intended ICT policy objectives. Multiple sources are used to 
gather evidence for the case, including document analysis and in-depth interviews with 
key role-players within regional institutions as well as stakeholders within the ICT sector 
of the region.  
Primary data is collected through semi-structured interviews carried out in person 
or remotely, using a structured questionnaire but with open questions. The research is also 
based on ‘direct observation’ of regional integration processes. Participatory observation 
is drawn from meetings, such as the Cape Town conference, ‘e-Parliament, Concept, 
Policy and Reality’; a CRASA meeting on spectrum management; and internet 
governance forums, such as the ICANN47 Durban meeting and the Southern Africa 
Internet Governance Forum. Also, ideas and concepts have emerged from the informal 
exchange of emails or networking meetings during conferences.  
Interviews have been conducted with a purposefully selected array of state- and 
non-state actors and stakeholders involved in regional ICT policy processes, technical 
assistance and capacity-building activities. For secondary data, newspapers articles, 
websites, media releases and official documents have been analysed.  
The interviewees were purposefully sampled: selection based on their potential to 
provide data that will contribute to answering the research questions. The interviews 
focused on the following areas: 
! roles, powers and functions of regional integration structures and institutions; 
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! processes for the formulation, ratification and implementation of regional ICT 
policy frameworks; and 
! linkages between these formal policies and strategies and infrastructure 
development on the ground. 
The interviews were coded and analysed in relation to the following issues: 
! The degree of political power of regional institutions and their capacity to 
influence the telecommunications sector reform process at a national level; 
! The capacity of regional institutions to influence ICT policy at a national level; 
! The degree of participation of member states in regional decision-making 
processes and regional ICT policy and regulatory formulation; 
! The degree of involvement of international organisations in processes of 
regional ICT policy formulation; and 
! The impact of regional ICT policy and regulatory frameworks on market 
structure and regional ICT infrastructure development, and the development of 
ICT infrastructure because of or despite this. 
The primary interviewees were selected on the basis of their role in regional ICT 
policy and regulation making. The findings of interviews were discussed against the 
analysis of the regional policy framework in order to review regional legal basis; legal 
instruments; implementation and enforcement mechanisms; infringement procedures; and 
to provide a critical evaluation of the level of implementation and ratification of regional 
arrangements at a national level. Finally, policy outcomes have been assessed in terms of 
quantitative supply-side (and, where available, demand-side) data, related to regional 
elements of the infrastructure, which were collected through secondary data from the ITU, 
the World Bank and Research ICT Africa. Thus the qualitative analysis was expanded and 
a strong case study built.  
4.1.1 A case study on regionalism and ICT sector development 
The thesis lends itself to a case study method, in the sense that the research is 
characterised by self-containment and typicality (Pierce, 2008). The research is self-
contained in the sense that the issue investigated is clearly distinguishable. It investigates 
a very narrow and specific topic, namely telecommunications policy and regulation, in a 
specific geographic area, the SADC. The case on regionalism, and the development of an 
information society in the SADC, is an empirical enquiry in the sense that it “investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” and “the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009:23). The case deals with a 
full variety of evidence: documents, interviews, observations, quantitative data, etc. It is 
explanatory in the sense that it is used to understand causation between different elements, 
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such as the political economy of the SADC, the regional institutional arrangements, policy 
outputs and policy outcomes, in order to identify underlying principles. Because of the 
complex nature of the case investigated, it relies on multiple sources of evidence. The 
case has been built mostly through direct observation of the event being studied, 
underpinned by interviews with the main people involved in the regional process (Yin, 
2009).  
4.1.2 Research limitations 
As indicated by Pierce (2008), the main limitation of a case study is that its generalisation 
remains unproven. While other RECs may learn lessons from this study, it does not 
attempt to generalise findings. Therefore, the explanation may be unique to this case. A 
natural development of this research could be a comparative analysis of the SADC case 
with cases developed in other regions. A comparative study allows for the identification 
of similarities and differences between regional ICT policy and regulatory frameworks at 
a global level, through a horizontal analysis of the issues at stake in regional policy 
development. However, it does not allow one to capture the nuances that emanate from an 
in-depth understanding of the political economic issues of a specific territory, and of the 
linkages between the political economic framework, the institutional arrangements, the 
policy and regulatory outputs, and the ICT market outcomes. The case study is used in 
this thesis to provide a detailed understanding of how and why policy outcomes in the 
SADC region have been shaped by all these elements. A convincing case has been built 
by analysing the reasons for policy outcomes and developing a rich narrative of the voices 
of those involved in the process.  
Another limitation with qualitative primary and secondary data, is that interviews 
reflect the interpretation and the opinion of those who have been interviewed, namely, 
those who have been directly involved in regional processes. Also, press releases, which 
have been used as secondary qualitative data, have, for the most part, been produced by 
regional organisations with vested interests. Thus they may reflect the values of these 
organisations, and may depict a reality that sheds mostly positive light on their outputs. 
This shortcoming is managed by making transparent the interests of all parties, 
triangulating different sources of information, and testing perceptions and claims against 
other qualitative and quantitative data. The results provide a base-line whereby to assess 
the effectiveness of the regional institutional regulatory arrangements.  
4.2 Primary and secondary sources 
The study is based on primary and secondary sources of data and information. 
Primary data has been collected though semi-structured interviews with key 
individuals involved in the regional policy and regulatory process. Interviews were 
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conducted either in person with an open-ended questionnaire or remotely by phone, 
digitally recorded and stored for transcription and coding. In addition, primary survey data, 
aimed at assessing the effectiveness of national, regional and continental organisations in 
influencing regional policy outputs, was collected by piggybacking on a broader online 
survey that I have been doing as the lead researcher on another Research ICT Africa 
project.64 In addition, policy outcomes have been measured in terms of the technological 
readiness of the region; the costs of communication; and the quality of ICT services, in 
particular broadband. Such data has been collected over a period of four years, while 
working as a research fellow at Research ICT Africa. Since the data has been collected for 
purposes other than this thesis, there are data gaps, in terms of the countries covered by 
these studies. However, the use of primary qualitative and quantitative data empirically 
collected and analysed, allows one to draw strong evidence-based conclusions on the 
performance of the sector in the SADC countries for which data is available. All the same, 
the main sources of primary data are interviews. Secondary data, including newspaper 
articles, websites and official documents, have also been analysed. In addition, 
contemporary documentary (written) records, including the minutes of meetings, final 
reports from SADC meetings and any other written documentation deemed relevant 
(Pierce, 2008), has been used. Furthermore, ICT indicators from recognised 
intergovernmental organisations, such as ITU, WEF, the World Bank and UNCTAD, 
have been used to fill in data gaps and to show regional trends. The following table 
depicts the data source and analytical method for each research component. 
 
Table 4.1: Conducting a case study: collection and analysis of evidence 
Research component Data source Analytical method 
Literature review Previous studies on the 
political economy of 
regional integration, 
regionalism, regional trade 
and regional 
competitiveness 
Scanning, comparing and 
critically reviewing previous 
literature linked to 
regionalism and ICT policy 
and regulation.  
Theoretical foundations of 
political economy and 
institutionalism 
SADC  regional 
infrastructure (i.e. regional 
Quantitative data: 
Administrative and supply-
Assessment of SADC 
(regional) ICT sector 
                                       
64 Specifically, the research seeks to identify multi-stakeholder forms of internet governance in Africa which 
have impacted internet policy-making processes and which unfold either at a national, regional or 
international level. The research did so by conducting a continent-wide online survey that was delivered to 
key national, regional, continental and international respondents. The survey aimed at exploring in detail 
national, regional and continental structures and processes for internet governance. 
 101 
Table 4.1: Conducting a case study: collection and analysis of evidence 
Research component Data source Analytical method 
ICT sector performance) side data (ITU database, 
WEF reports, RIA pricing 
portals) 
performance (as policy 
outcome) 
Document analysis SADC legal documents (i.e. 




policies for SADC, model 
laws, etc.) 
Analysis against global 
standard for ICT policy and 
regulatory framework (i.e. 
Reference paper of the IV 
Protocol to the GATS) 
Interviews, direct 
observation, participation to 
regional meetings and 
conferences 
Main actors and 
stakeholders involved in 
regional processes and 
structures; RIA survey on 
internet governance in 
Africa 
Semi-structured interviews; 
coding (to produce findings) 
and triangulation (to verify 
findings). The process of 
analysing findings is 
iterative.  
4.3 Interviews 
Interviews with key actors involved in the regional policy-making process provided a 
major source of information. However, it was not assumed that the information provided 
was reliable and accurate. One way to ascertain reliability and accuracy is by probing and 
following up inconsistencies in the line of argument or account of those being interviewed. 
Willfully misleading responses or misrepresentations of events can be very informative 
however. Through triangulation, using a number of responses to the same question or 
secondary data, significant analytical insights can be obtained.  
4.3.1 In-depth interviews 
Interviews with all the main actors involved in regional ICT policy and the regulatory 
development process have been attempted. It was possible to interview the main actors 
from regional and international organisations, where they were available, but budget 
constraints and the unavailability of respondents, made interviews with representatives of 
national governments and national parliaments more difficult. However, direct 
observation of regional processes, while working at the SADC Parliamentary Forum for 
one year, compensated to some extent for the missing interviews. The participatory 
observation included meetings such as participation in the SADC ICT conference ‘e-
Parliament, Concept, Policy and Reality’ hosted by the South African Parliament in Cape 
Town in October 2009; an ICASA/CRASA/SADC workshop on spectrum management 
held in Johannesburg in March 2011; a meeting on financial inclusion in Cape Town in 
September 2012; the Southern African IGF held in Luanda, Angola, in August 2013; and 
a conference on the political economy of regional integration held at the CTICC in Cape 
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Town in July 2014. Participating in regional meetings and conferences has allowed the 
researcher to learn from, and interact with, different people involved in regional processes. 
This has been especially useful when they could not be directly interviewed. In addition, 
the qualitative data gap has been filled by using qualitative data collected through an 
online survey delivered to key national, regional and continental public organisations.65 
Only data relevant to the SADC region has been selected to build the case study.  
The interviewees were purposefully sampled. An initial group of respondents was 
identified. Subsequently, a snowball procedure was used in order to identify additional 
respondents, based on their potential to provide the data and relevant information needed 
to answer the research questions. The interviews focused on the following areas: 
! identification of roles, powers and functions of regional integration structures 
and institutions; 
! description of processes for the formulation, ratification and implementation of 
ICT regional policy frameworks; 
! understanding of linkages between these formal policies and strategies and 
infrastructure development and sector performance on the ground. 
4.4 Coding and analysis of research data and information 
The first step in an analysis of data and information collected from primary and secondary 
sources, is to reduce the raw data by assembling and validating it. Coding qualitative data 
produced the main findings of the thesis. The analysis of the interviews is based on 
Gorden’s (1992) approach on how to code interview responses. After defining coding 
categories in an all-inclusive and mutually exclusive way, a symbolic label was assigned 
to each category, in order to summarise, condense, and store a concrete example falling 
into a certain coding category. In this case, the symbolic label used was a letter, or a 
combination of letters.  
Then, the digitally-recorded interviews were transcribed into a three-column format. 
Although required by Gorden’s approach (1992), not much information was excluded, 
because very little was irrelevant. Duplicated information collected from different sources 
has been used to corroborate and triangulate the available data. Then, narrative data was 
transposed into a common format and organised into folders and files. Thereafter the files 
were validated, by checking the data for errors or omissions, and anonymising people and 
places when respondents requested that this be done.   
Codes were designed and applied before all the interviews were conducted, and 
they were adjusted afterwards as some topics and issues were not identified originally. 
                                       
65 This Ph.D. research piggybacks on a broader online survey on internet governance in Africa that the 
candidate has led at Research ICT Africa. 
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The first phase of coding was the tagging. Basically key and ‘codable’ words or phrases 
had to be identified before they were coded. Different words and phrases in the text were 
highlighted with different colours (Pierce, 2008: 243). Afterwards, the narrative data 
collected and analysed was triangulated both with the document analysis and with more 
quantitative demand-side and supply-side indicators.  
Interviews on the following issues were coded and evaluated: 
! national, regional, and international drivers for an integrated ICT policy and 
regulatory framework; 
! level and mechanisms of participation of member states in the reform process; 
! level and mechanisms of involvement of national policy-makers in regional 
policy issues;  
! level of implementation of regional measures at a national level; 
! impact of leadership positions in the SADC on regional policies; 
! degree of influence – and mechanisms of involvement - of international 
organisations in setting the regional agenda on ICT; 
! regional policy and regulatory outcomes; 
! identification of institutional arrangements to ratify regional regulation at a 
national level; 
! degree and level of participation of the SADC in international forums and global 
policy-making; 
! level and degree of collaboration of the SADC secretariat with other regional 
organisations involved in ICT policy development. 
Finally, to evaluate policy outcomes precisely, a set of more quantitative supply- 
and demand-side data related to regional elements of the infrastructure were collected via 
secondary data from the ITU, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum and Research 
ICT Africa.  
4.4.1 Verification through triangulation 
In order to secure effective corroboration of the information collected, triangulation has 
been used to corroborate the sources of data as well as the data itself. In order to validate 
any crucial account, triangulation was used to compare data from that source with data 
from different sources and perspectives. Triangulation was used to verify findings 
identified through the coding of qualitative data. Triangulation allows one to find new 
angles from which to interpret the development of regional ICT policy and regulatory 
processes; to test assumptions and rationale for the creation of harmonised ICT policy and 
regulatory frameworks; and to examine the reasons behind the failures of institutional 
arrangements. It encourages a deeper understanding of regional processes than is possible 
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for any single participant involved in the process of corroborating qualitative data from 
different sources. Specifically, the findings were triangulated within and across the 
different data sources i.e. amongst interviewees but  also between findings from 
interviews and other sources such as documents: 
Table 4.2: Triangulation of different sources 
Source What for? 
Literature review Is the theoretical framework against which 
new knowledge produced by this research 
is analysed, assessed and understood. 
Quantitative data analysis Allows one to assess policy and regulatory 
outcomes in terms of market performance. 
Institutional document analysis Provides the official institutional 
framework for regional policy and 
regulatory formulation and implementation. 
Interviews with SADC institutions/ 
national governments/ technical partners/ 
academia 
Provides both political and technical insight 
into the regional policy and regulation- 
making process. 
 




Figure 4.1: triangulation of different data sources 
The process applied (to code qualitative data to produce findings; to triangulate data 
to verify findings; and to analyse findings to draw conclusions and recommendations) is 
iterative. In order to build a strong case study, the resulting iterative and reflecting 
Output: institutional 
document analysis 
Analysis of the official 
institutional framework for 
regional policy and regulatory 
formulation and implementation 
Interviews with SADC 
officials/technical 
partners/academia 
How regional structures and 
processes have tackled ICT 
sector development problems 
Outcome: quantitative 
data analysis 
Assessment of policy and 
regulatory outcomes in terms of 
market performance 
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analysis is purposeful, as it allows findings to be presented as they emerge through coding, 
and then to be verified by triangulating data and sources throughout the thesis. The 
consistency of the findings from different, as well as the same source has been checked 
and rechecked. When different opinions on the same issue were not available, the 
document analysis as well as direct observations of regional processes were used. 
Nevertheless, multiple sources of evidence were used. 
4.5 Obstacles to conducting the research 
There are a few obstacles to conducting research in the SADC region, such as: 
! the lack of reliable statistical information on ICT indicators. Most of the ICT 
supply-side (administrative) indicators, for instance from the ITU, are either 
outdated or inaccurate. Further, a few countries, such as South Africa for instance, 
failed to provide administrative data to the ITU. 
! the lack of documented processes of ratification of regional ICT policy and 
regulatory framework at a national level, which is compounded by a culture of 
secrecy which affects many African government organisations. 
! the difficulties in identifying the main actors in the process of integration, due to 
rapid personnel turnover in public administrations. 
! the unavailability of respondents, especially from national governments. 
In order to overcome these obstacles, a few methodological measures have been 
adopted to ensure a rigorous and empirical approach from which to carry out the research. 
Some aspects of SADC regional integration are already covered in the existing literature, 
and this body of research has informed the conceptual framework and has provided the 
theoretical foundations upon which to base an empirical case study on regional ICT policy 
and regulatory frameworks. 
Where respondents from national governments were unavailable, data and 
information were collected through an online-based survey, which was delivered to 
national, regional and continental respondents. The response rate to this survey has been 
high, due to the involvement of the NEPAD agency in the research.  
Most research on SADC policy issues is related to land reform, regional water 
management or other infrastructures, and there are only sporadic interventions in the area 
of ICT policy and regulation, despite the matter attracting much attention, especially from 
international organisations such as UN agencies, the World Trade Organisation and 
donors such as USAID. In particular, a few studies have focused on the role of external 
actors and organisations in shaping the processes of regional ICT policy-making and 
regulatory formulation.   
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4.6 Conclusion 
In summary, the literature review assisted in the identification of recurring themes and 
topics in the realm of regional ICT policy and regulation, with specific focus on Africa 
and, in particular, on the SADC. From the literature reviewed, the framework of analysis 
was extrapolated. This conceptual framework provided the lens through which empirical 
data was analysed. From the semi-structured interviews, qualitative evidence was 
collected to describe the SADC case on regional policy and regulation. The result is a 
detailed identification and description of regional structures and processes, in order to 
understand what they have tried to achieve in terms of regulating a regional market. 
Regional outputs have been assessed through document analysis, which provided 
evidence of the regulatory and legal basis. Also, primary and secondary qualitative data 
have been used to measure regional policy and regulatory outcomes, in terms of market 
performance.  
The following chapter presents the findings of the document and legal analysis of 
SADC structures and processes dealing with ICT policy and regulation. Legal documents 





CHAPTER 5 – DOCUMENT ANALYSIS OF SADC 
STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES FOR ICT POLICYMAKING 
This chapter presents the findings of a document analysis of treaties, protocols, model 
laws and policies, and regulatory guidelines that have created SADC structures and 
shaped the processes dealing with telecommunications policy and regulation. The analysis 
was undertaken in the context of an internationally developed and agreed framework for 
telecommunications sector reform. This assesses the level of liberalisation achieved by 
SADC countries as a result of the involvement of the region in WTO negotiation 
processes, and specifically, of accession to WTO and commitments made to the 
Telecommunications Reference Paper of the General Agreements on Trade and Service 
(GATS). 
The chapter identifies the main SADC structures for regional integration and the 
main legal documents underpinning regional ICT policy and the regulatory framework. 
The SADC structures and the regional ICT policy and regulatory framework are the main 
tangible outputs of regional processes. Thereafter, the emergence of trade in services in 
southern Africa is discussed, as well as the level of implementation of the Reference 
Paper of the IV Protocol to the GATS in the different national jurisdictions.  
Next, the chapter investigates compliance between what is widely accepted as the 
global consensus for standard regulation and design (the Reference Paper of the IV 
Protocol to the GATS) and the regional policy and regulatory framework. Finally, it 
concludes with an assessment of the level of liberalisation in national telecommunications 
markets, with an emphasis on constraints on foreign direct investments, which often drive 
telecommunications infrastructure roll-out and development.  
The key elements used as a framework within which to review various SADC 
documents are those included in the Reference Paper of the IV Protocol to the GATS. 
Specifically, the Reference Paper includes (a) competitive safeguards; (b) interconnection; 
(c) universal service; (d) public availability of licensing criteria; (e) independent 
regulators; (f) allocation and use of scarce resources. The regional reform process has 
been analysed by means of an assessment of what has been picked up and implemented in 
terms of liberalising national telecommunications markets, with respect to WTO 
accession, commitments to communication services, modes of supply, and restrictions 
based on legal status, investment and nationality.  
5.1 SADC structures for regional integration 
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was formed in 
Lusaka, Zambia, on 1 April 1980, following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration by 
 108 
nine founding member states.66 It was started by ‘frontline’ states whose twin objectives 
were the political liberation of southern Africa (SADC, 2012) and economic liberalisation. 
Discussions on economic cooperation started in May 1979 when the foreign ministers of 
the Frontline States met in Gaborone, Botswana. The ministers agreed to convene an 
international conference in Arusha, Tanzania, where government representatives and 
international agency representatives from all over the world gathered to discuss 
development and cooperation in southern Africa. By the late 1980s, SADCC leaders had 
realised that the organisation needed a treaty or some sort of legally binding document in 
order to strengthen regional cooperation among member states. In 1989, the SADCC 
Summit met in Harare, Zimbabwe, and decided to give legal status to the regional 
organisation, and to replace the Memorandum of Understanding with an agreement, 
charter or treaty.  
The Declaration and Treaty establishing the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), which replaced the Co-ordination Conference, was signed at the 
Summit of Heads of State or Government on 17 August 1992, in Windhoek, Namibia. 
The treaty is a legally binding document, which requires SADC countries to 
coordinate, harmonise and rationalise their policies and strategies for regionally 
sustainable development. The treaty commits SADC countries to principles such as 
sovereign equality of member states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, 
democracy and rule of law; and equity, balance and mutual benefit. 
According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO, (2014), “Decisions, 
policies and agreements entered into under the auspice of SADC are legally binding, and 
the organisation has the necessary legal instruments to enforce such decisions, policies 
and agreements”. However, as observed in different parts of this research, only protocols 
are binding legal documents for SADC member states. In addition, the SADC does not 
have infringement procedures in place for member states that do not implement protocol 
requirements. 
5.1.1 SADC institutional structures 
The Summit, a SADC institution established under Article 9 of the SADC Treaty (1992), 
consists of the heads of state or government of all member states. It is the supreme policy-
making institution of SADC (SADC Treaty, Article 10). The Council, consisting of one 
minister from each member state, preferably a minister responsible for foreign or external 
affairs, has the responsibility of overseeing the implementation of the policies of SADC 
and the proper execution of its programmes (SADC Treaty, Article 11). It approves 
policies and strategies, and recommends, for approval of the Summit, the establishment of 
                                       
66 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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directorates, committees, other institutions and organs. It also convenes conferences and 
other meetings for the purpose of promoting the objectives and programmes of SADC. 
Infrastructure and services, and the monitoring and control of the implementation of the 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), are areas of competence of the 
Integrated Committee of Ministers (SADC Treaty, Article 12). It also has decision-
making powers to ensure rapid implementation of programmes that would otherwise 
await a formal meeting of the Council (SADC Treaty, Article 12 (3)).  
The Secretariat, which is the principal executive institution of SADC (SADC 
Treaty, Article 14), is responsible for strategic planning and the management of 
programmes. It is also responsible for the coordination and harmonisation of the policies 
and strategies of member states, and will submit harmonised policies and programmes to 
the Council for consideration and approval. Furthermore, it monitors and evaluates the 
implementation of regional policies and programmes. It is also in charge of the 
development of capacity and infrastructure, as well as the maintenance of intra-regional 
information communications technology. 
5.1.2 Other regional structures for ICT policy and regulation 
CRASA 
The idea of setting up an association of telecommunications regulators was developed in 
the Regional Telecommunications Restructuring Programme (RTRP) (Barendse, 2006). 
The Telecommunications Regulators' Association of Southern Africa (TRASA), now 
Communications Regulators' Association of Southern Africa (CRASA), was established 
on 15 September 1997 in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, as a forum for information and 
communications regulators in southern Africa. The TRASA Constitution was adopted in 
December 1997 in Cape Town. It became officially operational in April 1998 with six 
funding members: Tanzania, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia.67  
It was set up within the framework of the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology (1996). 
The strategy pursued by the RTRP, which was working closely with the SARCC-TU and 
SATA, was to create a regional association of telecommunications regulators, which 
promotes the idea of model regulation (Barendse, 2006). 
The 9th Annual General Meeting (AGM) of TRASA, held in February 2006 in 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, approved a new constitution and TRASA’s name changed to 
                                       
67 According to Barendse (2006:166), “the consortium was largely inspired by the US approach to regional 
associations, the RTRP, in keeping with models that had been tried and tested, and based the TRASA 
constitution on the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) approach to regional 
harmonisation”.  
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CRASA. According to CRASA (2006), the constitutional review was necessary to align 
its operations with global changes, in particular those related to convergence of 
information technology, broadcasting and communication sectors.  
CRASA comprises four instruments, namely, the Annual General Meeting (AGM), 
the Executive Committee (EC), the Specialised Committees and the Secretariat. 
The AGM is the supreme decision-making body and meets once a year to receive 
and approve reports from the Specialised Committees, such as the annual action plans, the 
annual report and audited accounts, as well as the annual budget for the association. The 
AGM is also an occasion at which members can share their experiences through 
presentations and reports (CRASA, 2010). 
The second CRASA instrument is the Executive Committee, which exercises 
supervisory functions over the implementation of decisions made by the association in-
between the AGMs. The Executive Committee comprises four members: the Chairperson, 
the First Vice-Chairperson, the Second Vice-Chairperson and the Treasurer (CRASA, 
2010). 
The Annual General Meeting and Executive Committee are supported by 
Specialised Committees, by task teams and by the Secretariat. The Specialised 
Committees are responsible for producing model policies and guidelines on various 
regulatory functions applied by the telecommunications regulatory authority in the region 
of the SADC. The model policies and regulatory guidelines, as approved by CRASA 
AGM, are submitted to the meeting of ministers responsible for Telecommunications, 
Postal and ICT for final endorsement (CRASA, 2010). 
The task teams are established when the need arises, in order to undertake special 
assignments as authorised by the AGM. 
SATA  
The Southern Africa Telecommunications Association (SATA) was established in 1980 in 
pursuance of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Treaty and under the 
provisions of the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology. Until 
1999, the association was known as the Southern Africa Telecommunications 
Administration (SATA). The formation of SATA was based on the need for regional co-
operation among SADC member states, as envisaged in the SADC Treaty and the SADC 
Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology regarding issues pertaining to 
telecommunications policy and regulation. 
SATCC-TU 
The Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission Technical Unit 
(SATCC-TU) is a technical unit, which is intended to provide technical support to the 
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SATA (Article 13.11, SATA Constitution). Among others, its functions (Article 13.9, 
SATA Constitution) are related to research activities, including data collection and 
analysis, management of a resource centre, the storage of reliable data and resources, and 
intersection co-ordination between the transport, communications and meteorology 
sectors.  
SABA 
The Southern African Broadcasting Association (SABA) is a regional organisation 
representing public service and other broadcasting organisations across the SADC region. 
It was established in 1993 “to promote quality broadcasting by enhancing professionalism 
and the credibility of public service broadcasting across the countries in the region” 
(SABA, 2014). The main goal of the organisation is to ensure a smooth transition to 
digital TV by June 2015.  
5.2 Harmonised ICT policy and regulation in regional 
agreements and treaties 
In order to achieve the objectives of promoting sustainable and equitable economic 
growth and socio-economic development to ensure poverty alleviation (SADC Treaty, 
Article 5 (1)), the harmonisation of political and socio-economic policies and plans of 
member states has been seen as the main strategy (SADC Treaty, Article 5 (2.a)). Policies 
aim at progressively eliminating obstacles to free movement of capital, labour, goods and 
services (SADC Treaty, Article 5 (2.d)) and promoting the transfer and mastery of 
technology (SADC Treaty, Article 5 (2.f)).  
According to Article 21 of the SADC Treaty (1992), member states should 
coordinate, rationalise and harmonise their overall macro-economic policies and 
strategies, programmes and projects, in several areas of cooperation, including 
infrastructure and services. Member states are also required to develop protocols which 
may be necessary in each area of co-operation (SADC Treaty, Article 22). Protocols are 
approved by the Summit on recommendations of the Council (SADC Treaty, Article 22 
(2)).  
5.2.1 SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology 
The SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology (TCM) is a 
comprehensive legal document which regulates the entirety of the transport, 
communications and meteorology sectors of each member state and of the region, 
including all policy, legal, regulatory, institutional, operational, logistical, technical, 
commercial, administrative, financial, human resource and other issues (SADC Protocol 
on TCM, Article 2.1.).  
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With regard to the communications sector, the objective of the Protocol is to 
establish efficient, cost-effective and fully-integrated infrastructures and operations, in 
order to promote economic and social development (SADC Protocol on TCM, Article 2.3). 
According to the Protocol, it is the responsibility of member states to engage all 
stakeholders in order to integrate regional communications networks, facilitate the 
implementation of compatible policies and legislation (SADC Protocol on TCM, Article 
2.4 (a)), and restructure state enterprises and public utilities (SADC Protocol on TCM, 
Article 2.4 (d)). 
Chapter 10 of the Protocol on TCM is dedicated to the telecommunications sector. 
The chapter is particularly concerned with universal access and service, which is one of 
the main policy objectives of this section of the Protocol, together with achieving high-
quality and efficient services, and enhancing service interconnectivity in the region. 
Universal service provisions are not only mentioned in Article 10.3, but the creation of 
universal access and service funds are also reinforced in Article 10.8, when it is requested 
that regulatory bodies negotiate and set universal service obligations for network service 
providers. The whole of Article 10.3 of the Protocol is dedicated to universal service. In 
particular, member states agree to develop a common understanding of universal services 
by determining the basic elements which characterise universal service provision, 
including consideration of whether a service is essential in view of its social and cultural 
importance; whether it is reasonably accessible to all people of the region on an equitable 
and non-discriminatory basis; whether it is supplied as efficiently and economically as 
possible and therefore as affordably as possible (SADC Protocol on TCM, Article 10.3). 
According to the Protocol, the harmonised regional telecommunications policy 
aims at economic and institutional restructuring of telecommunications; and at 
accelerating network development and universal service; a priority for the harmonised 
telecommunications policy framework. The chapter on telecommunications also includes 
the promotion of fair competition between telecommunications service providers.  
Article 10.4 of the Protocol deals with broadcasting. The chapter highlights the 
importance of coordination between broadcasting and telecommunications sectors in view 
of their convergence, and it calls for the establishment of appropriate institutional 
mechanisms assisting co-operation and coordination of appropriate sector coordinators.  
Article 10.7 requires member states to ensure separation between the regulation and 
operation of telecommunications services within their national jurisdictions, and it 
underlines the need to establish an autonomous and independent national regulatory body 
with statutory authority to regulate the sector. Article 10.8 lists the responsibilities and 
functions of national regulatory agencies (NRAs), including the monitoring of a universal 
service fund, licensing, spectrum management, interconnection regulation, etc. An 
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important aspect of the harmonised regulatory framework is the request for 
interoperability of telecommunications services in the region, through the development of 
harmonised technical standards for network architectures and equipment.68 The Protocol 
also deals with human resource development in the region. In particular, Article 10.10 
suggests developing a common curriculum framework for the education and training of 
personnel, developing a common standard for competence evaluation and certification of 
personnel, developing a regional directory of training specialisation and centres, and 
supporting reciprocal recognition of qualifications. Finally, Article 10.11 stresses the 
importance of participating in regional and international telecommunications forums, such 
as ITU, in order to achieve global interconnectivity of networks and the interoperability of 
services. Further, it suggests that member states agree to be represented at international 
telecommunications forums by a single member state presenting a coordinated position.  
The following table summarises the main concepts included in the SADC Protocol 
on TCM.  
Table 5.1: SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology; Chapter 10 
on communications. 
Article no. Policy area Short description 
2.3 Integration of infrastructures The objective of the 
protocol is to establish 




2.4 (a) Implementation of 
compatible policies and 
legislation 
It is responsibility of 
member states to engage all 
stakeholders in order to 
integrate regional 
communications networks. 
10 Harmonised regional 
telecommunications policy 
The harmonised regional 
telecommunications policy 
aims at economic and 
institutional restructuring of 
telecommunications and at 
accelerating network 
development and universal 
service. 
10.3 and 10.8 Universal access and service Universal access and service 
is one of the main policy 
objectives of Chapter 10 of 
                                       
68 SADC Protocol on TCM, Article 10.9 (1). The Article includes a request for formulation or approval of the 
numbering plan and the setting of technical standards in respect of mobile phone systems, cable specifications, 
telephone signaling systems and equipment type approval. 
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Table 5.1: SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology; Chapter 10 
on communications. 
Article no. Policy area Short description 
the Protocol, together with 
achieving high-quality and 
efficient services and 
enhancing service 
interconnectivity in the 
region.  
10.4 Broadcasting Importance of coordination 
between broadcasting and 
telecommunications sectors 
in view of the convergence. 
10.7 Separation between 
regulation and operation of 
telecommunications services 
Importance of establishing 
autonomous and 
independent national 
regulatory bodies with 
statutory authority to 
regulate the sector. 
10.8 NRAs responsibilities and 
functions 
NRAs responsibilities and 
functions include the 
monitoring of the universal 




10.10 Human resource 
development 
Development of a common 
curriculum framework for 
the education and training of 
personnel, a regional 
directory of training 
specialisation and centres, 
and reciprocal recognition of 
qualifications. 
10.11 Participation in international 





interoperability of services. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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5.2.2 Telecommunications Policies for SADC and SADC Model 
Telecommunications Bill 
The SADC Model Telecommunications Bill was prepared in conjunction with 
telecommunications policies for SADC. The SADC documents were approved during an 
annual general meeting held in Swaziland in June 1998 by the SATCC Committee of 
Ministers.   
The Telecommunications Policies for SADC (SATCC, 1998)  
The document was prepared in pursuance of the provisions of Article 10.2 Chapter 10 of 
the Protocol on TCM. The policies were approved as a common policy guideline for 
adoption and implementation at a national level. The Southern Africa Transport  
Communications Commission – Technical Unit (SATCC-TU) was made responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of the policies and the Model Telecommunications Bill 
and was to report to the Committee of Ministers. 
The document includes a problem statement and objectives, and a series of 
strategies for achieving policy objectives. It has a checklist of functions and ways to 
support national governments, and authority to implement the regional policy framework 
at a national level.  
The policy aims at ensuring affordable, efficient and high-quality services, and at 
enhancing regional service interconnectivity. It also aims at creating a regional 
telecommunications industry that is globally competitive. The telecommunications policy 
stresses the importance of restructuring the institutional framework in order to properly 
allocate roles and responsibilities, to promote accountability and transparency, to promote 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness, to manage the telecommunications industry and to 
restructure national incumbent operators (SATCC Telecommunications Policies, Part 2 
(2.1.)). 
The policy clearly states the role of the government, the ministry responsible for 
telecommunications, and the regulator, indicating roles, responsibilities, scope and 
mandate, functions and relationships with all the relevant institutions. In particular, with 
regard to the Regulatory Authority, the policy includes a checklist of functions and issues 
with reference to establishing or strengthening a regulatory authority (SATCC 
Telecommunications Policies, Part 2).  
The policy also addresses policy and regulatory principles crucial to the overall 
achievement of universal service and access. It suggests that many aspects of the 
telecommunications sector should be regulated, such as: universal service and universal 
access, tariffs, interconnection, frequency spectrum, numbering plan, new and advanced 
services, standards enforcement, indigenous participation in development, social 
obligation, and regional and international participation. 
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The Telecommunications Bill Model for SADC (SATCC, 1998) 
The Telecommunications Bill Model for SADC  (SATCC, 1998) is a document aiming at 
supporting SADC member states in the development of their own ICT bill. 
The Telecommunications Bill empowers the minister to establish overall policies 
for the telecommunications sector. As with the Telecommunications Policies for SADC, it 
requires the establishment of autonomous and independent Regulatory Authorities.69 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison between SADC Protocol on TCM and Model legislation 
SADC Protocol on Transport, 
Communications and Meteorology 
Telecommunications Policies for SADC 
and SADC Telecommunications Bill 
Objective: to establish efficient, cost-
effective and fully integrated 
infrastructures and operations. 
Objective: to ensure affordable, efficient 
and high-quality services and enhance 
regional service interconnectivity. Also, to 
create a regional telecommunications 
industry that is globally competitive. 
Universal service provisions: creation of 
universal access and service funds; 
universal service obligations. 
Policy and regulatory principles are to 
achieve universal service and access. 
Harmonisation aims at economic and 
institutional restructuring of 
telecommunications. 
-- 
Promotion of fair competition between 
telecommunications providers. 
-- 
Coordination between broadcasting and 
telecommunications in view of the 
convergence. In that regard it calls for the 
establishment of appropriate institutional 
mechanisms for co-operation and 
coordination. 
-- 
Separation between the regulation and 
operation of telecommunications services. 
Specification of roles, responsibilities, 
scope and mandate, functions and 
relationships between the ministry 
responsible for telecommunications and the 
regulator. 
-- Importance of restructuring the institutional 
framework in order to properly allocate 
roles and responsibilities, to promote 
                                       
69 In particular, the Telecommunications Bill goes into detail regarding the powers and functions of the NRA, 
the structure of authorities, including the number and appointment mechanisms of board members. It also 
addresses the financing of the authorities. It lists general powers and duties related to the regulation of the 
sector, including licensing. 
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Table 5.2: Comparison between SADC Protocol on TCM and Model legislation 
SADC Protocol on Transport, 
Communications and Meteorology 
Telecommunications Policies for SADC 
and SADC Telecommunications Bill 
accountability and transparency, to promote 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness, to 
manage the telecommunications industry 
and to restructure national incumbent 
operators. 
Functions of NRAs include: monitoring the 
universal service fund, licensing, spectrum 
management and interconnection 
regulation, among others. 
Aspects that should be regulated include: 
universal service and universal access, 
tariffs, interconnection, frequency 
spectrum, numbering plan, new and 
advanced services, standards enforcement, 
indigenous participation in development, 
social obligations, and regional and 
international participation. 
Request for the interoperability of 
telecommunications services. 
-- 
Human resource development in the region 
through the development of a common 
curriculum framework. 
-- 
Participation in regional and international 
telecommunications forums. 
-- 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Table 5.2 above compares the SADC proposal on transport, communications and 
meteorology with the SADC model legislation on ICT. The two frameworks address 
similar issues, and both have a special focus on universal access and service. However, 
while the Protocol broadly requires that government functions are separate from 
regulatory functions, the model legislation goes into detail on the roles and 
responsibilities of both the ministry and the regulatory authority. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of SADC in creating an integrated regional 
market for communications services, the following sections seek to evaluate the level of 
compliance of regional and national policy and regulatory frameworks with the Reference 
Paper of the IV Protocol to the GATS.70 The principles of the Reference Paper of the IV 
Protocol to GATS are widely accepted as a solid foundation for standard regulatory 
design (Cohen, 2001 LIRNEasia, 2008).  
                                       
70 See http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm 
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The following table depicts a two-level coding frame adopted to conduct the 
document analysis. 
Table 5.3: Two-level coding frame for document analysis 
Structures and processes Coding frame 
1) International telecommunication sector 
reform  
Reference Paper of the IV Protocol to the 
General Agreements on Trade and Service 
(GATS): 
- Competitive safeguards 
- Interconnection 
- Universal service 
- Public availability of licensing 
criteria 
- Independent regulators 
- Allocation and use of scarce 
resources 
2) Regional reform What has been implemented at a regional 
level in terms of liberalising national 
telecommunications markets? 
- WTO accession 
- Commitments to communication 
services 
- Modes of supply 
- Restrictions based on legal status, 
investment and nationality 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
5.3 Regional alignment to global regulatory frameworks 
Services, such as telecommunications, have been historically considered non-tradable for 
several legal, institutional, economic and technical reasons, including their supposed 
intangibility or invisibility, their non-durable or transitory character, and the view that 
they require direct and simultaneous production and consumption (Senunas, 1997, in 
Cohen, 2001). 
Although its regulatory principles have often been criticised for lack of precision, 
the Reference Paper of the IV Protocol to the GATS represents widely-accepted principles 
for regulating basic telecommunications services (Cohen, 2001; LIRNEasia, 2008). As 
Cohen notes (2001), obligations undertaken through the Fourth Protocol and the 
Reference Paper are a reflection of signatories’ existing or planned domestic liberalisation 
policies. However, she notes that the strength of the Reference Paper lies in ensuring that 
implementation occurs according to a set time-frame.  
 119 
In particular, the Reference Paper is divided into six sections, the first two applying 
to regulation of “major suppliers”, while the remaining four deal with general regulatory 
issues.  
5.3.1 Competitive safeguards 
The first section of the Reference Paper requires that competitive safeguards be set, in 
order to prevent the main suppliers from engaging in, or continuing, anti-competitive 
practices, such as (a) engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidisation; (b) using 
information obtained from competitors inappropriately; and (c) retaining technical 
information about essential facilities or commercially-relevant information. 
Chapter 10 of the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology 
aims at promoting and sustaining fair competition between telecommunications service 
providers. It requires the granting of access to telecommunications networks and services 
by each other’s service providers, on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and 
conditions.  
With regard to the Telecommunications Policies of SADC, one of the main policy 
objectives is to build a competitive regional telecommunications sector, by attracting local 
and foreign investors (TP for SADC, SATCC, 1998, Art. 1.2.3). Furthermore, they aim to 
promote a fair, competitive and stable investment environment and require stakeholders to 
provide network access on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions (TP 
for SADC, SATCC, 1998, Art. 1.2.4). The competition aspect is mentioned in other 
sections of the document. First, the section discussing institutional frameworks states that 
one of the objectives of the required structural transformation of telecommunications 
institutions is to introduce and to promote competition. To this end, governments are 
required to create a level playing field to facilitate the entry and growth of nascent 
operators; and to allow for checks and balances, including an independent judiciary 
service. Second, the section related to the role of the regulator clearly states that the 
regulator is in charge of monitoring the demand and supply capacity of service providers, 
and should intervene to correct imbalances or market distortion in favour of users. 
According to the TP for SADC (SATCC, 1998) one of the specific objectives of the 
regulatory authority is to “ensure a level playing field where competitive entry is 
permitted under the info-communications policy” (Art. 2.5.4). Ownership, control and 
competition are also listed as key regulatory issues. In order to create the necessary 
conditions for long-term stability in countries where privatisation or competition have 
already been introduced, it was suggested that a review of policy and regulatory 
frameworks be conducted, in line with the aim of effectively monitoring the abuse of 
monopoly power.  
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However, at the time the Protocol was promulgated, SADC markets were still 
structured around vertically-integrated incumbents, and liberalisation, where it occurred, 
was “managed”. Therefore conditions for fair competition, within the Public Switched 
Telephone Network (PSTN) market segment, were not in place. 71  The 
Telecommunications Policy for SADC (SATCC, 1998) prescribes that the SADC 
countries retain the vertically-integrated nature of the PSTN incumbent during negotiation 
on exclusivity, because it considers this structure to be more attractive to potential 
investors. It envisages competition in networks and services other than the integrated 
PSTN, including mobile network, VANS and electronic devices. At a national level South 
Africa for instance, as part of the implementation of GATS commitments, opened up its 
market in 1994 only in value-added or enhanced services, while at the horizontal level it 
made no market-access undertakings. Subsequently, in 1997 through the 
Telecommunications Act, it continued to impose the same restrictions with respect to 
market access and national treatment, resulting in the creation of protective legislation 
around Telkom’s monopoly of voice services and essential facilities (Cohen, 2001). 
5.3.2 Interconnection 
Ensuring interconnection, on reasonable terms and within a reasonable time, is considered 
a pre-condition for competition within the telecommunications market, as regulated cost-
based interconnection rates allow new entrants access to the network of an established 
vertically-integrated incumbent. Interconnection should be provided on non-
discriminatory terms, conditions and rates. Transparency is required with regard to 
procedures for interconnection negotiations and arrangements. 
The SADC Protocol on TCM (1996) only mentions that NRAs are responsible for 
determining harmonised interconnection guidelines (Art. 10.8). Interconnectivity of 
networks is only required at a technical level for interoperability of telecommunication 
services. Telecommunication policies for SADC (SATCC, 1998), which aim at 
developing a common regional telecommunications policy, address the interconnection 
issue more from a policy perspective. The regional policy document requires that 
interconnection facilitate the interoperability of new services, including carrier pre-
selection and number portability. Although it does not mention that interconnection 
                                       
71 The “managed liberalisation” approach has had negative consequences in the development of the sector. 
According to Gillwald (2009), the privatisation of Telkom in South Africa through the extension of its 
monopoly, negatively affected affordable access and market development. “Managed liberalisation” allowed 
the incumbent to extract monopoly profits, which were partially repatriated to the United States by SBC. “By 
the end of the five years exclusivity period in 2002, the partially-privatised and foreign-controlled incumbent, 
Telkom, had retrenched over 20,000 workers, and cut off a million people who could not afford to pay even 
for local and national services” (Gillwald, 2009:167). 
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should be cost-based, it suggests that an operator should be compensated for the traffic 
that it carries for another operator, and in cases where additional equipment capacity is 
required, the carrier operator should use the long-run incremental cost principle to 
calculate the applicable tariffs (which should not be worse that those applicable to its own 
subscribers) or to promote infrastructure expansion.   
However, in 2000, TRASA developed guidelines on interconnection for SADC 
countries in order to implement the protocol guidelines. These guidelines constitute a 
comprehensive document aimed at facilitating the development of country-specific 
principles by NRAs, taking into account that harmonisation should remain the key 
objective as far as practicable in the building up of regional integration.72  
The guidelines on interconnection have not been updated since 2000, although the 
technological environment has changed to converged and IP-based platforms. 
5.3.3 Universal service 
The RP mentions that any member has the right to define the kind of universal service 
obligations it wishes to maintain. Such obligations should be administered in a 
transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and should not be more 
burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service defined by the members.  
Universal service is the guiding principle of regional ICT policy and regulation in 
the SADC. The main objective of the SADC Protocol on TCM (1996) is to achieve 
regional universal service with regard to telecommunications services, and regional 
universal access to advanced information services. The Protocol envisages restructuring 
telecommunications markets, taking into account ownership options with due regard for 
the achievement of universal service goals, and the extent to which strategic public and 
private investors can be introduced. It requests that member states develop a common 
understanding of service by determining the basic elements which characterise universal 
service provision, taking into account an efficient and economic supply which will allow 
affordable services. It also suggests that the special needs of persons with disabilities 
should be taken into account, as well as the need for connectivity in rural areas. The 
Protocol also recommends that progress with universal service should be measured 
through indicators. 
                                       
72 The Policy Guidelines on Interconnection for SADC countries and Model Telecomm Regulations on 
Interconnection (2000) address issues of regional mobile roaming. They have been developed despite 
recognition that roaming charges in the region are too high due to market forces. The guidelines recommend 
establishing a Regional Alliance Task Team in order to investigate mechanisms for reducing regional roaming 
tariffs in the SADC countries. The Ministers recommended that the SADC Home and Away Roaming Project 
be implemented in three phases, including: 1) liberalisation, transparency, information and data collection; 2) 
roam-like-a-local; and 3) cost-based price regulation. 
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Universal access and service is the principal policy and regulatory principle of the 
SADC Telecommunications Model Policy (SATCC 1998; Telecommunications policies 
for SADC): the policy objectives being to achieve universal service with regard to 
telecommunications services, and universal access with regard to advanced information 
services in the region. The Telecommunications Policy Model overlaps functions of 
policy development, policy implementation and administration, and the management of 
the fund. It prescribes the establishment of a universal service fund, and it states that it 
should be administered by a specialised agency under the ministry or under the 
regulator,73 without mentioning issues of independence or the definition of roles and 
responsibilities for each institutional actor. In a different section of the document, 
universal access and service is listed as one of the main functions of the regulator, who 
should also implement the policy formulated by the Universal Service Agency and 
administer the fund. The overlapping roles and functions of the minister, the regulator and 
the specialised agency, as specified in the Telecommunications Policy Model, nullify the 
possibility of using this model to develop a universal access and service policy, which 
takes into account the separation of powers and the independence of the regulator or the 
agency managing and administering the fund.74   
Universal access and service guidelines have been updated with the HIPPSA 
project in the form of a toolkit to implement universal access funding and service. 
Although the guidelines are focused on practical methods of establishing, running and 
disbursing a universal access and service fund, other research conducted in the region has 
been particularly critical of the establishment of the fund to finance network extension in 
rural and perceived uneconomic areas. This has mostly been due to weak institutional 
arrangements in the region and difficulties related to disbursing the fund. In particular, 
Calandro and Moyo (2010) assert that some of the perceived failure of markets, or the 
perception that some areas are uneconomic, which provides the rationale for the 
establishment of UAFs, is often the result of the failure of African governments to create a 
policy and regulatory environment conducive to investment, or to open up markets to 
                                       
73 Although there is not “one solution fits all” aspect to universal access and service policy, which can be 
implemented either by a regulator, a minister of ICT or a special agency, general ITU guidelines prescribe that 
there should be a legal mandate for the minister to develop universal access and service policies. However, the 
guidelines warn that in cases where the policy is both developed and implemented by the same organ, such as 
the minister, a risk of managing the fund independently may occur, especially in cases where the government 
has ownership interests in the industry (Maddens, 2009). 
74 It is important to mention that strong emphasis is placed on the creation and setting up of independent 
regulatory agencies, both in the Protocol and in the Telecommunications Policy Model. 
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competitors who may have not found it uneconomic to service areas where incumbents 
have legacy networks.  
5.3.4 Public availability of licensing criteria 
The Protocol on TCM (1996) does not mention that licensing criteria should be publicly 
available. This compromises a major public value of the government organisation: 
transparency. The Telecommunications Policy Model (SATCC, 1998) does not require 
that licensing criteria be publicly available, although it prescribes that the licensing 
function should be performed in a transparent manner.75 
5.3.5 Independent regulators 
The regional policy framework places a strong emphasis on the establishment of 
independent national regulatory bodies. Chapter 10 of the SADC Protocol specifically 
prescribes the establishment of autonomous and independent regulatory bodies. 
Furthermore, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies is mentioned as a 
structural change in the Telecommunications Policy Model for SADC, which also  
mentions that in a reformed telecommunications industry, public roles and power should 
be clearly separated. While governments should retain strategic planning and policy-
making powers, national regulatory agencies should independently enforce government 
directions. The document specifies that regulatory institutions should be completely 
independent from operators and governments, in order to ensure impartiality, flexibility 
and transparency.   
5.3.6 Allocation and use of scarce resources 
The regional policy and regulatory framework devotes little attention to the allocation and 
use of scarce resources, although the management of scarce resources is specifically 
mentioned among the regulatory functions in the Telecommunications Policy Model. It is 
also emphasised that the allocation of scarce resources should be done in a transparent 
manner. Neither the Protocol nor the Telecommunications Policy Model require that 
scarce-resource allocation should be done in an objective, timely and non-discriminatory 
manner. 
 
                                       
75 Specifically, the document requires that the licensing system should “undertake the licensing of all 
telecommunications service providers, according to such policy guidelines as may be set by the Minister; 
licence radio spectrum users, except those operating under licences issued by the broadcasting regulatory 
agency, where such an agency exists, undertake the review of existing licences, where applicable; monitor and 
enforce compliance with the relevant legislation and regulations; determine appropriate classes of licences; 
hear complaints from users and service providers.” (SATCC, 1998; Telecommunications policies for SADC). 
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Table 5.4: Comparison between Reference paper of GATS, SADC Protocol on TCM and 
Telecommunications Policies for SADC 
Reference paper of the IV 
Protocol to the GATS 
SADC Protocol on TCM Telecommunications 
Policies for SADC 
Sets up competitive 
safeguards to prevent main 
suppliers from engaging in, 
or continuing, anti-
competitive practices. 
Aims at promoting and 




requires granting of access 
to telecommunications 
networks and services by 
each other’s service 
providers on reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms 
and conditions. 
Aims at building a 
competitive regional 
telecommunications sector 
by attracting local and 
foreign investors; 
aims at promoting a fair 
competitive and stable 
investment environment; 
requires that network access 
is provided on reasonable 
and non-discriminatory 
terms and conditions; 
upholds the objective of 
structural transformation of 
the telecommunications 
institutions to introduce and 
to promote competition; 
puts the regulator in charge 
of monitoring demand- and 
supply-capacity of service 
providers with the right to 
intervene in order to correct 
imbalances or market 
distortion in favour of users. 
 
Ensures interconnection on 
reasonable terms and within 
a reasonable time. 
States that NRAs are 
responsible for determining 
harmonised interconnection 
guidelines. 
States that interconnection 
should facilitate 
interoperability of new 
services including carrier 
pre-selection and number 
portability. 
Specifies that any member Aims at achieving regional Upholds universal access 
 125 
Table 5.4: Comparison between Reference paper of GATS, SADC Protocol on TCM and 
Telecommunications Policies for SADC 
Reference paper of the IV 
Protocol to the GATS 
SADC Protocol on TCM Telecommunications 
Policies for SADC 
has the right to define the 
kind of universal service 
obligations it wishes to 
maintain; such obligations 





universal service with 
regard to 
telecommunications 
services; and regional 
universal access to 
advanced information 
services. 
and service as the principal 
policy and regulatory 
principle of the policy. 
Stipulates the public 
availability of licensing 
criteria. 
// // 
Calls for an independent 
regulator. 
Prescribes the establishment 




regulation as a possible 
structural change. 
Allocates the use of scarce 
resources. 
// Emphasises the allocation 
of scarce resources as a 
regulatory function which 
should be done in a 
transparent manner. 
Source: Author’s own tabulation 
 
5.3.7 The policy of managed liberalisation in regional documents 
Both the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology (1996) and the 
Telecommunications Policies for the SADC (SATCC, 1998) prescribe a liberalisation of 
the telecommunications sector in phases. By regulation, both the Protocol on Transport, 
Communications and Meteorology (1996) and the Telecommunications Policies for the 
SADC (SATCC, 1998) limited competition and market entry by granting exclusivity 
periods, in order to maximise the advantages of telecommunications infrastructures for 
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buyers.76 With regard to an exclusivity period, Wallsten (2000) investigates the effect of 
an exclusivity period on sector performance. He observes that countries granting the 
privatised incumbent an exclusivity period thereby guaranteed a temporary monopoly, 
thus attracting investors while doubling the value of telecommunication infrastructure 
assets. However, he found out that, although the exclusivity period granted by regulation 
is associated with significant increases in the value of the incumbent’s assets, the operator 
significantly decreases investment in telecommunications infrastructure. The reason is 
that monopolies maximise profits, cutting down outputs, and therefore have no incentive 
to invest in order to improve outputs (Wallsten, 2000). Furthermore, the exclusivity 
period conflicts with market efficiency objectives because it significantly reduces 
competition (Hodge, 2002). 
The second reason for a gradual liberalisation programme is to provide enough time 
for incumbents to adjust to a new, potentially competitive environment, and survive.  
Another measure restricting market entry is the imposed limitation on foreign 
ownership, adopted as a foundation of the telecommunications reform policy in order to 
build domestic expertise and entrepreneurship. Countries force foreign investors to go into 
a joint venture with a domestic partner. South Africa has also inserted the black economic 
empowerment clause. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The SADC has formally achieved a high level of regional integration. Political and 
economic reasons have caused the region to establish a development community regulated 
by constitutionally-binding documents, such as the treaty establishing the SADC (1992). 
Under the treaty, several institutions have been created with powers to impose binding 
rules on member states, and to initiate, implement and monitor strategic plans, 
programmes and projects. In addition to the SADC secretariat and a specialised office 
dealing with regional ICT policies, other regional structures have been created to regulate 
the sector at a regional level, and to monitor the level of development in the 
                                       
76 The Telecommunications Policy for the SADC clearly states that the regional strategy to maximize revenue 
generation is to “retain the integrated nature of the state-owned telecommunications enterprise network intact 
during negotiation on exclusivity” (SATCC, 1998: 25). This is because the vertically-integrated structure of 
the incumbent is considered more attractive to potential investors. In particular, the “transition period” is 
aimed at creating, within the new institutional framework, the necessary capacity to operate in a largely 
liberalised global economy, and to allow the existing institutions and the newly-established regulators and 
operators time to adjust to new market conditions, which include the privatisation of the incumbent and the 
entrance of new telecommunication players. The Protocol on TCM (SADC, 1997) prescribed that changes 
leading to partial or total privatisation of the public incumbent be affected in phases. It was recommended that 
a five year limited period of exclusivity be granted. 
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telecommunications sector, which is supported by regional organisation. A Protocol, 
Telecommunications Policy Guidelines and a Telecommunications Model Bill govern the 
sector at a regional level, and provide guidelines for member states on how to regulate key 
issues, such as the establishment of universal access and service funds, interconnection, 
allocation of scarce resources, public availability of licencing criteria, and independent 
regulators. The SADC ICT policy and regulatory framework is well aligned to the 
Reference Paper of the IV Protocol to the GATS. However, both the SADC Protocol on 
TCM (1996) and the Telecommunications Policies for the SADC (1998) prescribe a 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in phases. They recommend that the 
SADC countries retain the vertically-integrated nature of the PSTN incumbent during 
negotiation on exclusivity, in order to maximise telecommunications infrastructure assets 
for buyers. 
Although RECs can support the participation of less-resourced and small member 
countries in WTO negotiation processes, as they can support preparatory work of member 
states and the coordination of regional positions at WTO level, studies reveal that the 
SADC lacks human and financial resources, lacks representation in Geneva and lacks 
concrete inputs from member states at WTO negotiations. As a result, although most of 
the recommendations provided by the RP of the IV Protocol to the GATS have been 
embedded in regional ICT policy and regulatory framework, only six countries (Botswana, 
DRC, Lesotho, South Africa, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe) have made specific commitments 
on telecommunications. Angola, Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique have only partially 
liberalised their markets, while ownership restrictions in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South 
Africa may obstruct foreign direct investments in telecommunications markets.  
The next chapter explores how the regional institutional arrangements (in policy 
and regulatory efforts) have shaped ICT policy and regulatory outcomes, in terms of 
outputs in relation to regional structures, institutions and ICT legal frameworks. 
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CHAPTER 6 – ANALYSIS OF QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
While the previous chapter identified the institutions and instruments of regional 
integration, particularly with respect to the ICT sector, this chapter reports on the findings 
from interviews, conducted with key stakeholders involved in the reform process of ICT 
policy and regulation in the SADC. The aim is to establish whether the regional 
institutional arrangements – including regional structures and processes – facilitated or 
constrained the realisation of the regional objectives of integration and harmonisation of 
ICT policy and regulatory frameworks, and why and how they did so. The information 
collected through the interviews has been integrated and complemented with media and 
press releases, informal conversations with representatives from national, regional and 
international organisations, and presentations from regional meetings.77  
In the final chapter, this analysis uses Keohane and Nye’s (1975) concept of 
“institutional integration” to assess the policy outcomes of governments. Keohane and 
Nye emphasise the importance of explaining aspects of integration, such as institutional 
and policy integration, and of relating this level of integration to their outputs. They 
suggest that institutions are created for the effects that they have on social and economic 
conditions, and should be evaluated in terms of the outcomes of government policies. 
They observe that focusing on policy integration directs one’s evaluation to those 
outcomes which directly affect people’s lives. This analytical approach goes beyond the 
observation of institutions. It therefore overcomes the limitations of an analysis that 
correlates “the political significance of an integration process with its degree of formal 
institutionalisation” (Keohane and Nye, 1975: 375). In addition, the conceptual 
framework of capacity-building, as a tool for foreign affairs, is used as the lens through 
which to examine the evidence collected through interviews conducted with respondents, 
who are involved in the regional process of developing an harmonised ICT policy and 
regulatory framework. The thesis draws on Hameiri’s (2009) concept of capacity-building 
as a political mechanism for state trans-nationalisation and thus as an instrument in 
foreign affairs. In that sense, technical assistance and capacity-building activities are not 
only technical undertakings aimed at improving economic performance and social 
development, but are also foreign policy tools which are used to advance national interests 
and norms (Pawlak, 2014).  
                                       
77 The participatory observation included a few meetings such as participation in the conference “e-Parliament, 
Concept, Policy and Reality” held at parliament in the Republic of South Africa during October 2009; a 
CRASA meeting on spectrum management held in Johannesburg in September 2012; participation in internet 
governance forums, such as the ICANN47 Durban meeting and the Southern Africa IGF. 
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The analysis of the qualitative findings, and the emerging themes and patterns 
arising from the interviews, are used, together with the findings of the document analysis 
in the previous chapter, to build a case study of regional policymaking.  
The interviews were conducted with purposefully sampled key stakeholders, and 
focused on four main areas of investigation: 
1. the drivers (national and international) for the development of an integrated regional 
ICT policy and regulatory framework; 
2. the enforcement of regional ICT policies, protocols and declarations at a national level, 
and level and status of integration and harmonisation achieved by ICT policy and 
regulation in the SADC region; 
3. the involvement of international organisations in regional ICT policy and regulatory 
formulation; and 
4. the role of SADC in international regulation. 
6.1 Coding 
The first step in my analysis of the interviews was to develop codes to select and narrow 
down the information received from the participants into more manageable and consistent 
clusters of data. The codes were generated from the topics addressed in the semi-
structured questionnaire, and were useful in clustering similar subjects or ideas gathered 
from different conversations. 
Thematic coding involves “interpreting the information” and categorising textual 
extracts with reference to “themes in the context of a theory or conceptual framework” 
(Boyatzis, 1998:11). This form of coding allows one to analyse narrative data and to 
identify emergent themes. Individual topics were identified, based on the proposed 
theoretical framework, research questions, and prior literature review, and they are 
described through the lens of “institutional integration”, capacity building as a form of 
foreign affairs and the support of an epistemic community. Thematic coding was used, for 
example, to combine and catalogue recurring patterns identified in the narrative data 
collected through the semi-structured interviews. Transcripts of digitally recorded 
interviews have been reviewed, and the topics found have been listed, based on recurring 
subjects and issues. The themes or thematic patterns were used as a framework to analyse 
why regional structures, through their policy and regulatory interventions, have not 
achieved the intended ICT policy objectives as stated in SADC protocols and declarations.  
Once groups of narrative data were created on the basis of themes and issues mentioned 
above, a more in-depth analysis of the participants’ answers gathered in codes, made it 
possible to identify themes that were clearly connected to the issues previously identified 
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in the theoretical framework. 
The interviews have been coded and evaluated according to the following issues: 
! the degree of policy and regulatory impact of regional institutions and their capacity 
to influence the telecommunications sector reform process at a national level; 
! the capacity of regional institutions to influence ICT policy at a national level; 
! the degree of participation of member states in regional decision-making processes 
and regional ICT policy and regulatory formulation; 
! the degree of involvement of international organisations and foreign communities 
in processes of regional ICT policy formulation; and 
! the impact of regional ICT policy and regulatory frameworks on market structure 
and regional ICT infrastructure development, and the development of ICT 
infrastructure because or despite of these. 
6.2 Challenges in collecting and analysing qualitative data 
The main challenge encountered in conducting the interviews was the availability of 
respondents. The majority of them belong to national, regional and international public 
organisations and although they were consistently followed up, in many cases no answer 
or limited feedback was received. As emerged during some interviews, there is not a 
strong practice of transparency and accountability in the African public sector. Indeed, in 
some countries a culture of secrecy still exists and therefore officials from public 
institutions were reluctant to be involved in this study. Alternatively, they did not feel any 
obligation to record or account for their period in office. Others were defensive, either 
about policy outcomes or because they feared their lack of expertise in the area might be 
exposed. 
In addition, reports from regional meetings and declarations are not always publicly 
available, and representatives from regional organisations refused to provide these 
documents. The regional legal framework does not require the publication of these 
documents and therefore representatives from regional organisations prefer not to release 
them. Therefore, the only accessible documents, besides the historical legal documents, 
such as guidelines, model laws and model bills, were media statements and presentations, 
to supplement often outdated websites.  
This has been counterbalanced to some degree, by drawing on the survey results of 
mapping multi-stakeholder participation in internet governance from an African 
perspective conducted during 2014.78  
                                       
78 I was the project leader on this Annenberg-funded survey designed and conducted at Research ICT Africa 
(RIA) in collaboration with NEPAD Agency. RIA is the regional think tank where I have been working as a 
research fellow since I started the Ph.D. thesis. 
 131 
6.3 Summary of findings 
The purposefully sampled respondents were selected from regional and international 
organisations involved in the first and second round of reforms. Respondents included 
representatives from NEPAD agency, ITU, SATRA, Research ICT Africa, USAID, 
CRASA, SADC Secretariat, and SADC Parliamentary Forum.  
The following themes, recurring in the coding process, produced these findings: 
1) The importance of economies of scale and scope and the need for a common approach 
to the market were found to be the main drivers integrating and harmonising policy and 
regulation at a regional level. In addition, two main reasons for regional integration 
emerged from a political point of view: the need to create a common regional identity; and 
the need to shift from the isolation of South Africa under the apartheid regime to a more 
regionally-inclusive regime. 
2) The level of participation of member states in the reform process was evaluated as high 
by different respondents. However, member states only become involved at the end of the 
regional policy-making and regulatory process, when they participated in validation 
workshops after the legal documents have already been developed by consultants from 
donors or multilateral agencies. 
3) Although a harmonised policy and regulatory framework exists and has been developed 
at a regional level, it has not been fully transposed to the national level. The main 
objective of the first round of reforms, separating government and regulatory roles, was 
achieved at national level - with the exception of Swaziland – but the regional framework 
has been unequally implemented in all SADC countries. The main reasons are (a) absence 
of enforcement mechanisms for model policies and model bills, and a voluntary approach 
to transposing the regional framework at national level; (b) different transposing 
mechanisms in different national legislative frameworks; (c) lack of expertise at a 
parliamentary level to transpose regional measures into national legislation; (d) lack of a 
robust base of data and analysis on the development of the ICT sector, which makes it 
difficult for policy-makers to adapt a regional framework to local reality, and identify 
precise points of policy intervention; (e) lack of parliamentary participation in regional 
processes, despite the existence of the SADC Parliamentary Forum. 
4) Although leadership positions on different policies rotate among SADC countries, 
some member states, such as Mauritius and South Africa, have been more capable of 
leading the regional debate. The countries which most influence regional policy and 
regulatory outcome are those that perform better in terms of regulating the sector, or 
simply have a larger market (even if they experience policy and regulatory failure), and 
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other member states thus follow their example. Nevertheless, among SADC countries 
there is a strong feeling of teamwork when they deal with ICT policy issues. 
5) Due to a lack of financial and human resources, and technical capacity at a regional 
level, especially with regard to ICT policy and regulation, international organisations 
provide the technical expertise needed to develop harmonised regional frameworks. 
Although they employ experts and consultants, they bring into the region an epistemic 
community view of international regulation, which is often informed by assumptions 
developed in mature markets and political systems. 
6) The regional institutional arrangements are not conducive to effective ICT policy-
making. Structures to monitor and evaluate the level integration achieved by the 
harmonised regional framework do not play any significant role. Furthermore, the 
dominance of ministers in the ratification process does not leave enough space for other 
entities – such as parliaments – to participate and influence regional ICT policy outcomes. 
In order to link views to institutional perspectives in the analysis of the interviews, I have 
assigned specific roles to the interviewees. They were grouped in the following 
categories: representatives from international organisations, representatives from regional 
organisations, and representatives from academia and external consultants. These groups 
have been categorised according to the interviewees’ involvement in the regional reform 
process. 
The following paragraphs analyse in detail what emerged from the semi-structured 
interviews. 
6.4 What are the drivers of the development of an integrated 
regional ICT policy and regulatory framework? 
In order to assess the drivers (national and international) for the development of an 
integrated regional ICT policy and regulatory framework, interviewees were asked to 
discuss the reasons for ICT policy and regulatory integration in the SADC region, and 
what are the mechanisms of participation of member states in the regional ICT policy and 
regulatory formulation. From the codification of the answers, the following five drivers 
have emerged. 
6.4.1 The theory: Regional economies of scale and scope 
Respondents provided different answers. The main reason was the creation of regional 
economies of scale and scope.  
“It is important to harmonise ICT policy and regulation to benefit from 
economies of scale and scope. The majority of SADC countries have small 
telecommunications markets that would not appeal to investors. Instead, a 
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bigger market would attract a bigger injection of investment in this sector.” 
(Linzie, telephonic interview, April 2013).  
Regional economies of scale and scope, according to another respondent, would develop 
through the creation of a regional telecommunications market.  
“One of the main objectives of the African Union is to develop a bigger 
market, starting with the establishment of Regional Economic Communities 
which are the building blocks of the African Union. In order to establish a 
common market the players in the market need a regulatory environment 
which is conducive to stimulating business. A common market allows the 
movement of products and services across countries and therefore there is a 
need to establish a regional market with similar rules across SADC countries. 
The establishment of a regional market would also attract more investors to 
the region.” (Katiti, telephonic interview, April 2013). 
On the same note, a representative from the Africa ITU regional office remarked that: 
“The existence of the SADC emanates from the need of the countries to 
integrate their economies and to achieve free movement of people. The 
integration of ICT policy and regulation was part of SADC economic 
integrations. These policies do not differ from other RECs. They all try to 
integrate their economies to create bigger markets to make investment more 
attractive and cheaper.” (Tayob, telephonic interview, October 2012). 
However, according to an external consultant, although the rationale to integrate policy 
frameworks in the first round of reforms was to achieve economies of scale, the benefits 
of economies of scale and scope were not totally understood at that time due to the pre-
liberalisation context in which the process developed.79 
Similarly, and linked to economies of scale and scope, an external consultant mentioned 
the need for a common approach to the market.  
                                       
79  In the 1980s, the World Bank and the IMF promoted the liberalisation of telecommunications markets in 
Africa in the form of structural adjustment programmes (Alemu, undated). The pre-liberalisation era was 
characterised by government ownership of a monopoly telecommunications company and government funds 
were allocated to develop the infrastructure. Inefficiencies such as slow pace of network roll-out, long waiting 
line for services, consumers limited to only one service provider, and poor quality of service delivery were, 
among others, common characteristics of the pre-liberalisation period throughout African markets. In the last 
two decades of the 20th century, several countries in the world have come to realise the importance of 
liberalising the telecommunications market for rapid growth of the network, and many have recognised the 
importance of private sector participation to attract financial resources, innovation and new technology 
(Ndukwe, 2005b). 
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“There is a need for the region to have a common approach to the market. In 
the SADC, there are different levels of development of national markets.” 
(Msimang, telephonic interview, November 2012). 
6.4.2 The cultural and political ideology: building an African identity 
In addition to economic issues, two political reasons were identified during the interviews. 
A representative from the ITU stressed the need for an African voice:  
“In the African continent there are differences in terms of economic 
development. Integration tries to ensure that African countries speak the same 
language at a continental level. Integration should be achieved both at a 
regional and at a continental level.” (Jallow, telephonic interview, April 
2013).  
Another official from the ITU remarked that historically, integration was created by 
SADC countries to isolate South Africa under the apartheid regime.  
“At that time, integrating telecommunications infrastructure was pursued to 
achieve a higher level of independence (from South Africa) and therefore, 
SADC prioritised infrastructure integration, including telecommunications.” 
(Tayob, telephonic interview, October 2012). 
6.4.3 The aspiration: emulating the EU model of integration 
In addition to economies of scale and scope, and the political reasons mentioned above, a 
third reason for integration emerged from the interviews: that the SADC is influenced by 
the EU model of integration. An external consultant asserted that: 
“SADC operates on the principle that it would like to emulate the EU – it 
would like to reach the same level of regional integration. However, a balance 
needs to be achieved between integration and countries going their own way.” 
(Goulden, personal interview, October 2012). 
A similar reason was provided by another interviewee from a multilateral agency: 
“Regional integration was achieved through regulatory harmonisation and 
legal integration.” (Le Bihan, telephonic interview, October 2012). 
However, he also expressed doubts about the viability of applying regulatory frameworks 
developed in the EU to the SADC context.  
6.4.4 The epistemic community: international regulatory trends 
A representative from a regional organisation recognised that regional reforms, in the 
SADC ICT policy context, were driven by international regulatory trends set by the ITU, 
such as the separation of postal and telecommunication regulation.  
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“Drivers were coming from outside the region, for instance at the ITU level. 
As member states came together (with the creation of the Southern African 
Development Coordinating Conference by treaty in 1980), they realised that 
there was a need to harmonise telecommunications policy and regulatory 
frameworks. At that time, the main issue was separating postal and 
telecommunications services. The SADC works closely with the ITU and it 
seeks to keep up with what is happening at an international level. Since the 
process of integration had already started in the SADC, it facilitated the 
implementation of a process that was happening at an international level. The 
protocol then called for that separation.” (Mamelodi, personal interview, 
January 2013). 
6.4.5 Global interoperability: technical harmonisation at a regional level 
There were also reasons of a technical nature given as justification to harmonise ICT 
policy and regulation in SADC countries.  
“Some technical issues, such as frequency harmonisation, need to be 
addressed at a regional level in order to prevent cross-border conflicts.” 
(Msimang, telephonic interview, November 2012). 
However, it was explained that in an exercise of harmonisation, it is important to take into 
account similar and diverging elements between countries.  
“With the HIPPSA project we supported SADC countries to develop 
guidelines related to cyber-security and universal access and service.” 
(Bazzanella, telephonic interview, November 2012). 
An interviewee from a regional regulator stressed that harmonising ICT policy and 
regulation is a learning process for the region. She expressed the need to share 
experiences with other regions which had a more mature economy and regulation.   
However, it also emerged that harmonisation has several challenges. A representative 
from a regional regulator stated that harmonisation is considered a new phenomenon in 
the SADC region as it began only 20 years ago. In other regions, such as in the United 
States and in Europe, this process started earlier. 
6.5  Shortfalls of regional institutional arrangements for ICT 
policy-making 
Issues pertaining to ICT policy at a regional level have rarely been a priority for the 
SADC. This is confirmed by the fact that ICT, as an issue, was only taken to the Summit 
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level in August 1996, when the Heads of State gathered in Maseru, Lesotho, to sign the 
SADC Protocol80 on Transport, Communications and Meteorology.  
A second problem, related to the regional institutional arrangement that emerged from the 
interviews, is linked to monitoring the implementation of the Protocol at a national level. 
An external consultant stated that in the first round of reforms, institutional structures in 
charge of monitoring the implementation of the Protocol at a national level did not play 
any significant role. According to him: 
“The SADC Council did not play any relevant role in supervising the 
implementation of the Protocol mostly because it did not have enough 
(operational) funds. Two programmes were set up to support the 
implementation of the Protocol and they were called the RAPID81 and SIRPS 
for the southern African ICT policy and regulatory support programme. The 
support programme aimed mostly at involving ICT ministers who were under-
resourced and therefore worked on very broad policy issues.” (Goulden, 
personal interview, October 2012). 
Another shortfall in the regional institutional arrangements, is that parliaments and MPs 
have not played any relevant role in regional ICT policy-making processes. From the 
interviews it clearly emerged that the majority of regional decisions pertaining to ICT are 
taken at an ICT ministerial meeting level. Regional projects, programmes and declarations 
are all approved at that level.82  
6.5.1 Regional policy outputs normally do not reach the SADC Summit 
Since regional documents do not reach the Summit level, they do not become legally 
binding on member states. For instance, although the first phase of the HIPSSA project 
has been concluded, the amended protocol, which was the most important component of 
the overall project, did not reach the Summit level, and therefore is not binding on 
member states. A representative from a regional organisation gave a few reasons for the 
protocol not reaching Summit level: 
                                       
80 The Protocol is a binding document for signatories and therefore needs to be endorsed by Heads of State. 
81 The Regional Activity to Promote Integration Through Dialogue and Policy Implementation (RAPID) was 
the successor of the RTRP programme (Barendse, 2006). It was a 5-year USAID-financed regional 
programme which aimed at providing “quick-response, short- to medium-term technical services supporting 
policy analysis, dialogue, and facilitation of policy implementation under the Regional Centre for southern 
Africa’s development assistance programme for the SADC region.” (Zlotsky, 2001). 
82 The HIPSSA framework was approved by ICT ministers from SADC meeting in Mauritius. In 2008, the 
Reference Framework for harmonization of the telecommunication and ICT policies and regulation in Africa, 
was adopted by member states of the African Union (AU), during the 2nd conference of African Ministers in 
charge of Communication and Information Technologies (ITU, 2013). 
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“The work undertaken by HIPSSA has not been taken to the Summit. We have 
been required to wait, because our protocol includes transport, 
communications and meteorology. We have only done the communications 
chapter. But to review the protocol it is also required that we review the other 
chapters. The amended protocol was not taken to the Summit level because 
our legal department identified a problem relating to the separation of 
different policy domains. Do we need a protocol including all these three 
sectors or do we need to separate the protocol? I think that the decision can 
only be made in totality. The protocol as it stands has not been forwarded to 
the member states. Further, when our legal experts required a version with 
tracked changes of the draft of the new protocol, people working on the postal 
component failed to submit a tracked document and so the legal department 
placed the process on hold. Before a document goes to the Heads of State it 
needs to go through (and be approved by) the legal department.” (Mamelodi, 
personal interview, January 2013).   
Despite an updated protocol on communications not being approved, two harmonised 
model laws were approved by SADC ICT ministers through the HIPSSA project: a SADC 
harmonised cyber-security model law83 and the SADC Guidelines on Transparency for the 
SADC Home and Away Roaming.84 
“The new legislative framework went through all national regulators. CRASA 
has approved it and now it needs to be approved by the ministers to become 
part of the new national regulatory framework.” (Msimang, telephonic 
interview, November 2012). 
                                       
83 In March 2012 in Gaborone, Botswana, a multi-stakeholder validation workshop was held to validate the 
SADC harmonised cyber-security model law, which was developed as an output of the HIPSSA project. The 
model law was reviewed again during the SADC ICT SCOM in April 2012 in Balaclava, Mauritius. 
Subsequently, the model laws were approved by SADC ICT ministers in November 2012 in Balaclava, 
Mauritius. SADC member states are undertaking national transpositions of the SADC harmonised cyber-
security model laws. In particular, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have been 
supported by the ITU; Botswana by the Commonwealth Secretariat; and the Seychelles by UNECA (Ah-Thew, 
2013). 
84 SADC ministers have considered and approved the SADC Guidelines on Transparency (e.g. on balance, 
call limit information, tariffs for voice, SMS and data) for SADC Home and Away Roaming (SHAR) and this 
became effective on the 1st June 2013. The aim of the roaming process was to develop legislation on the end 
of roaming based on the EU model. The SHAR is a regional initiative to promote affordability of mobile 
roaming services in the SADC region. The guidelines are in line with the directive of the ministers meeting 
held in November 2012 in Balaclava, Mauritius, which stipulated the enforcement of transparency measures 
and the establishment of the Roam Like A Local (RLAL) principle by June 2015. (SADC, 2012). 
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6.5.2 Policy and regulatory processes slower than market developments 
Regional policymaking processes have not always been able to keep up with 
developments in the telecommunications industry. Policy and regulatory processes have 
been slower than market developments. According to an external consultant,  
“In the SADC, roaming has already happened, for instance, through the 
Vodacom network. What CRASA was trying to do, through a regional 
regulatory intervention, was to import a ‘hot topic’, but operators were 
already finding their own ways to reduce roaming charges. At that time it was 
a hot topic on the agenda in Europe and ministries decided to address it in the 
SADC as well. ICT ministries identified it as an issue and they looked for an 
international partner to fund the implementation of a regulatory framework. 
The EU approved the intervention and came on board. However, by the time it 
was approved and financed, the market had anticipated the regulatory reform, 
which has not yet been completed because it has not been taken to the Summit 
level.” (Msimang, telephonic interview, November 2012). 
6.5.3 Weak enforcement mechanisms of regional regulatory documents 
An interviewee from the SADC Secretariat asserted that the majority of SADC countries 
implemented regional measures. However, she stressed that the SADC is not the only 
organisation assisting member states to update their ICT policy and regulatory framework: 
“Countries at a national level have their own supporting agreements and their 
own partnerships. Countries usually look to SADC for guidance but they have 
their own bilateral agreements to support them. Some countries are ahead of 
the SADC, and we take into account their laws in our harmonised framework 
so that we don’t replicate resources. Others have set up a computer measures 
response team. Others have support from other organisations. We can 
facilitate the funding or get support at national level.” (Mamelodi, personal 
interview, January 2013). 
Outputs of regional ICT policy processes include declarations. According to the 
interviewee, declarations may represent an obstacle to the implementation of the regional 
framework at a national level due to their legal status: these documents are not required to 
be enforced at national level. An external consultant agreed with this view of the legal 
status of protocols in the SADC. He stated that although there is an enforcement clause in 
the protocol, it is meaningless. Despite a formal enforcement mechanism in place at a 
protocol level, it is actually ineffective. The model law and the model policy are used as a 
baseline for the work done by member states, but only a few countries have adopted the 
models because they all have different national legislative frameworks. 
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On a different regulatory level, it emerged that model laws developed in the second round 
of reforms have had a bigger impact on national regulations. The interviews showed that 
international organisations have been successful in providing support for an effective 
implementation of international programmes at a regional level and support member states 
in the implementation of regional model policy and model laws. A representative from an 
international organisation declared that, at an implementation level, the ministerial 
meeting held in Mauritius in 2012 adopted the framework developed by the HIPSSA 
project.85  
“At the moment many SADC countries are at the implementation phase (of the 
cyber-security and universal access and service model laws). Following the 
adoption by all SADC ministers, the ITU provides support for each country to 
support the transposition. Currently (at the time the interview was conducted), 
the ITU has a request for assistance from Tanzania, which has almost 
completed the transposition process, and from Lesotho. The ITU is in the 
process of supporting Namibia, Seychelles, Zambia, and Rwanda as well.” 
(Jallow, telephonic interview, April 2013).  
6.5.4 Different regional issues dominated by different member countries 
Opinions vary as to whether a particular country has had a leadership position in the 
process of harmonising ICT policies at a regional level. Instead of one country acting as 
leader, a representative from a regional organisation mentioned the rotation of leadership 
among SADC countries with reference to policy issues. For instance, the role of host 
country, chairing a subsector in the SADC Parliamentary Forum, rotates every three years.  
However, a representative from the SADC Parliamentary Forum acknowledged that there 
are some countries more capable of dominating the regional debate and agenda on ICT. 
Among those countries, Mauritius was mentioned.  
                                       
85 Specifically, the meeting deliberated over a number of issues and made a number of decisions, including the 
adoption of the principle of “roam like a local”; the approval of a regional roadmap on DTT broadcasting 
migration; the approval of the draft SADC model laws on cyber security, cybercrime, data protection and 
electronic transactions; the approval of the draft e-Commerce Strategy and Action Plan; and directed the 
Secretariat to ensure that they effectively implement the SADC e-Commerce Strategy and Action Plan. The 
ministerial meetings acknowledged the work undertaken by the SADC with regard to the updating of 
guidelines, including the review of the SADC Frequency Band Plan and the development of guidelines for 
accessing unlicensed spectrum bands. Issues of equitable access to submarine cables at fair and affordable 
prices were also discussed, and member states with landing stations were required to work with land-locked 
counterparts (SADC, 2012).  
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“The country is performing relatively well with regard to regulating the sector, 
and therefore other countries try to emulate its performance.” (Matanga, 
telephonic interview, November 2012).  
She added that South Africa has a similar role in the region. According to her, the country 
leading or driving the debate is not the country which tries to influence regional policy 
and regulatory outcome, but the one which is performing better in terms of regulating the 
sector, when its example is followed by other member states. Her position was confirmed 
during another interview with a SADC official. The respondent stated that rotation 
mechanisms are in place86 and that there is no feeling among member states that the 
Secretariat is pushing a specific national agenda. She added that the SADC Secretariat is 
not aware of any dissenting voice with regard to the formulation of its regional policies. 
According to her, all the SADC countries have recognised the importance of ICT and they 
work as a team, taking into account different levels of ICT development in each country 
(Mamelodi, personal interview, January 2013).  
 
A respondent from the ITU asserted that the HIPSSA process was led and driven by South 
Africa because the country has more resources than other SADC countries. However, 
other countries could also be influential. For instance, he recalled that Botswana hosted a 
meeting on cyber-security87 and Mauritius has always been very involved in regional 
issues. The relevant role of South Africa in regional issues has been identified by a 
representative from a regional implementing agency, who stated that the country is one of 
the founding countries of the NEPAD, together with Nigeria, Senegal, Egypt and Algeria. 
He stressed that 
“Those are the countries providing more substantial support to the NEPAD. 
They support not only the vision of the agency, but also the NEPAD 
financially. With regard to ICT, we have received substantial support from the 
South African Department of Communications.” (Katiti, telephonic interview, 
April 2013). 
                                       
86 The SADC Chairperson is elected each year by the annual Summit of the Heads of State (SADC, 2014b).  
87 On the 8 November 2012, in Baclava, Mauritius, SADC ministers responsible for communications and ICT, 
deliberated over a number of issues including a revised SADC roadmap on DTT broadcasting migration; they 
agreed that the region move towards the adoption of the “Road like a local” and requested SADC ICT 
regulators to engage national operators to effectively implement the recommendation. In addition, they 
approved the draft SADC roadmap on DTT broadcasting migration; the draft SADC model law on cyber-
security, cyber-crime, data protection and electronic transaction, which was developed in conformity with the 
AUC Draft Convention on Cyber Security (2012); and a draft e-Commerce Strategy and Action Plan (SADC, 
2014). 
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An external consultant had a different opinion, particularly concerning the leadership 
during the first round of reforms:  
“South Africa would like to believe it was driving the process, but in reality 
the two driving countries were Botswana and Tanzania. A young lawyer from 
Tanzania, Mozli Lakawka, drafted the original SADCC treaty. He had a very 
strong regional focus. Also Thapelo Maupa from the BTA [Botswana 
Telecommunications Authority] was very involved. Most SADC countries do 
not consider South Africa as the leading country in the SADC.” (Goulden, 
personal interview, October 2012). 
A similar view was expressed by an interviewee from an international organisation who 
stated that there was not any particular country leading the reform process. However, he 
argued that:  
“Zambia quickly became the reference point for other countries because it 
was able to rapidly reform the sector and therefore was perceived as a 
success and as a more advanced country. But the country was not leading the 
process.” (Tayob, telephonic interview, October 2012). 
6.5.5 Lack of skills and funds at a regional level 
It emerged from an interview that regional institutions need to engage with international 
organisations in order to develop and implement programmes due to lack of capacity, 
skills and funds: 
“The ability (of regional organisations) to deliver is a challenge. There is 
lack of capacity to manage these processes and there are no real 
alternatives to the EU. There is no budget for ICT programmes at a regional 
level.” (Gillwald, personal interview, June 2012). 
In the second round of reforms, in addition to the ITU, the EU played an important role in 
the HIPSSA project. From an interview with a representative from a regional organisation, 
it appeared that the EU, through the European Commission, funded the project and an 
international consultant belonging to the ITU was appointed as project coordinator. Like 
other respondents from regional organisations, she asserted that African regional 
organisations, such as the SADC, need support from international organisations due to 
lack of capacity and, in some cases, lack of independence, as in the case of CRASA. She 
added that they lack funds because member states do not always pay their regional 
membership fees.88 The level of involvement of international organisations is thus high 
                                       
88 SADC countries are experiencing severe public debt and public budget constraints. Also, overlapping 
membership in different regional organisations creates duplication of resources and increases membership 
fees for member states. 
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and they are able to strongly influence the regional and the international agenda. This 
position was reinforced by a respondent from an international organisation, who affirmed 
that:  
“Due to the low level of resources that African countries have, especially in 
the realm of ICT, you find that African countries require assistance from 
international organisations that are able to source the right capacity needed 
to implement international best practices. Due to limited capacity and lack of 
experience, you find that these countries need support from international 
organisations in the area of ICT.” (Jallow, telephonic interview, April 2013). 
Regarding funds available for the region to support the development of regional ICT 
policy and regulatory formulation, the key role played by the EU in the second round of 
reforms was stressed by a representative from a regional organisation who stated that the 
EU is one of the main organisations supporting activities related to ICT policy, regulatory 
formulation and implementation. However, it appears that mechanisms of involvement of 
the EU with the HIPSSA project were not fully understood by the SADC Secretariat:  
“There is a theory that the SADC has been allocated funds by the EU that 
have never been used. Although it seems that there are some funds allocated 
for ICT, we have not been told how to access them, so they got lost. Those who 
knew that there was this fund, have not been able to advise how to access it. 
When the HIPSSA project came out, we were told that there was this project, 
and I know that ICT was funded by the EU, so maybe this was a new EU 
method of funding? Most of the work that we did was really with member state 
support. HIPSSA is now going to phase two, and we wrote a letter of support 
because we saw the benefits of it.” (Mamelodi, personal interview, January 
2013). 
According to an external consultant, international organisations provided mostly technical 
support. However, their role is limited.  
“They provide support on a specific issue and then they disappear.” 
(Msimang, telephonic interview, November 2012).  
“They act as a forum for exchanging ideas. There are agreements on 
standards. They have a leading role for least-developed countries. ITU is 
very important in sub-Saharan Africa because they can provide the technical 
knowledge.” (Goulden, personal interview, October 2012). 
The role of international organisations as technical partners was confirmed by a 
representative from a regional organisation who also provided a detailed description of 
the role of international organisations in the HIPSSA project. 
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“The support provided (by international organisations) was in connection 
with writing the terms of references, identifying the consultants, getting the 
reports out, providing funds to convene validation workshops, and funding the 
participation of member states in the validation workshops. In order to 
develop the e-strategy, the UNECA assisted us (i.e. SADC Secretariat) to 
develop the ToRs, to identify the consultants, to organise a number of 
preparatory workshops. […] We hope that in the future, once we have set up 
our thematic group, we will be able to work directly with partners.” 
(Mamelodi, personal interview, January 2013). 
6.6 Uneven implementation of regional measures at a national 
level 
In order to understand if national and international drivers for the development of an 
integrated regional ICT policy and regulatory framework take into account national 
differences in terms of ICT sector development, one area of investigation was the level of 
participation of member states in the process of integrating ICT policy and regulation at a 
regional level. According to many of the interviewees the level of participation of SADC 
countries in this process was significant, but the issue of implementation of regional ICT 
policy and regulatory framework at a national level is most controversial, because 
respondents provided diverging opinions. 
6.6.1 Participation of member states through conferences and validation 
workshops 
From the interviews it emerged that the main institutionalised mechanisms of 
participation of member states in the process of reforming the telecommunications sector 
at a regional level are meetings, in the form of conferences and validation workshops. 
Thus in the second round of reforms, member states were mostly involved at the end of 
the process. 
”Although the participation of SADC countries has been considered high, 
SADC countries were mostly involved at a validation workshop level.” (Jallow, 
telephonic interview, April 2013).  
“In the validation workshop for the Universal Access and Service guidelines, 
for example, there was little feedback from Malawi, Lesotho and Botswana 
and a low level of participation by South Africa.” (Msimang, telephonic 
interview, November 2012). 
A respondent from an international organisation provided a detailed description of how 
participation of member states was implemented through a consultative process in the first 
round of reforms.  
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“The implementing agency of the Protocol on Transport, Communications 
and Meteorology was the technical unit of the Southern Africa Transport and 
Communication Commission (SATCC). The Secretariat was composed of 
member states, represented by Ministers of Transport and Communications or 
Ministers of Post and Telecommunications, depending on the structure in each 
country. They held a ministerial meeting annually but also extraordinary 
meetings. As a technical unit, they designed a project called the Regional 
Telecommunications Restructuring Programme (RTRP). Brian Goulden was 
recruited as project manager, chief of the party. Throughout that project, 
anything they came up with was submitted to different channels for ministerial 
approval. Committees composed of specialists in each country were set up. 
They met regularly in order to revise the protocol. Protocols were submitted 
to Ministers of Transport/Post and Communications to endorse the new 
framework. Countries were very much involved at every stage. They also had 
a chance to analyse the impact of the new regional framework on their own 
legislation, policy and strategy, to make sure that whatever was coming up 
was not conflicting with what they had at national level. It was a very 
interactive process.” (Tayob, telephonic interview, October 2012). 
Mechanisms of participation of member countries in regional processes were 
institutionalised through the Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology. 
“The institutional process used to develop the new ICT policy and regulatory 
framework, was the one described by the SADC Protocol on TCM, so it went 
through the sectorial committees defined by the Protocol. The Protocol went 
through the ministerial meeting. It provides the institutional set-up.” (Le 
Bihan, telephonic interview, October 2012). 
A representative from a regional organisation confirmed that participation by member 
countries in the process was high, although the nature of their involvement was more 
technical than related to policy and regulation.  
"The SADC Secretariat processes are carried out in such a way that 
everybody can participate. The responsibility of the ministry is just to pass the 
resolution. The ground work is done by technocrats.” (Mamelodi, personal 
interview, January 2013). 
In addition, a representative from a regional regulator pointed out the high level at which 
member countries participate  
“Individual countries participation is both at a regional and at an 
international level.” (Linzie, telephonic interview, April 2013).  
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“At a regional level, when member countries come together they seek an 
agreement on developed guidelines (either policy or regulation) and 
subsequently these models are used by member countries.” (Linzie, telephonic 
interview, April 2013). 
Other views were more critical of the level of participation of member states. For instance, 
a representative from a regional implementing agency explained why member countries 
are not effectively participating in regional policy and regulatory processes.  
“RECs existence is to create regional economies. Some of them are more 
active than others, depending on constraints, such as budget and availability 
of human resources. The SADC is one of the most consistent participants in 
AU programmes, although it does not have as many resources as other 
regions, such as the ECOWAS. The latter has raised member funding more 
effectively than other regions, while the SADC has more constraints in terms 
of budget and human resources.” (Katiti, telephonic interview, April 2013). 
An interviewee from academia had a more critical view of participating procedures 
relating to member countries.  
“National states were involved in both rounds (first and second wave of 
reforms). In terms of developing the model policy and the model law, although 
the documents went through different SADC structures, there was not full 
participation. In the first round of reforms, participation of member states 
happened only once the model legislation was developed. The new policy and 
regulatory framework was driven by consultants from 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) through the Regional Telecommunications 
Restructuring Programme. Subsequently, the model went to SATCC structures 
for amendment and approval.” (Gillwald, personal interview, June 2012).  
This view was supported by an external consultant:  
“Some countries did not play an active role in the process of harmonisation. 
The ITU came with an agenda and the local buy-in was achieved through 
local consultants. In the validation workshop there was already an EU view.” 
(Msimang, telephonic interview, November 2012). 
An interviewee from the ITU explained that when the ITU provided technical assistance it 
followed a precise methodology in which national participation is crucial. As SADC 
countries were involved in regional meetings, especially during validation workshops,  
she felt that the ITU had followed a structured methodology for participation.  
“At these validation workshops all SADC countries usually participate and 
are represented by ICT ministries and regulatory authorities. This group 
comes together and looks at what documents have been developed, and then 
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provides comments and inputs to amend the legislation and the previously-
developed policy model. At the end of the meeting they seek to reach an 
agreement to validate the new model.” (Jallow, telephonic interview, April 
2013). 
A representative from CRASA confirmed a high level of participation by national 
regulators at CRASA meetings. She alleged that conferences, organised by CRASA, 
SATA and SABA, are the main mechanisms for country participation.  
“There is also some work done through the Southern African Broadcasting 
Association (SABA). They work on regionalism and they bring member states 
together. They are involved in policy issues and I was involved in a 
programme with them when I was at the SADC PF.” (Matanga, telephonic 
interview, November 2012). 
She indicated that member states are involved in two different structures: first, at a policy 
level through the SADC Secretariat; second, at a regulatory level through CRASA.  
“In addition, the private sector was involved especially through CRASA and 
the Southern Africa Telecommunications Association (SATA). They brought 
together policy-makers, MPs, people from the private sector and from the 
regulators. They are trying to get different stakeholders involved in policy 
issues.” (Matanga, telephonic interview, November 2012). 
The twofold structure was confirmed by a representative from another regional 
organisation. She added that a third structure assembles telecommunications operators.  
“SADC, in the ICT sector, operates on three tiers: first, SADC Secretariat 
linked to policy makers; second, CRASA as an implementing agency and its 
membership includes 12 of the 14 SADC member states; third, SATA group 
operators who work together to build the regional infrastructure. Depending 
on the issue at stake, the more relevant SADC structure is involved. In 
addition, the SADC Secretariat holds a ministerial meeting annually.” 
(Mamelodi, personal interview, January 2013). 
According to her, member states participate throughout the entire process, and their 
involvement is formally requested in order to establish buy-in and endorse the 
documentation produced.  
“Member states are involved: they validate the work that has been conducted 
at a regional level and they adopt. Member states guide regional 
organisations according to their own requirements. Therefore, member states 
own the process. SADC Secretariat is the body that coordinates activities. 
Since implementation is at a national level, there is a need to involve member 
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states at each stage of the work.” (Mamelodi, telephonic interview, January 
2013). 
An interviewee from an international organisation explained that prior to the development 
of the model policy, model law and guidelines, international and local technical 
consultants made a country-by-country assessment to identify what was already available 
at a country level. As a result, the regional framework was built upon national policy and 
regulatory frameworks.  
“The ITU selected local experts who were knowledgeable regarding issues in 
each country.” (Bazzanella, telephonic interview, November 2012). 
6.6.2 Predominant involvement of ICT ministries in regional processes 
An external consultant stressed that while he was running the RTRP project89 (from July 
1995 till September 1999) in the first round of the SADC telecommunications policy 
reform, all member states were involved. He asserted that member states were carried 
along with the regional telecommunications reform process as they were joining the 
SADC. He explained that there was a lot of participation in terms of amending the 
protocol, the model policy and the model law.  
“For instance, a draft of the protocol was presented to the SADC members 
and a lot of amendments were based on member states’ input.” (Goulden, 
personal interview, October 2012).  
A second external consultant added that the involvement of member states is 
predominantly driven by ICT ministries.  
“I have not been involved in the second round of reforms at a personal level, 
but member states are indeed involved, through their ministries of ICT, for 
instance. There are annual ministerial meetings and other similar conferences 
that have been implemented through the SADC Secretariat and other bodies 
associated with ICT in the region.” (Msimang, telephonic interview, 
November 2012). 
An interview with a representative from a regional organisation revealed that the SADC 
Secretariat deals with policy issues. The declaration is the main instrument used at 
                                       
89 The Southern Africa Regional Telecom Restructuring Project (RTRP) was a USD15 million programme, 
funded by USAID’s Regional Centre for southern Africa based in Gaborone, Botswana. In 5 years, the 
programme aimed at providing support to the telecommunications market by undertaking policy reforms and 
restructuring, in order to attract private investment and therefore improve service quality and delivery. The 
programme provided technical advisorship for telecom ministries and regulatory bodies through workshops 
and training in the United States for southern Africans, who had the opportunity to apprehend regulatory and 
policy options. The project included assistance in incorporating the SADC Protocol on Telecom into national 
laws. The project officially ended in October 1999 (International Business Publications, USA, 2011). 
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regional level to influence national policies. Usually, ICT ministers are the main political 
actors involved in the process. However, depending on the institutional arrangements of 
member states, other ministries can get involved in the process: 
“The ministry responsible for ICT is the one involved in the process. That 
could be with broadcasting. Mostly it coincides with the Ministry of 
Information, but also Transport and Communications. Otherwise, the Ministry 
of Energy and Communications.” (Matanga, telephonic interview, November 
2012). 
It is the minister who plays the main role at the end of the process in order to enforce a 
model bill or a regional recommendation:  
“They endorse the final policy or model legislation. For instance, in South 
Africa, before it gets approved (i.e. a regional recommendation), it goes to the 
Department of Communications or to the regulator. The formal involvement is 
at the actual ministerial level, at the end.” (Msimang, telephonic interview, 
November 2012). 
Although the main actors involved in regional policy-making are ICT ministers, their 
involvement in the overall regional process has been considered relatively low. The main 
reason given for limited involvement of ICT ministers is lack of financial resources. 
“Although communications ministers were involved in regional processes, 
they were under-resourced. As a result, they only intervene in broad issues 
related to ICT policy.” (Goulden, personal interview, October 2012). 
6.6.3 Establishment of independent regulators in the first round 
An interviewee from a regional organisation added that one of the main successes of the 
first round of reforms is that every country, except Swaziland, set up an independent 
regulatory body.90 According to her, most SADC countries have also separated postal and 
                                       
90 It has been observed by other studies on ICT sector performance in African countries, that although the last 
decade has seen institutional rearrangements adjust (within the ICT sector) to conform to international reform 
trends - with the ITU reporting that 93% of African countries have established regulators – these reforms do 
not equate with regulatory effectiveness. The ineffectiveness of many regulatory agencies across the continent 
relates to the absence of political autonomy to regulate independently (Calandro, Gillwald et al, 2010).  
 149 
telecommunications regulatory frameworks and the regulatory bodies.91 In this way the 
objective of separation, which was part of the first round of reforms, was achieved.92 
“The first round of regional reform was particularly beneficial for Lesotho. 
Only Swaziland has no separation yet, but they are very advanced in 
achieving it. In terms of implementing the requirements of the Protocol, I 
think that has been done. I don’t know if ICT people feel that you cannot be 
left behind because you signed these international agreements which affect the 
work you do. Our member states are also very active at an international level 
and they are also active at a continental level, where we take a SADC position 
and we try to influence proceedings. Seychelles is a new entrant into SADC. 
All the rest of the countries have set up a regulatory authority. So in terms of 
separating and creating a regulator we are all on track. But we are still 
working on converging regulators.” (Mamelodi, personal interview, January 
2013). 
The first round of reforms had traction at a national level, especially taking into account 
that most of the SADC countries at that time had not yet embarked on ICT policy and 
regulatory reform: 
“The first output of the RTRP was a model telecommunications bill and 
model telecommunications policy. At that time there were two or three 
countries that made a move on ICT policy and legislation, in order to be 
able to accommodate the separation of operations and the setting up of an 
independent regulator. Countries that had not started that process at that 
time, had the opportunity of using the model policy and the model bill to 
establish their own regulators. That document was timely and it was 
relevant for member states interested in reviewing institutional 
arrangements, taking into account the separation of the policy-making 
                                       
91  Despite that, the recent separation of the Department of Communications in South Africa into 
communications on the one hand and telecommunications and postal services on the other hand, seems to go 
in the opposite direction to global trends on convergence, and it is contrary to an ecosystem approach to the 
governance of the internet (Gillwald, 2014b). 
92 Some of the positive outcomes noticeable during the programme include the entry of new mobile operators 
and multiple internet service providers (ISPs) which have obtained licences to operate. Also, a few countries 
have embarked on the process of privatising state-owned telecom carriers. Although there was a growing 
acceptance that states should shift their roles from telecommunications providers to entities in charge of 
creating a favourable policy and regulatory environment to facilitate and to attract private investment to the 
sector, a wide consensus among policy-makers on this point has not been achieved as yet. Rather, consensus 
was reached on the need for continuous training as part of the effort to develop and liberalise 
telecommunications in southern Africa (International Business Publications, USA, 2011).  
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body from the regulator. That was the beginning of the process of 
harmonisation.” (Mamelodi, personal interview, January 2013). 
On a similar note an external consultant affirmed that national legislation is well aligned 
to model legislation, developed at a regional level, as an output of the first wave of 
reforms. She added that 
“Model laws are good tools, especially to tackle the issue of lack of policy 
and regulatory capacity. However, the region has a tendency to copy and 
paste (from international regulation).” (Msimang, personal interview, 15 
November 2012). 
6.6.4 Voluntary approach to transposition 
A major challenge identified by a few respondents was the transposition of regional 
regulation into national legislation. A representative from an international organisation 
asserted that SADC countries follow a voluntary approach to transposing. The voluntary 
approach has been identified as one of the main problems hampering the implementation 
of the regional framework at a national level.  
“When the SADC approves a regional instrument, the document is not binding 
on member states. Therefore the document becomes a reference framework 
and needs to be adjusted before being transposed into national legislation.” 
(Tayob, telephonic interview, October 2012). 
Although interviewees recognised a relatively high level of participation of member states 
in the process, they identified the main problem to be integrating ICT policy and 
regulation and transposing regional model policy and the model bill at a national level. 
“In Europe it is compulsory to implement, but not for SADC countries. 
Despite this, we expect them to implement the developed guidelines because 
normally they are agreed at a regional level. We also count on peer pressure 
to implement guidelines developed at a regional level. At international level 
there is a need for coordination.” (Linzie, telephonic interview, April 2013). 
The volunteer approach to transposition was confirmed by a second respondent from an 
international organisation who, while commenting on the transposition of regional 
frameworks at a national level, explained that, taking into account weak enforcement 
procedures in the regional legal institutional arrangement, “willingness to enforce regional 
frameworks” is one of the main requirements for transposing regional recommendations 
(Bazzanella, telephonic interview, November 2012). He explained that:  
“Sometimes countries have not willingness to endorse regional frameworks. 
Sometimes recommendations have not been taken into account.” (Bazzanella, 
telephonic interview, November 2012). 
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In addition to that, an external consultant identified a few problems related to decision-
making processes in the SADC: on the one hand there is the lack of a culture of 
transparency, and on the other, a lack of legal status of regional processes for ICT policy 
development. 
“All the documents produced at ICT ministry meetings are confidential and 
not for public use. The reason for that is that the ICT ministry conference does 
not have legal status, because the Protocol and the subsequent institutional 
set-up that the Protocol created, does not exist anymore. There are now 
different venues for decision-making, but their founding act has not been 
updated. So the decisions are taken by a body which legally does not exist 
anymore. Second, the culture of transparency has not been embraced in the 
SADC.” (Le Bihan, telephonic interview, October 2012). 
An external consultant declared that most of the countries are still transposing the new 
legislative model law. According to her, approaching some policy and regulatory issues at 
a regional level is more effective than addressing them at a national level. At a regional 
level, there is a need to highlight some common issues. 
“Approaching the UAS issue from a regional level is more effective. The 
regional approach is then transposed nationally. If a new framework is 
adopted at a regional level, then the document is usually transposed.” 
(Msimang, telephonic interview, November 2012). 
6.6.5 Different national institutional arrangements 
An interviewee from an international organisation identified national constraints, deriving 
from specific national institutional arrangements, as among the reasons for not 
transposing the regional framework into national legislation. He alleged that parliaments 
play a major role in the process of transposing, and therefore called for parliamentarians 
in each country to be educated, so that they understand what regional model legislations 
are trying to achieve, and what the implications are for ICT policy and regulation at a 
national level. Even the legislation, methodology and structure of laws in each country 
may differ. There may be constraints related to the legislative approach in different 
countries. For instance, he explained that while Portuguese legislative systems are 
relatively small and simple, the English legislative system is very detailed. He stressed 
that the final national legislative frameworks on ICT should be similar, in order to achieve 
policy and regulatory integration. However, he noted that in the region, although there is 
no binding requirement, most countries are moving in the direction of adopting the model 
law. For instance, he asserted that Zimbabwe has tried to establish a secretary body in 
charge of updating national ICT legislation. He recognised that the country has been very 
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active in the process of creating a model law, and they have used the SADC legal 
instruments as reference documents, which have been transposed in the light of their own 
national legislative framework. 
 
A representative from a regional organisation believes that different transposing 
mechanisms slow down regional harmonisation.  
“At a parliamentary level there might be some limitations, for instance, in the 
constitution. It is the constitution that states how a regional measure becomes 
law in a specific country. In Namibia, for instance, it is the ministry who 
decides if a declaration becomes a law in the country and this is declared in 
the constitution. In some countries it becomes law automatically, but in some 
countries they have to “domesticate” the declaration before it becomes law.” 
(Matanga, telephonic interview, November 2012). 
She identified other problems related to the process of transposing the regional framework 
into national legislation. First, she stressed that trying to include local specificities in the 
transposed regional framework is a complex legislative process. In some instances, the 
institutional arrangement in place can be an obstacle. Second, she noted that at a 
parliamentary level the expertise required might not be there and members of parliament 
might not have the appropriate capacity to regulate. Third, still at a parliamentary level, 
she asserted that parliaments do not have the necessary information and data to legislate 
and to make informed decisions. Therefore, she stressed that  
“It might happen that the law is developed outside the formal institutional 
arrangement and the parliament is simply required to pass it.” (Matanga, 
telephonic interview, November 2012). 
Four, lack of stakeholder participation, in particular parliaments, was identified as a factor 
affecting the implementation of the regional framework at a national level. 
 
Regarding the capacity of the regional institutions to influence national ICT policy and 
regulatory processes, interviewees provided different and diverging opinions. A 
representative from a regional organisation affirmed that although ICT ministries are 
requested to report back to parliament on whatever work is undertaken at a regional level, 
they often fail to do so. In her opinion, different countries have different ICT policy-
making processes defined by different institutional arrangements.93  
                                       
93  In order to strengthen the parliamentary role within national institutional arrangements, a regional 
organisation, called the SADC Parliamentary Forum, has tried to solve the issue of lack of involvement of 
parliaments in regional policies through capacity-building for members of parliament. The forum is a regional 
inter-parliamentary body, composed of thirteen parliaments representing over 3500 parliamentarians in the 
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“In some countries there is a committee outside the ICT ministry and 
parliament, where all the stakeholders meet. In most of the SADC 
countries, however, there is a ministerial approach to transposing 
regional legislation at a national level. Ministries hold all the 
information and sometimes the parliament is not aware of what is 
actually happening at a regional level. … However, it depends on the 
parliament. In some cases issues are discussed within parliamentary 
committees, and the parliament becomes more proactive. In addition, 
research done by the parliament has an important role, because it 
provides the information required to understand regional issues.” 
(Matanga, telephonic interview, November 2012).  
An external consultant, involved with the first wave of reforms, explained that the process, 
followed by parliaments to implement regional frameworks, might follow a different 
procedure to that developed by external consultants or regional organisations. Therefore, 
the model policy and model laws are used by SADC countries as a baseline for their own 
national legislations.  
“The majority of countries use the TCM Protocol to develop their 
legislation at a national level. This is due to the fact that the Protocol is a 
legally-binding document, while other documents (such as declarations) 
are models for adaptation and adoption.” (Goulden, personal interview, 
October 2012).  
6.6.6 Weak follow-up at a national level 
Among the challenges of transposing94 the regional legislation at a national level, a 
representative from an international organisation alleged that one of the main problems 
for SADC member states is the follow-up of regional initiatives.  
                                                                                                         
SADC region. It was established in 1997 in accordance with Article 9 (2) of the SADC Treaty, as an 
autonomous institution of SADC. Member parliaments are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. Its main objective is to provide a platform for parliaments and parliamentarians to promote and 
improve regional integration in the SADC region, through parliamentary involvement. 
.3 
94 Transposition into national law of European directives is a means of binding member states through results 
achieved, while member states remain free to choose the form and means of achieving this result. The correct 
and timely transposition of directives is fundamental for the smooth operation of European policies (EU, 
2005). The SADC has adopted a similar approach to the implementation of regional laws at a national level, 
although SADC binding mechanisms are very weak compared to Europe. 
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“When dealing with government institutions we noticed that the follow-up 
is very poor. A lot of good work has been done, but the main concern is 
what will happen when the project is handed over to the ICT ministry. 
There is a need to monitor and evaluate the implementation of regional 
frameworks to create continuity. It would also help to assess if there is a 
need for technical assistance. For instance, if there is an assessment for 
which the framework has been implemented up to a certain point, 
international organisations could intervene by providing only the technical 
assistance needed.” (Jallow, telephonic interview, April 2013). 
6.7  Strong influence of international organisations in setting the 
regional agenda 
A representative from a regional organisation explained why international organisations 
are involved in regional ICT policies:  
“Since they have a global experience, they can act as think-tanks that know 
which countries are performing well and can share this knowledge with other 
countries that lag behind. They are involved in the harmonisation agenda at a 
global level. They are bringing down global issues from an international level 
to a regional, national and grass-root level. Therefore, they can influence 
national processes to align with global agenda.” (Matanga, telephonic 
interview, November 2012).  
She stated that the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa was particularly 
involved in the first round of reforms. The UNECA provided mostly technical advisory 
services and technical assistance. Also, it assisted the SATCC TU in organising meetings 
and workshops. The UNECA was primarily engaged at a regional level through the 
SADC Secretariat and through the SATCC TU.  
The UNECA was mentioned as a relevant partner of the SADC, in particular with regard 
to the development and implementation of the e-SADC framework.95  
“We are also benefiting from the UNECA and it is a partner in the multi-year 
programme, through which we set up the e-SADC framework, which was 
approved in 2010 and which is now guiding the implementation of ICT. It has 
                                       
95 In May 2010, SADC created an ICT development strategy called the e-SADC Strategic Framework. The 
framework was set up as part of the implementation of the African Information Society Initiative. It focuses 
on the harmonisation of ICT infrastructure, services and indicators and it promotes ICT usage for regional 
economic integration, enhancement of connectivity and access to ICT services among and within the member 
states. The deployment of e-commerce is one of its objectives. Based on a readiness assessment of the e-
commerce in the region, the framework seeks to develop a regional e-commerce strategic action plan (SADC, 
2014c). However, at the moment the SADC does not have the capacity to collect and analyse ICT indicators.  
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got a specific roadmap in terms of what we need to achieve. UNECA also 
supported us to implement e-SADC. As a first activity we came up with an e-
Commerce framework and this year we want to set up a SADC ICT 
observatory, because one of the issues is that at the moment we cannot 
measure (the ICT sector performance). At the last ministerial meeting we 
received support for this initiative.” (Mamelodi, personal interview, January 
2013).  
A respondent from an international organisation asserted that the participation of 
international organisations in regional processes is based on requests. In the first round, in 
order to coordinate actions between donors, the SADC set up a coordination meeting for 
donors.  
“Every year a big conference was held for member states to mobilize 
resources in all areas, including telecommunications, through the SADC 
Secretariat. The main debates during these regional meetings concerned the 
capability of SATCC TU to formulate and implement regional ICT policy and 
regulatory projects. It was identified that the organisation did not have 
enough human resources. Therefore, they realised that the ITU could be a 
relevant partner because it could bring the missing expertise to the region. 
The ITU was assigned the role of ‘coordinating consultant’ because it is an 
impartial organisation and was not driving any specific interest from a 
specific country.” (Tayob, telephonic interview, October 2012). 
According to Tayob, the coordination of the project was done by ITU’s impartial experts 
and afterwards was transferred to regional experts.  
6.7.1 Reform processes as an international agenda 
According to a respondent from academia, the reform process took the form of an 
international agenda and it is doubtful whether any member state involved could have 
implemented this process without any external support (Gillwald, personal interview, June 
2012).  
This argument was reinforced by a representative from a regional organisation who 
explained that regional policies are aligned to an international agenda.96  
                                       
96 It should be noted that during the SADC ICT ministers meeting held in Mauritius in November 2012, 
ministers encouraged the Secretariat to pursue harmonised common positions for proposals to the WRC-15, 
WTDC-14 and the 5th WTPF, demonstrating common positions between SADC member countries at an 
international meeting level (SADC, 2012). 
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“For instance, when I look at policies coming from ITU, the variation is 
minimal. In terms of our interests, the variations with international 
organisations are very small”. (Linzie, telephonic interview, April 2013). 
6.7.2 Involvement of international organisations not always 
institutionalised 
Respondents have not always been able to clearly identify and explain the institutionalised 
mechanisms for involvement of international organisations in regional processes. For 
instance, a representative from a regional organisation stated that although she believed 
that at the SADC level there are institutionalised mechanisms for involvement of 
international organisations, she was not able to describe those mechanisms. However, she 
recalled that the UNECA had been involved from the stage of problem identification. The 
significant role of UNECA in SADC regional processes is also confirmed by its plan to 
have an office in Botswana to improve its impact and its support of the regional 
organisation.97 
A representative from a UN agency explained that the participation of international 
organisations in regional processes is based on a request by the beneficiary. Normally, 
their assistance is requested to support the regional organisation on technical issues. This 
aspect was explained by an external consultant: 
                                       
97 The UNECA is a good example of a regional organisation, which has often acted as a bridge between 
international organisations and the regional community (Calandro, Gillwald and Zingales, 2013). The UN 
ECOSOC established this institution in 1958 as one of the UN's five regional commissions, with the specific 
mandate to promote the economic and social development of its member states, to foster intra-regional 
integration and promote international cooperation for Africa's development. UNECA places a special focus on 
collecting up-to-date and original regional statistics for its 54 member states, in order to ground its policy 
research and advocacy on clear objective evidence; promote policy consensus; and provide meaningful 
capacity development and advisory services in key thematic fields (UNECA, 2006). However, the 
organisation seems to have fallen behind in producing concrete output over the last 15 years. The only 
measurement of performance has been done by UNECA itself with respect to one of its biggest projects, the 
African Information Society Initiative (AISI), launched in 1996 to constitute a high-level work group to 
develop an action plan for ICTs to accelerate socio-economic development in Africa. Not surprisingly, a ten-
year review of UNECA’s execution of the project confirmed its success, as evidenced by the existence of 
national e-strategies in three-quarters of UNECA’s member states, complementing their development efforts 
(UNECA, 2006). However, the objective of the programme was to realise a sustainable information society in 
Africa by 2010, where “every man and woman, schoolchild, village, government office and business can 
access information knowledge resources through computers and telecommunications” (Soul Beat Africa, 
2004) and this is far from being met. Just recently, the Conference of African Ministers of Communication 
and Information Technology (CITMC) called for the cooperation of the African Union (AU) Commission and 
UNECA’s AISI project, for the finalisation of the draft Convention on Cyber Legislation, and for the support 
of its implementation in member states on or before December 2012. Yet, this objective has not been 
accomplished to date (AU, 2012). 
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“Depending on the issue, there are different ways international 
organisations approach regional organisations. International 
organisations are allowed to participate in workshops, for instance, 
organised by CRASA, and most of the time are involved in technical issues.” 
(Msimang, telephonic interview, November 2012). 
6.7.3 Ineffective involvement of international organisations 
International organisations provide mostly technical support in areas where RECs lack 
expertise, according to a representative from a regional organisation. However, their role 
is less visible during the implementation phase. 
“When it comes to implementation, the involvement of international 
organisations in not so strong. It is more visible during the planning and 
developing guidelines phase”. (Linzie, telephonic interview, April 2013).  
A representative from academia and an external consultant confirmed that international 
organisations provide mostly technical support, but also provide financial support.  
“It is donor support for technical assistance.” (Gillwald, personal interview, 
June 2012). 
“In the first wave of reforms, USAID provided financial and technical support. 
They also provided training in the US. At that time there was a substantial 
amount of funding available.” (Goulden, personal interview, October 2012).  
Not only the SADC Secretariat and CRASA benefited from technical assistance by 
international organisations, the SADC Parliamentary Forum was able to develop capacity 
and an ICT programme specifically addressed to parliaments. However, due to budget 
constraints, the ICT programme for SADC parliaments has come to an end.  
“The SADC PF got involved in the reform process as a regional forum 
because there was a need to build ICT capacity at parliamentary level. The 
ICT programme for SADC parliaments started in 2005. We conducted a 
survey on ICT equipment, programmes, and how SADC parliaments were 
implementing ICT in their parliamentary work. Through the leadership centre 
(at the SADC Parliamentary Forum) we initiated a learning and knowledge-
sharing programme funded by OSISA. The programme started with a strong 
technical emphasis on e-Parliament but then it evolved and included a policy 
component, specifically related to the role of members of parliament in 
contributing to ICT policy-making. Since then, committees at a parliamentary 
level have been implemented. For instance, Uganda set up a parliamentary 
committee to discuss policy issues at national and regional level. The ICT 
committee established a sub-committee to talk about ICT policy. But 
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unfortunately due to budget constraints the programme stopped.” (Matanga, 
telephonic interview, November 2012).  
Another interviewee from academia noted inefficiencies involving international 
organisational support for the implementation of reforms at national level based on 
regional frameworks:  
“By the time the SADC developed the harmonised framework, both South 
Africa and Botswana had their own legislative frameworks already in 
place which had gone through a consultative paper, and were very 
different from the white and green paper. Therefore, by the time the SADC 
started with the process of harmonising ICT policy and regulation, both 
South Africa and Botswana were ahead of the process of reforming the 
sector, through an international process which had provided input. 
Therefore, the same kind of people belonging to the epistemic community 
were all working in this area and they were all discussing the same issues. 
….. The epistemic community is a group of global consultants who 
accepted and adopted a set of reforms and criteria globally defined. They 
were sharing the same set of values. In southern Africa, the reform agenda 
was rhetorically adopted but not practically implemented at all.” (Gillwald, 
personal interview, June 2012). 
She added that in the mid ‘90s, South African so-called “managed liberalisation” had an 
impact on the southern African agenda for the liberalisation of the telecommunications 
sector. Issues, such as incomplete liberalisation of the market and a very strong focus on 
universal access, were also embraced by other countries in the region. Managed 
liberalisation was a label applied retrospectively to this reform process. Rather, it was 
supposed to be a staged reform period.  
“Within SADC it (managed liberalisation) was reflected differently. 
Namibia and Botswana displayed a very cautious approach - cautious to 
liberalisation. Mozambique was very tentative. Zambia did not create 
conditions conducive to investment.” (Gillwald, personal interview, June 
2012). 
The first phase of the regional telecommunications market reform has been associated 
with the Washington consensus reform agenda.98 However, an interviewee noted that it 
has not been acknowledged that the reform programme was only partially implemented.  
                                       
98 The “Washington consensus” is a set of economic principles based on neo-liberal theories, which reject 
government intervention in the market to improve economic conditions of developing countries. The term 
includes a set of policies, such as privatisation, trade liberalisation, public expenditure priorities, fiscal 
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Privatisation does not constitute the reform programme. And full 
liberalisation has never happened. (Gillwald, personal interview, June 
2012). 
In addition, the first phase of the reform did not prepare the ground for implementing the 
second phase.  
“We didn’t really set up independent regulators, we didn’t really manage 
to liberalise and to privatise the sector. In the second wave of reform, the 
telecommunications sector has experienced significant and fundamental 
changes. Emerging issues related to competition and market structure have 
arisen and they were not part of the agenda a decade ago.” (Gillwald, 
personal interview, June 2012). 
As a result of the involvement of international organisations in regional processes, a 
respondent from a regional organisation declared that one of the main benefits of the 
HIPSSA project was building ICT policy and regulatory capacity at a regional level. On a 
different note, another interviewee from a regional organisation explained that the main 
challenges he experienced with the HIPSSA project were the limitation of funds and the 
difficulties experienced in achieving country consensus:  
“After it was done, the output was considered a success. We managed to 
review the regional ICT policy and regulatory framework taking into account 
the converging environment, and both the model policy and model ICT bill 
have been updated. That work has been approved”. (Mamelodi, personal 
interview, January 2013). 
With regard to the positive outputs of the HIPSSA project, she explained that:  
“One of the successes of the HIPSSA project was the development of three 
model bills related to cyber-security. Those model bills draw from a 
regulatory framework which was developed in West and East Africa. This can 
be considered a success in terms of African REC cooperation. The SADC 
Secretariat has also received a request to transpose the framework in five 
countries including Namibia, Lesotho, Malawi and Botswana.” (Mamelodi, 
personal interview, January 2013). 
More difficulties were encountered with regard to the development and approval of the 
updated protocol, which did not pass the ratification phase at the SADC Summit level.  
                                                                                                         
disciplines, tax reform, interest rate liberalisation, competitive exchange rate, foreign direct investment, 
deregulation and property rights (Williamson, 1990; Onis & Senses, 2005; Beeson & Islam, 2005).  
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“After the updated protocol was released, SADC member countries decided to 
review it again entirely, mostly because it is a binding document.” (Mamelodi, 
personal interview, January 2013). 
The HIPSSA project employed both local and European consultants. 
“In the HIPSSA project, the requirement was that consultants had to be 
locals. There was a need for local expertise.” (Msimang, telephonic 
interview,  November 2012). 
However, as a representative from academia pointed out, the project’s budget was based 
on EU funding, so local consultants had to be supported by European consultants. With 
regard to continental government organisations being involved in the second round of 
reform, a representative of an African continental implementing agency explained that the 
NEPAD did not have a relevant role in the HIPSSA project.99  
“Negotiations were conducted by the African Union Commission and at that 
level the NEPAD is not very engaged. The African Union Commission is 
mandated to work on soft law issues for developing policy. The NEPAD is a 
technical body and it is more concerned with overseeing the implementation 
of projects and programmes.” (Katiti, telephonic interview, April 2013).  
6.7.4 Ineffective technical assistance without understanding the political 
economy on the ground 
The phase of implementation of regional frameworks at a national level represents the 
second layer of technical support from international organisations. However, in order for 
this technical support to be effective: 
“The implementation needs to have a local understanding, otherwise we cannot 
refer to it as democratic participation in the regional process of integration.” 
(Gillwald, personal interview, June 2012). 
Therefore, technical assistance is not effective without a broad knowledge and 
understanding of the political economy at ground level in SADC countries. 
“Why does reform not work? Economic-based solutions are plunged down 
from Europe on a completely different political and economic environment. 
Strategies, to reform the economic sector through policies, fail to take into 
account the political economies of the SADC countries. International 
organisations assume that all these countries have democracies, independent 
regulators, participatory policy systems. Therefore, the reason for failures is 
that international organisations are not adequately prepared to deal with the 
                                       
99 The NEPAD, through the e-Africa Programme develops policies, strategies and projects at a continental 
level for the development of an information society throughout Africa. 
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reality on the ground. It might mean a less harmonised approach at national 
level in order to get some regional functionality. For instance, we cannot hope 
for a participatory open approach in Swaziland, because the political reality 
of that country does not allow for such an approach. In other cases 
democratic systems are dominated by single dominant political parties, such 
as in Mozambique, in South Africa, and in Namibia. The democratic 
assumption that goes with these institutional arrangements in Europe does not 
apply in this environment.” (Gillwald, personal interview, June 2012).  
6.7.5 Technical support in planning and developing guidelines 
A respondent from a regional regulator confirmed that international organisations, for 
instance the ITU and Universal Post Union (UPU), provide the technical expertise needed 
for regional policy and regulation, in particular planning and developing guidelines. 
However, she added that when it comes to implementation, the involvement of 
international organisations in less visible. She was supportive of the involvement of 
international organisations in regional regulation, because the variations between the 
interests of regional and international organisations are very small. 
 
The relevant role that USAID had in the first round of reforms was highlighted by an 
external consultant. He explained that it was not the only international organisation 
involved in the process. Together with the USAID, the Commonwealth Telecoms 
Organisation, the ITU, Australian Aid and the Swedish International Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) all worked together on the same programme. International organisations were 
development-focused.  
“The SADC was poor with regard to ICT and telecom sector development 
although the telecommunications infrastructure was recognised as an engine 
for growth in economic, social and educational terms. The time was right in 
the mid 90s.” (Goulden, personal interview, October 2012). 
With regard to the HIPSSA project, an interviewee from an international organisation 
explained which partners got involved and how they collaborated on the development of 
regional guidelines. 
“The project was mainly an ITU project for developing guidelines on cyber-
security and universal access and service. The ITU conducted a benchmark 
exercise and it was an ITU project in collaboration with CRASA. The 
guidelines on cyber-criminality were developed in collaboration with the 
Council of Europe, the Commonwealth, and the section of the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UN ODC) dealing with cyber-criminality. The objective of 
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this collaboration was that all these organisations should work together with 
the AU and UNECA.” (Bazzanella, telephonic interview, November 2012).  
6.7.6 US free market ideology in the first round of reforms 
An external consultant explained that in the first round of reforms, international 
organisations and donor organisations got involved at ministerial level. This round was 
dominated by American consultants who introduced free market ideology (confirmed by 
an academic interviewee). 
“The process was initiated by the US State Department and the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), which is the 
nearest organisation that the US has to a Ministry of Communications. They 
engaged with the ITU. The location of the regional programme in Botswana 
came from the President of Botswana who provided the facilities for a 
regional centre. USAID was welcomed at a presidential level.” (Goulden, 
personal interview, October 2012). 
A representative from an international organisation added that the reform in the 90s was 
part of an international process of reforming the sector. 
“In 1990, there was a coordination meeting called for donors within the 
SADC structures. Every year the SADC used to hold a big conference for 
member states to try to mobilize resources in all policy areas including 
telecommunications. There was a debate on the capability of the Technical 
Unit of the SATCC to formulate and implement projects. There was a need to 
have additional human resources. They came up with the idea – in 
particular SIDA Canada – that they should bring in ITU because it had the 
needed expertise. In addition, they needed an organisation which was able 
to coordinate the consultants. So the ITU was involved because it was 
considered to be an impartial organisation. The ITU is not driven by the 
specific interest of any specific country. Therefore, the ITU needed 
somebody to support the implementation of this project and it approached 
Telecom Mozambique and I was involved. I became part of the project to 
help the ITU. In addition, there were consultants from different countries 
such as Canada, Sweden, Australia. A law firm from South Africa drafted 
the protocol. The coordination was done by ITU experts and later by 
regional experts.” (Tayob, telephonic interview, October 2012).  
6.7.7 European approach to harmonisation in the second round of reforms 
In contrast, the second round of reforms, the Harmonistation of ICT Policy in Sub-
Saharan Africa (HIPSSA) project, was driven by European consultants.  
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“The European Union funded the project and therefore employed European 
consultants to run it. As a result, the project was driven by European values, 
namely the competition values of Europe. The output presented by the 
consultants is based on European reforms. Those reforms work better in 
mature economies but this framework to reform the sector was what was 
presented to Africa.” (Gillwald, personal interview, June 2012). 
The project was not completed due to the withdrawal of funds. 
“The HIPSSA project was driven by consultants, except that the SADC 
Secretariat had to request support. As primary international experts, a 
German firm and an expert from Zimbabwe were employed. I was in charge 
of a technical review, specifically reviewing the model policy and the model 
law. Subsequently, the project was taken to SADC structures at various 
times. It was then endorsed by member states, but for the final endorsement 
it had to go through ministerial meetings. However, since the project was 
supposed to modify the Protocol, it had to be approved at the Summit level. 
At the end of this process (which was not completed) the person in charge at 
the ITU left and the project was wrapped up. The consultants withdrew when 
the project ran out of funds and the people who had been sourced no longer 
attended the SADC meeting.” (Gillwald, personal interview, June 2012). 
A representative from an international organisation explained how the ITU and the 
European Commission got involved in the second round of reforms in the SADC. He 
revealed that SADC member states had been involved since the inception phase of the 
project. 
“The European Commission had a project on harmonisation of ICT 
policy and regulation. At the beginning of the project, the ITU submitted 
an application to the European Commission to work on that aspect. The 
ITU contacted member states to find out if that objective was part of their 
priorities. The project was recognised as something that was important 
for the region. Regional organisations wrote a letter confirming that they 
needed a project to harmonise ICT policy and regulatory frameworks.” 
(Jallow, telephonic interview, April 2013). 
6.8 Role of the SADC in international regulation 
Not only member states, but also Regional Economic Communities are represented at the 
ITU level. 
“SADC countries are part of the ITU both individually and as a group. Each 
member has sovereign rights at the ITU. At the ITU level, member states have 
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the right to make decisions. At the ITU level there are two different types of 
membership: first, member states; second, sector members.” (Tayob, 
telephonic interview, October 2012).  
6.8.1 SADC caucus at the ITU level 
A representative from a regional organisation explained that regional organisations have 
the task of coordinating the position of member countries on international issues. 
“Before meetings such as the World Radio Conference or the WCIT, we 
create a technical group which is set up by CRASA. We identify the relevant 
issues that are for discussion and the SADC supports the preparation of 
preparatory meetings. Then, we take the sub-regional position to the African 
position, so that we are sure that our issues are taken into consideration at a 
continental level. SADC is very active at an international level, even more 
than other regions. SADC coordinates the meetings, and coordinates a 
harmonisation consensus to go forward.” (Mamelodi, personal interview, 
January 2013). 
The relevant role of the SADC, especially at the ITU level, has been widely 
acknowledged. For instance, in meetings for the radio sector of the ITU, SADC countries 
have successfully been able to coordinate their strategies and positions to be more 
effective at an international level. That has been facilitated by the development of a 
regional radio spectrum plan undertaken by CRASA (Cohen and Gillwald, 2008).  
Although RECs have the role of coordinating the position of member states position with 
regard to issues, such as frequency coordination, they do not have the right to vote.  
“RECs play a critical role in coordinating the position of member states, but 
when it comes to voting, each member state has the right to vote. RECs try to 
coordinate the views of different member states when there are conflicts of 
interest. It is important to have a block to represent regional interests.” 
(Tayob, telephonic interview, October 2012). 
However, regional coordination at an international level has not always been effective. A 
representative from an international organisation stated that when it comes to the 
definition of technical specifications and standards at the ITU level, the SADC does not 
have the manufacturing power to influence the ITU standardisation process. Therefore, 
their participation in this domain is limited. 
 
In contrast, when it comes to frequency issues, African countries are directly affected and 
therefore they are more active. In particular, he mentioned the coordinating role of 
continental organisations such as the ATU and the leading role of the SADC at a 
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continental level. Specifically, the SADC had a leading and coordinating role in the 
process of negotiating the standard for digital terrestrial television broadcasting at a 
continental level. 
“Africa Telecommunications Union tries to coordinate the position of SADC 
with other regions, such as the ECOWAS, the EAC, and all other RECs. The 
SADC can drive the position of the rest of Africa, and the REC has tried to do 
so on several occasions, for instance, with regard to digital migration. The 
standard of digital terrestrial television broadcasting at a continental level 
was set up by the SADC. Some countries in the SADC wanted to adopt the 
ISDB-T, which is Japanese, while others preferred the DVB-T, which is 
European. The European standard appeared the most suitable because both 
Europe and Africa belong to Region 1, meaning that they belong to the same 
frequency region. The SADC was actively trying to push other RECs to follow 
at the same time as they were trying to coordinate internal opinion to adopt 
the standard. At the end of the negotiating process, the DVB-T2 was the 
standard adopted, and other African countries followed. Only Angola seems 
to have opted for another position.” (Tayob, telephonic interview, October 
2012). 
The SADC Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) broadcasting migration is often 
mentioned as an example of a successful regional initiative.100  
6.8.2 Overlapping membership in different regional organisations 
Another obstacle in the implementation of the SADC ICT framework at national level, is 
the multi-membership of SADC countries in different RECs.  
“For instance, Zambia belongs both to SADC and COMESA. Frequently it 
may create difficulties. One organisation might be faster than another, and 
adopt the most advanced mechanisms.” (Tayob, telephonic interview, 
October 2012). 
                                       
100 In May 2009, in Namibia, the SADC adopted a roadmap for digital broadcasting migration to guide 
member states to make a smooth DTT broadcasting migration. A project management office was established 
in order to assist member states. The project management office is in charge of both assessing the progress 
that SADC countries have been making to migrate broadcasting to digital TV and to provide technical support. 
SADC countries plan to meet the ITU analogue switch-off deadline, set for the 17 June 2015. A few 
challenges facing a smooth migration have been identified, such as: the availability of set top box for all the 
SADC population; the sharing of a sub-optimal infrastructure; the human capital required to manage and 
implement the migration; the need for public awareness; the production of new digital content and the 
prevention of piracy; and the general funding of this operation (Ah-Thew, 2013b). 
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The overlapping membership of SADC countries in different RECs creates duplication of 
policy and regulatory objectives and frameworks, which may result in a waste of financial 
and technical resources.  
6.8.3 Principle of subsidiarity is used to share responsibilities between 
regional organisations 
With regard to forms of collaboration between regional organisations, a representative 
from a regional regulator explained that CRASA and SADC Secretariat work closely 
together and each of them has a specific domain of work. CRASA acts as an 
implementing agency while SADC Secretariat develops policy. She highlighted that the 
principle of subsidiarity has been used to share responsibilities. 
“In the SADC we work under the principle of subsidiarity. CRASA is an 
agency and it acts as a technical arm. CRASA is the implementing agency 
while SADC does not have technical expertise. Therefore CRASA has an 
implementation role. We assist SADC Secretariat on technical issues with 
regard to policy and regulation. For instance, when there are more 
technical issues, such as the development of standards for migration, the 
CRASA should be involved in order to implement the regional programme. 
Whenever there was a meeting [on digital migration] it was under the SADC 
auspices. CRASA supported the meetings but the meetings had the SADC 
logo, because the ministers are aware that at the SADC level, policy might 
be developed.” (Linzie, telephonic interview, April 2013).  
6.9  Conclusions 
The following table summarises the main findings that emerged from interviews, 
direct participation in regional processes, and official media statements issued by 
SADC organisations. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of the main findings from semi-structured interviews, direct participation and media statements.  
Area of investigation Recurring themes Summary of findings 
Drivers for the development of an integrated 
regional ICT policy and regulatory framework 
Regional economies of scale and 
scope 
The establishment of a regional telecommunications market 
would attract more investors in the region.  
The integration of ICT policy and regulation is part of SADC 
economic integration. 
Building an African identity Integration would allow SADC countries to “speak the same 
language”.  
Historically, integration was intended to isolate apartheid 
South Africa. 
Emulating the EU model of 
integration 
SADC would like to reach the same level of regional 
integration as the EU through harmonisation and integration 
International regulatory trends Regional reform is driven by international regulatory trends 
set by the ITU and other international organisations. 
Technical harmonisation at a 
regional level 
Issues of a technical nature, such as frequency 
harmonisation, require regional coordination of ICT policy 
and regulation. 
Enforcement of regional ICT policies, protocols 
and declarations at a national level, and the 
level and status of integration and 
harmonisation achieved by ICT policy and 
regulation in the SADC region 
Regional policy outputs normally 
do not reach the SADC Summit. 
Since regional regulation does not reach the Summit level for 
approval, these documents are not binding on member states. 
Regional policy and regulatory outputs have the form of 
model policies, model bills and declarations. 
Policy and regulatory processes lag 
behind market developments. 
Telecommunication industry developments are faster than 
regional policy and regulatory processes for integration and 
harmonisation. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of the main findings from semi-structured interviews, direct participation and media statements.  
Area of investigation Recurring themes Summary of findings 
Weak enforcement mechanisms of 
regional regulatory documents 
Declarations are one of the main outputs of regional 
policymaking. Such documents are not proposed for 
enforcement at national level. 
Conversely, regional model policies and model laws have a 
bigger impact at national level as they are used as guidelines 
to develop national regulation. 
Different regional issues  
dominated by different member 
countries 
SADC leadership on policy issues rotates among the 
member states. 
Mauritius and South Africa have been more able to 
dominate the regional debate due to their performance on 
regulating the sector at national level, and other countries 
emulate their models. 
SADC countries work as a team on issues relating to ICT. 
Lack of skills and funds at a 
regional level 
Regional institutions need to engage with international 
organisations in order to develop and implement 
programmes, because RECs lack capacity, skills, funds 
and, in some cases, independence. 
International organisations provide mostly technical 
support. 
Participation of member states in 
conferences and validation 
workshops 
The main institutional mechanisms of participation by 
member states in the process of reforming the 
telecommunications sector are meetings in the form of 
conferences and validation workshops. Therefore, the 
participation of SADC countries happens mostly at the end 
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Table 6.1: Summary of the main findings from semi-structured interviews, direct participation and media statements.  
Area of investigation Recurring themes Summary of findings 
of the process. 
Budget and human resource constraints are the main 
obstacles to effective participation by SADC countries in 
regional processes. 
Predominant involvement of ICT 
ministries in regional processes 
The involvement of member states in regional ICT policy 
and regulation is predominantly driven by ICT ministries. 
Budget constraints make their involvement relatively low. 
Establishment of independent 
regulators in the first round 
One of the main successes of the first round of reforms was 
the creation of independent regulatory bodies in all 
countries except Swaziland. 
National legislation is well aligned to the model legislation 
developed as an output of the first wave of reforms. 
Voluntary approach to 
transposition 
The voluntary approach to transposing regional legislation 
at a national level has been identified as the main problem 
hindering regional harmonisation and integration. 
Documents produced during ICT ministry meetings are 
confidential and not for public use, because the ICT 
ministry conference does not have a legal status. 
Different national institutional 
arrangements 
Legislation, methodology, and legislative structures differ 
in each country, hampering the transposition of regional 
policy and regulation at national level. 
Different transposing mechanisms at a national level slow 
 170 
Table 6.1: Summary of the main findings from semi-structured interviews, direct participation and media statements.  
Area of investigation Recurring themes Summary of findings 
down regional harmonisation. 
ICT ministers fail to report back to parliaments on issues 
related to ICT. 
Weak follow-up at a national level The follow-up at a national level is normally poor. There is 
a need to monitor and evaluate the level of implementation 
of regional measures. 
Involvement of international organisations in 
regional ICT policy and regulatory formulation 
Reform processes as an 
international agenda 
The reform process assumed an international agenda and it 
is doubtful that any member state could have driven this 
process without external support. 
Regional policies are aligned to an international agenda. 
Involvement of international 
organisations not always 
institutionalised 
Mechanisms of involvement of international organisations 
in regional processes do not always follow a standard 
procedure. 
Participation of international organisations in regional 
processes is based on a request by the beneficiary (i.e. 
country to whom help is given). 
Ineffective involvement of 
international organisations 
Some member states already have their own legislative 
framework in place by the time international organisations 
become involved at a regional level. 
The reform process based on the Washington consensus 
agenda was only partially implemented. 
Ineffective technical assistance 
without understanding the political 
economy at ground level 
Technical assistance is not effective without a broad 
knowledge and understanding of the political economy on 
the ground in the SADC countries. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of the main findings from semi-structured interviews, direct participation and media statements.  
Area of investigation Recurring themes Summary of findings 
Technical support in planning and 
developing guidelines 
Although international organisations provide support with 
regard to planning and developing guidelines, their support 
is less visible when it comes to implementation. 
International organisations are development-focused. 
US free market ideology in the first 
round of reforms 
The first round of reforms was shaped by the agenda of the 
USA State Department and the NTIA. 
Americans introduced free market ideology to the project. 
European approach to 
harmonisation in the second round 
of reforms 
The HIPSSA project was funded by the EU and therefore it 
was driven by European values (i.e. competition). The 
output presented was based on European reforms. 
Role of the SADC in international regulation SADC caucus at the ITU level SADC countries have successfully coordinated their 
strategies and positions in order to be more effective at 
international level. 
African RECs do not have the right to vote. 
Overlapping membership in 
different regional organisations 
Multi-membership of SADC countries in different RECs 
creates duplication of policy objectives and frameworks, 
and wastes financial and technical resources.  
Principle of subsidiarity is used to 
share responsibilities between 
regional organisations 
CRASA and SADC Secretariat work closely together and 
each has a specific domain of work. The principle of 
subsidiarity is used to share responsibilities. 
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CHAPTER 7 – ANALYSIS AND DEMONSTRATION OF 
CASE 
This chapter draws together the analysis of the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 to 
present a case study of regional ICT policymaking in SADC. Emerging themes and 
patterns arising from the interviews in the previous chapter are synthesised with the 
findings of the document analysis in Chapter 5. Policy outcomes, assessed in terms of 
technological readiness of the region, costs of communication and quality of services of 
ICT, and in particular, broadband, are weighed against the common policy objectives of 
the region and underlying institutions and processes.  
The following sections analyse the main research findings that have emerged from 
the different sources of data. Regional institutional arrangements are examined in terms 
of regional policy outcomes, and factors contributing to poor policy outcomes are 
identified. The definition of regional policy outcomes adopted in this thesis moves 
beyond the usual ICT indicators related to market performance, such as access, use, 
price and quality of service in technical policy studies. This case study considers policy 
outcomes as any phenomenon resulting from regional processes and structures for ICT 
policy-making. Therefore, it includes the institutional structures that have been created 
to regulate the sector, and the roles and responsibilities of the main stakeholders who 
have been involved in these processes; the legal framework that has been created by 
these structures and processes to regulate the sector from a regional perspective; and 
market performance, in terms of the level of reform achieved by national markets as a 
result of the participation of SADC institutions in several multilateral trade agreements. 
Finally, a few quantitative, supply-side indicators are discussed to complete the case 
study and to demonstrate the poor integration of national infrastructures into a seamless 
regional telecommunications network. 
7.1 First policy outcome: ineffective institutional arrangements for policy 
integration 
The complex and static regional institutional arrangement for the harmonisation of ICT 
policy and regulatory frameworks in the SADC region, takes the form of a multitude of 
international, multilateral, regional and national organisations (from an institutional 
structure point of view) and model frameworks (from a policy and processes points of 
view).  
Regarding ICT policymaking, regulation and the development of ICT 
programmes, expert opinions have highlighted the three tier structure of SADC, which 
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manages and coordinates the overall ICT programme:101 the first layer is represented by 
the SADC Secretariat whose activities are closely linked to policy-makers; the second 
layer is occupied by CRASA which operates as an implementing agency; and third, 
SATA gathers fixed-line and mobile operators together to build the regional 
infrastructure (Mamelodi, interview, 2013). These structures are involved in different 
ways depending on the issue under discussion – or the ICT programme which needs to 
be implemented – according to the regional agenda. 
In order to achieve regional objectives of poverty alleviation through economic 
growth and development, member states are required to harmonise political and socio-
economic policies through protocols which are approved by the Summit on 
recommendations of the Council.102 With regard to ICT, policy issues have not been a 
priority on the SADC agenda. There has been no update in the last 20 years since the 
protocol on communications was adopted by the Summit in August 1996, when Heads 
of State gathered in Maseru, Lesotho to sign the SADC Protocol on TCM.103 Although 
constitutionally,104 decisions, policies and agreements entered into under the auspices of 
SADC are legally binding, only protocols are required to be implemented at a national 
level. It is not required that other documents such as model policies and model laws be 
adopted at a national level (Tayob, interview, 2012) and transposition is done on a 
voluntary basis (Linzie, interview, 2013). However, infringement procedures are not in 
place should national states fail to implement regional policies and model legislation 
(Linzie, interview, 2013; Tayob, interview, 2012; Bazzanella, interview, 2012), even 
                                       
101 The conceptual framework of this thesis depicts a three layer structure of ICT policymaking, which 
includes multilateral and international organisations; regional organisations; and national organisations 
(Figure 3.1). 
102 SADC Protocols are binding documents, which coordinate, rationalise and harmonise policies and 
strategies in many areas of cooperation including infrastructure and services. In the area of 
telecommunications and ICT, Chapter 10 of the 1996 SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and 
Meteorology (TCM) states objectives, targets and responsibilities of SADC member states with regard to 
communications infrastructures. The Protocol on TCM is a binding document for SADC member states, 
which are required to implement the harmonised policy framework at a national level. 
103 An attempt to update the SADC Protocol on TCM is represented by the recent ITU/EC HIPSSA project 
(2008-2013), through which ITU provided technical support to align policy, and legislative guidelines for 
industry developments, such as convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications licensing models. 
However, the amended protocol did not reach the SADC Summit level and therefore the main output of the 
second round of regional reforms does not have binding requirements for SADC member states. 
104 Southern African countries strengthened regional cooperation among member states in 1992, when the 
SADCC Summit gave legal status to the regional organisation and replaced the Lusaka Declaration (1980) 
with a Declaration and Treaty establishing the SADC. Since then, SADC countries have been required to 
coordinate, harmonise and rationalise their policies and strategies for regional development. 
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though, as observed in chapter 5, the organisation has legal instruments to enforce such 
decisions, policies and agreements. In fact, in order to enforce decisions, the SADC has 
set up institutional structures with decision-making, oversight, monitoring and 
evaluation, and executive powers. 105  Interviewees revealed that despite such 
enforcement mechanisms being in place, SADC has neglected to use them (Msimang, 
interview, 2012; Mamelodi, interview, 2013). This could be due to the absence, or a low 
level, of political will, or bureaucratic apathy. Consequently, in the second round of 
reforms, the SADC Protocol106 was not updated by the Summit.107 The endorsement of 
the protocol by the Summit is necessary for the document to become a legally binding 
text for member states. Two main reasons for this failure emerged from the interviews: 
first, the SADC Protocol includes not only a section on communications, but also one on 
transport and one on meteorology. Therefore, in order for a revised or new protocol to 
be approved, all the sections have to have been reviewed in unison. However, only the 
communications section had been reviewed. Secondly, the SADC legal department 
identified a procedural problem in the updating process: “…when the (SADC) legal 
experts required a version with tracked changes of the draft of the new protocol, people 
working on the postal component failed to submit a tracked document and so the legal 
department placed the process on hold” (Mamelodi, interview, 2012). Therefore, the 
HIPPSA project failed to achieve its main objective of updating the SADC Protocol by 
aligning it with continental and global trends. 
In addition to protocols, other legal instruments for integrating and harmonising 
ICT policy and regulation in the SADC region are model policies and model bills. These 
                                       
105 According to the SADC Treaty (1992) the Summit, which consists of Heads of State or Government of 
all member states, is the supreme policymaking institution. The Summit is supported by the Council, which 
oversees the implementation of policies and the proper execution of programmes. The Integrated Committee 
of Ministers is in charge of monitoring and controlling the implementation of the RISDP and has decision-
making powers to ensure a rapid implementation of programmes. The Secretariat is responsible for strategic 
planning and management of the programmes and it is responsible for submitting harmonised policies and 
programmes to the Council for consideration and approval. It has also monitoring and evaluation powers. 
The Secretariat is required to develop the capacity, infrastructure and maintenance of the regional ICT 
infrastructure, and to fulfill this role is supported by other regional organisations, including CRASA, the 
association of telecommunications regulators; SATA, a forum of operators of fixed land and mobile 
telephony networks; SATCC-TU, a technical support provider for the SATA; and SABA which represents 
public services and other broadcasting organisations. 
106 The updating of the Protocol on Communications was one of the main objectives of HIPSSA, a project 
funded by EC and implemented with the support of ITU (ITU, 2013). 
107 Since the Protocol is a binding document for its signatories, it needs to be endorsed by Heads of State. 
According to the SADC Treaty, protocols are approved by the Summit on recommendations of the Council 
(SADC Treaty, 1992, Art. 22 (2)). 
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instruments of regionalism can be used as guidelines by member states to develop 
national policy and regulatory frameworks in the realm of ICT.108 Even though these 
documents are not specifically binding, it emerged from the interviews that member 
states have been adopting and using these models to develop national frameworks. As an 
outcome of the adoption of these models, national legislative frameworks on ICT should 
be similar in order to achieve policy and regulatory harmonisation and integration. 
However, the process of adopting these documents at a national level is not linear and 
straightforward. National constraints derive, for instance, from specific national 
institutional arrangements and endorsements (Matanga, interview, 2012). Expert 
opinions revealed that legislation, methodology, and the structure of laws in each 
country may differ and constrain the various legislative approaches. Some countries may 
have constitutional limitations with regard to how a regional policy or law can be 
implemented at national level. Others may simply not have the capacity to introduce and 
implement the model law. 
Also, transposing regional regulations into national legislation has not been 
properly institutionalised. Rather, transposition is done on a voluntary basis and 
infringement procedures are not in place if national states fail to implement regional 
policies and model legislation (Linzie, interview, 2013; Tayob, interview, 2012; 
Bazzanella, interview, 2012). The failure to integrate national ICT markets results in an 
uneven level of liberalisation in SADC national markets (Table 7.1) and an uneven level 
of technological readiness throughout SADC countries (Table 1.4). A further regional 
legal instrument is represented by declarations. Declarations represent an additional 
obstacle to the implementation of the regional ICT policy framework at national level. 
Their soft legal status means that they do not need to be enforced at national level.  
On the other hand, one of the main successes of the implementation of the 
Protocol at national level and of the first round of reforms,109 was the creation of 
independent regulatory bodies in the SADC countries and the separation of postal and 
telecommunications regulatory frameworks and regulatory bodies (Mamelodi, 
interview, 2013; Msimang, interview, 2012). The majority of SADC countries have 
implemented the SADC Protocol on TCM (Mamelodi, interview, 2013), with the 
support of SATCC-TU (Tayob, interview, 2012). This is confirmed by the document 
                                       
108 Telecommunications Policies for SADC and the SADC Telecommunications Model Bill (1998) have the 
format of common guidelines for adoption and implementation at national level. These documents were 
developed to assist SADC member states to develop national policies and regulation on ICT. 
109 The first round of ICT reforms in the SADC coincides with the development and implementation of the 
SADC Protocol on TCM (1997), the Telecommunications Policies for SADC and the SADC 
Telecommunications Model Bill (1998). 
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analysis, from which it emerges that the principle of regulatory independence, included 
in the Reference Paper of the IV Protocol to the GATS, was implemented by both the 
SADC Protocol on TCM, which prescribes the establishment of autonomous and 
independent regulatory bodies, and by the Telecommunications Policies for SADC, 
which mentions that in a reformed telecommunications industry, public roles and 
powers should be clearly separated. However, other studies on ICT sector performance 
in selected African countries (Calandro et al., 2010; Gillwald, 2010) have been more 
critical of the level of independence of regulatory bodies in Africa. In fact, although the 
last decade has seen institutional rearrangements adjusted within the ICT sector to 
conform to international reform trends - with the ITU reporting that 93% of African 
countries have established regulators – these reforms do not equate to regulatory 
effectiveness if primary policy objectives are assessed against outcomes. The impotence 
of many regulatory agencies across the continent relates, at least in part, to the absence 
of political autonomy to regulate independently (Calandro and Moyo, 2010). Although 
autonomy of the regulator has been established by law, the required authority for them 
to regulate effectively is often curtailed by their lack of independence as a result of 
either the appointment process for the decision-making body, the financial situation of 
the authority, or the absence of accountability and transparency processes. 
Lack of transparency represents a barrier to the reforms being effectively 
developed and implemented at national level. Most of the documents produced by 
SADC ICT ministers’ meetings are confidential and records not available to the public, 
because the ICT ministry conferences are not under legal pressure to publish them (Le 
Bihan, interview, 2012). This situation is compounded by the absence of monitoring and 
evaluation of the level of integration achieved by national markets.  
ICT ministers play a predominant role in regional policymaking, overtaking the 
role that should be fulfilled by legislatures (Matanga, interview, 2012). Also, the follow-
up by ICT ministers can be poor and there is a lack of continuity. Therefore, as the 
document analysis demonstrated, despite formal development of ICT policy and 
regulatory framework at regional level, it has not been properly implemented at national 
level. Another obstacle to the implementation of regional frameworks at national level is 
that participation of member states in the process of reforming the telecommunications 
sector at regional level is in the form of conferences and validation workshops. Thus 
their role is more visible at the end of the process and less evident during the process, 
when it would be more relevant (Jallow, interview, 2013). In order to be effective, the 
regional policy needs to be aligned with local institutional needs in order to have local 
standing and ownership. Technical assistance is not effective without a deep 
understanding of the political economy in which reform is taking place (Gillwald, 2012).  
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7.1.1  ICT policy reform as a new form of foreign affairs shaped by the epistemic 
communities 
International, donors and multilateral organisations, such as USAID, ITU and the 
European Commission, have been extensively and consistently involved in ICT policy 
reform processes in the SADC region from the 1990s. These organisations are involved 
in harmonising a global agenda on ICT policy, driven by international regulatory 
trends.110 SADC regional institutions need to engage with international organisations in 
order to develop and implement ICT programmes and projects, because they lack 
capacity, skills, funds111 and independence (Gillwald, 2012). SADC countries, many of 
whom are heavily in debt, or have public budget constraints, often do not pay regional 
membership fees.112 As a result, other policy areas deemed more relevant and important 
in the region, such as fighting HIV/AIDS or natural resource management, are on top of 
the SADC policy agenda. Regional organisations are able to secure some public budget 
to undertake policy development work in these critical areas, while ICT policy is 
normally not considered a priority for the regional agenda on development (Matanga, 
interview, 2012). Therefore, regional organisations depend on international, multilateral 
or donor organisations to run ICT policy and regulation programmes.113 These are 
designed and implemented to improve regional competitiveness and regional 
attractiveness and to reap economic and social gains as a result of the deployment of 
ICT infrastructures.114 In addition, the involvement of international and multilateral 
                                       
110 Convergence, roll-out of fibre-optic networks, and the release of LTE spectrum are currently the 
priorities for ICT policy and regulatory reforms in developing countries. In addition, as more people get 
connected to the internet, internet governance issues such as cyber-security, surveillance and freedom of 
expression are becoming the new regulatory challenges for governments and regulatory bodies in 
developing countries.    
111  The survey on mapping multi-stakeholder participation in internet governance from an African 
perspective (RIA, 2014b) indicated that lack of financial resources is one of the main factors preventing 
effective participation in internet governance processes and debates. 
112 Some SADC countries belong to different RECs. This raises administrative costs because membership is 
associated with financial obligations. 
113 The ICT programme of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, for instance, has been created and funded only 
through donor funds. In 2012, when all donors withdrew from the programme, the entire SADC PF chapter 
on ICT had to close. 
114 Extensive and efficient telecommunications infrastructure is a driver of competitiveness (WEF, 2009). In 
the SADC region a seamless ICT infrastructure reduces the effect of geographical distance between 
countries and it fosters the integration of national markets at a regional level by connecting them to markets 
in other regions all over the world at low cost. Solid, good quality and extensive telecommunications 
networks allow a rapid and low-cost flow of information, increasing overall economic efficiency. 
Investment in telecommunications is substantially more productive than investment on average, due to the 
existence of externalities (Cannig, 1999). Studies have identified positive associations between 
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organisations in the regional ICT policy process includes technical components related 
to frequency harmonisation to avoid cross-border interference, or the maintenance of the 
global technical interoperability of the internet. 
The strong influence of international, multilateral and donor organisations in 
shaping a regional agenda on ICT is a combination of a global technical agenda for the 
interoperability of the global telecommunications network and the internet115 on the one 
hand; and on the other hand, a relationship of dependence by national and regional 
institutions on international, multilateral and donor organisations to run ICT 
programmes to compensate for their lack of capacity, skills, funds and independence. 
The implementation of regional strategic plans is dependent on regional capacity to 
collect and analyse ICT indicators, but the interviews indicate that, at the moment, 
SADC organisations do not have the resources or capacity to carry out this kind of 
monitoring and evaluation. 
International and multilateral organisations have the technical capacity to support 
RECs and normally they provide technical support in the form of capacity-building. 
SADC institutions and regional processes have been supported and shaped by a network 
of development practitioners, consultants and academics with a shared system of values, 
beliefs and practices, mostly drawn from Western democracies and mature economies. 
This community of experts is referenced in the literature as an “epistemic community” 
(Haas, 1992).  
“The epistemic community is a knowledge community or reference group, 
in this case a group of international consultants who share the same set of 
values… who accept and adopt a set of reforms and criteria which were 
globally defined in their practice and which are applied pretty uniformly 
across the different jurisdictions in which they work …” (Gillwald, 
interview, June 2012). 
The strong influence of epistemic communities in ICT policy development in Africa has 
been confirmed by a representative of the ITU, participating in an online survey on 
                                                                                                       
telecommunications infrastructure and economic growth (Jipp, 1963; Dholoakia and Harlam, 1994; Roller 
and Waverman, 2001; Koutrompis, 2009; Kim, Kelly et al, 2010, Katz, 2012; Williams, 2009; OECD, 
2007).  
115 The two main global organisations in charge of technical interoperability of telecommunications and the 
internet are the ITU and the ICANN. The ITU has standardisation and radio spectrum harmonisation at the 
core of its technical mandate. Its activities are executed at the infrastructure and services level, as opposed to 
content regulation. Specifically, the ITU has two technical areas: telecommunications standardisation (ITU-
T); and radio spectrum and satellite orbits allocation (ITU-R). The ICANN is engaged in managing internet 
numberings and domain names, and it is involved also in policymaking related to them, by establishing a 
system of rules rooted in contracts so as to order the global supply of domain names. 
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mapping multi-stakeholder participation in internet governance (Calandro, 2014). He 
clearly acknowledged the impact of the foreign epistemic community on the creation of 
standardised policies, particularly those relating to internet policies in developing 
countries. The respondent, referring to the extent to which multi-stakeholderism is 
practised, feasible or applicable in existing (internet) governance and policy structures in 
Africa, declared that:  
“Presently there is hardly (any) and you find a few selected groups 
making assumptions for many” (RIA survey on multi-stakeholderism, 
2014b). 
These shared international values featured in Thabo Mbeki’s ‘African Renaissance’ 
motif which was based on the idea that the economic growth of SADC countries should 
be related to a regional integration project based on good governance, democracy and 
liberalised markets. These values are widely shared by the epistemic community of 
consultants and experts, who provide technical support and capacity-building to SADC 
in its task of harmonising and integrating national ICT markets through regional policy 
and regulatory frameworks.  
Studies on the political economy of developing countries observe that a major 
obstacle to economic development is caused by the lack of implementation of 
democratic principles in their governance. Democracy in developing countries does not 
result in a significant change in the economic situation of these countries, which are 
characterised by a large informal economy and widespread non-market accumulation 
processes (Khan, 2002). Economic marginalisation of African countries is partially the 
result of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), promoted in the 1980s and 1990s by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and by the World Bank. The SAPs preceded the 
“Washington Consensus”, a set of economic principles based on neo-liberal theories, 
which reject government intervention in the marketplace to improve economic 
conditions in developing countries. Assessments of SAPs on poverty indicators suggest 
that these programmes had a negative impact on poverty and income distribution. After 
their implementation, economic activities were suppressed, wages and tax revenues were 
reduced and the balance of payment worsened (ECA and AU, 2006). Most of the 
economies of SADC countries are characterised by weak factor-driven elements, 
including basic institutional development; poor infrastructure, health and primary 
education; and macro-economic instability. Furthermore, they lack efficiency-driven 
elements, such as acceptable market size, reasonable levels of higher education and 
training, goods and labour market efficiencies, final market sophistication and 
technological readiness. Overlooking such political and economic conditions, could lead 
to the failure of technical assistance or capacity-building programmes, initiated or 
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supported by international, multilateral or donor organisations, and often implemented 
by external consultants. 
Haas (2008) has argued that epistemic communities emerge and proliferate when 
demands for specialised information arise. In the case of the reform of SADC regional 
ICT policy and regulatory framework, interviewees indicated that the intervention of 
international organisations was based on the need to build capacity and provide technical 
assistance either for the development of a common framework or to update one. This 
fitted in with international best practices of regulation, relating to the separation of 
political, legislative and regulatory power (first round of reforms) – even if ineffectively 
implemented - and convergence and internet regulation, such as cyber-security (second 
round of reforms). 
The epistemic community of external consultants and representatives from 
international organisations, who have been involved in regional processes, have a 
normative approach to regional policy-making, which comes from their experience of 
the mature markets of Europe and the United States. This normative approach informing 
regionalisation efforts draws extensively from the European Union as the most 
developed integrated region, for instance, where institutionalised and complex structures 
and processes for the harmonisation of regional frameworks are in place, and the 
interaction between the regional level and the national level is structured around 
sophisticated bureaucratic organisations, which monitor and evaluate the 
implementation of regional measures.116 
7.2 Second policy outcome: limited market entry and FDI 
Reasons for integration of regional blocs in a continental free trade area can be found in 
the theory of political economy of regional integration. Reducing costs of intra-trade 
between African countries, increasing foreign investment flows, and addressing 
capacity constraints have been heralded as key objectives of regional trade agreements. 
The literature review in Chapter 2 concluded that the political rationale of such trade 
agreements has been to create a southern African economic community as part of the 
broader goal of African unity (Draper, 2011). This political motivation has been 
confirmed by the interviews. Several interviewees pointed out that one of the drivers for 
the development of an harmonised regional ICT policy and regulatory framework was 
building an African identity. Historically, integration in southern Africa was either to 
consolidate South Africa’s economic management of the region, primarily for labour 
                                       
116 In the European Union, directives are mainly used for the implementation of regional measures at 
national level. 
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supply purposes through the customs union, or subsequently for the Frontline States to 
isolate South Africa under the apartheid regime. However, over the last two decades, 
regional integration has been considered a strategy to allow SADC countries to “speak 
the same language” (Katiti, interview, 2013).  
Objectives for the integration of ICT policy and regulatory frameworks in the 
SADC mostly relate to the creation of regional economies of scale and scope (Linzie, 
interview, 2013; Katiti, interview, 2013; Tayob, interview, 2012). A regional market 
“would attract a bigger injection in the sector” (Linzie, interview, 2013). While all 
SADC member states encourage foreign direct investment (FDI), each member state 
currently operates its own, regulatory framework with its own pace of economic 
liberalisation, that is largely disconnected. Some member states place restrictions on 
foreign ownership of the telecommunications industry and media. Assessing foreign 
investments in telecommunications in the SADC is problematic, particularly because 
different institutional sources of sector indicators report diverging data.117  
The first round of reforms introduced the liberalisation phase of 
telecommunications markets, with the intention of providing clear sector policy and 
regulatory guidance to govern the transition from state-owned monopolies to privatised 
infrastructures. Market reforms in the telecommunications sector were introduced in the 
last quarter of the 20th century to correct inefficiencies in the public utilities. In the 
liberalisation phase of the reform of the sector, market forces were thought to be the 
prime drivers of efficiency (Ndukwe, 2005). However, the FDI in Africa was highly 
concentrated in the oil and mining sectors.  
The following table compares and summarises two sources of data on market 
entry in the SADC, with a particular focus on foreign direct investment. 
 
Table 7.1: Market entry and FDI in SADC countries 
Country 
Market entry (source: Lewis 











Restricted: Foreign companies 
are prohibited from holding a 
Allowed Allowed 
                                       
117 According to SADC, five SADC countries restrict foreign investments in telecommunications, with only 
Mauritius and Zambia allowing 100% foreign ownership. Madagascar and Mozambique only restrict fixed 
line telecommunications, allowing foreign ownership of mobile services (SADC, 2014). 
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Table 7.1: Market entry and FDI in SADC countries 
Country 
Market entry (source: Lewis 










majority stake in any 
telecommunications licensee. 
Cross ownership of licensed 
operations is limited to 10%. 
Botswana 
Open to foreign investors 
(especially in the mobile 
segment). No restrictions on 
foreign suppliers. 
Not allowed Limited to 2 
DRC 
Open to foreign investors. 
Mobile sector heavily 




1999 Act promotes the 
introduction of competition by 
attracting new players. 
Allowed Not allowed 
Madagascar Open to foreign investors. 
  
Malawi 
Open to foreign investors. 
However, there are restrictions 
both in the fixed and mobile 
markets, but on a non-
discriminatory basis. 
Not allowed Not allowed 
Mauritius 
Open to foreign investors. The 
country represents an 
emerging offshore investment 
destination. 
Allowed Allowed 
Mozambique Open to foreign investors. 
  
Namibia 
Restrictive. Foreign ownership 
available by licence to 49% of 
the company that applies for 
Not allowed Allowed 
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Table 7.1: Market entry and FDI in SADC countries 
Country 
Market entry (source: Lewis 












Open to foreign investors. 
100% of voice market is 
controlled by foreign 
suppliers. 
    
South Africa 
Open to foreign investments, 
especially in the mobile and 
mobile broadband sub-sector. 
Not allowed 
till expiry of a 
specific 
timeframe 




Restricted. There are no 
foreign-controlled entities in 





Open to foreign investment. 
Voice telephony providers, 
with a foreign controlling 
interest, account for over 99% 
of the voice telephony market. 
Allowed Allowed 
Zambia 
Open to foreign investment, in 
particular the voice market. 
Now allowed Allowed 
Zimbabwe 
Restricted. 80% of voice 
telephony is controlled by 
Zimbabwean companies, with 
only 20% available to foreign 
entities. 
Allowed Allowed 
Source: Lewis and Abrahams, 2013; UNCTAD, 2009. 
 
American consultants influenced the first round of reforms, introducing a free 
market ideology (Goulden, interview, 2012). This ideology was then translated into the 
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Telecommunications Policies for SADC (SATCC, 1998) which envisaged the creation 
of a competitive regional telecommunications sector, attracting local and foreign 
investors, promoting a fair competitive and stable investment environment, and 
providing network access on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions. 
Nevertheless, as previously observed (Chapter 1, § 1.4) the region adopted a “cautionary 
approach” to telecommunications sector reform (Hodge, 2002), because of strong 
political opposition to full liberalisation of the sector. 
As a result, both market entry and FDI in the SADC region are limited. Botswana, 
Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia do not allow new entrants in the fixed-lines market 
(UNCTAD, 2009). In Angola, foreign companies are prohibited from holding a majority 
stake in any telecommunications licensee, and cross-ownership of licensed operations is 
limited to 10% (Lewis and Abrahams, 2013). In Namibia, market entry is restricted, 
since it does not allow more than 49% of the telecommunications companies to be 
owned by foreigners. In Zimbabwe, the indigenisation policy requires majority 
ownership by “indigenous Zimbabweans”. 
Telecommunications markets have been only partially reformed at a national level 
in the WTO process through the GATS framework, and only a few member states have 
agreed on a certain number of commitments. In SADC, only six countries (Botswana, 
DRC, Lesotho, South Africa, Mauritius and Zimbabwe) have made specific 
commitments in telecommunications. As part of that process, South Africa committed to 
at least a second national operator. With regard to mobile communications, only South 
Africa and Mauritius made commitments, both undertaking a limited liberalisation of 
this market segment, allowing two operators to enter the market initially, but South 
Africa committed to more. 
In the VAS segment, only Lesotho committed to full liberalisation of the sector, 
while South Africa and Zimbabwe offer limited liberalisation. All service providers are 
required to lease monopoly facilities in order to offer their services. 
7.3 Third policy outcome: poor market performance 
Overall, SADC countries are characterised by poor institutional arrangements for ICT 
sector development, which results in poor ICT market performance, such as low access 
to, and use of ICT, high prices and poor quality of service. Socio-economic outcomes in 
many developing countries are shaped by political patronage and internal political 
instability (Chapter 2, § 2.1). The economy is not sustained primarily through fiscal 
policies but mainly through accommodating off-budget interests of factions organised 
along political patronage lines (Khan, 2002). Client-patron networks in Africa survived 
the transition to democracy. In developing countries the patron can divert political 
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power to capture public resources. An extreme example of this is Swaziland, but this is 
also evident in countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. 
In this political context, SADC countries do not have a political and regulatory 
environment conducive to investment (Chapter 1, Table 1.6). From the interviews it 
emerged that the heterogeneity of political and regulatory environments among SADC 
countries is an obstacle to harmonising and integrating national policy and regulatory 
frameworks at a regional level because different countries have different institutional 
arrangements, political environments and different legislative frameworks (Matanga, 
interview, 2012; Le Bihan, interview, 2012. 
Most SADC countries are defined either as “factor driven economies”118 or as 
“transition economies” by the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) of the WEF (2014). 
These countries are characterised by weak institutions, absence of efficient higher 
education and training, under-developed infrastructures, small market size and poor 
technical readiness (GCI, WEF, 2014).  
While South Africa and Mauritius are the leading countries in the region in terms 
of quality of the overall infrastructure, all the other countries rank poorly on global 
indexes such as the GCI (WEF, 2014) and the IDI (ITU, 2014). In the majority of SADC 
countries, telecommunications networks are poorly developed, and access to and use of 
ICT is low. Regulatory agencies lack independence119 (Calandro, Gillwald, et al., 2010) 
and the executive subsumes parliamentary roles and responsibilities (Matanga, interview, 
2012) weakening legislative and oversight functions. This thesis maintains that 
government organisations and regulatory agencies do not have enough technical and 
financial resources to effectively regulate the sector. SADC countries are unable to 
leverage ICT to improve business efficiency and therefore to increase productivity (GCI 
Technological Readiness, WEF, 2014).  
On a different note, island states such as Mauritius and Seychelles are efficiency 
driven economies (WEF, 2014), have higher levels of individuals using the internet and 
greater numbers of fixed (wired)-broadband subscriptions (ITU, 2013).  
South Africa, in contrast, has the characteristics of both a developed and 
developing economy. On the one hand the country has the strongest economy in the 
region (table 1.1) and has a relatively high level of access to ICT in comparison to other 
SADC countries (ITU, 2014). Besides its relatively strong infrastructural development, 
its institutional development includes sophisticated world universities and research 
                                       
118 Factor driven economies in the SADC region are Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
119 Specifically, Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe do not have a conducive political and 
regulatory environment (WEF, 2014). 
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bodies. The country also has a strong private sector and financial services sector (WEF, 
2014). On the other hand, despite the country still being the highest on several indicators 
at a regional level, it lost positions on global ICT indices over the last two decades 
(Gillwald, 2013). 
Another significant cause for poor ICT market performance in the region is the 
low participation of the private sector in the development of the internet in many SADC 
markets. In addition to contributing to ineffective ICT policies and regulations,120 this 
results in an uneven distribution of internet resources - such as Tier1 networks and 
Internet Exchange Points and intermediaries,121 which are concentrated in the Global 
North (Calandro et al., 2013).  
Communication prices in SADC countries, wholesale and retail, are high, 
reflecting policy failure with regard to the objective of affordable access. According to 
retail pricing data collected by Research ICT Africa over four years since Q4 2010, 
mobile voice tariffs in SADC countries are expensive (Table 1.8; Figure 1.3). However, 
regulated reduction of mobile termination rates, and increased competition in the mobile 
market segment, are reducing mobile voice tariffs throughout the region. Data prices 
reflect the new challenge, with wholesale price regulation far more of a challenge in an 
internet environment. 
Of the SADC countries measured in the Mobile Africa Price Transparency Index 
(RIA, 2014; Table 1.8) Mauritius is ranked the highest due to a competitive 
telecommunications environment with two fixed-line operators (Mauritius Telecom and 
MTML 122 ) and three mobile operators (Orange, Emtel and MTML) providing 
communications services to a relatively small population. Namibia and Botswana, two 
countries with small market size due to a small population, managed to significantly 
reduce communications prices over the last three years. Specifically, in Namibia the 
reduction of MTR since 2009 has brought about a significant reduction in retail voice 
tariffs.  
                                       
120 By contrast, in the global north, business associations substantially contributed to the development of 
ICT policy and regulatory frameworks through a multi-stakeholder approach to internet policymaking: 
examples are the role played by the International Chamber of Commerce as coordinating advocacy lobby 
for business in WSIS, ICANN, OECD, IGF, etc., as well as the significant investment of time, resources and 
energy into multi-stakeholder dialogue by individual tech companies, like Cisco, Microsoft, Nokia-Siemens, 
Verizon etc. 
121 According to the OECD (2010), internet intermediaries are internet service providers (ISPs), hosting 
providers, search engines, e-commerce intermediaries, internet payment systems and participative web 
platforms. 
122 MTML provides CDMA2000 services. 
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In Mozambique, the entry of a third mobile operator, Movitel, into the market in 
2012, has shaken up a duopoly in the fixed and mobile segments, that was delivering 
poor quality and highly priced services to the major cities. In addition, in 2012, a 
reduction of MTR assisted the market to become more competitive, with both mCel and 
Vodacom Mozambique pressured into reducing their mobile prepaid voice tariffs. 
In comparison to other SADC countries, South Africa has high levels of access to, 
and use of, mobile phones. The market is characterised by an oligopoly dominated by 
two mobile operators, MTN SA and Vodacom SA. The two operators have matched 
their relatively high prices over the last two years (RIA, 2014). On the other hand, the 
small operators, Cell C and Telkom Mobile, have been reducing their retail prices and 
that has translated into a very good ranking in the RIA mobile ‘cheapest in the country’ 
index (7th position in Q2 2014, see Table 1.8). 
Despite some countries reducing their mobile prepaid voice prices, broadband 
prices remain very expensive. Research ICT Africa compiles a broadband price 
transparency index, which ranks selected African countries according to the price of 
1GB basket. Among SADC countries, South Africa is the cheapest country in the index. 
At the end of Q1 2014, 1GB of data cost USD13.7. In contrast, Namibia and Botswana 
are the most expensive in the data market. Namibia has drastically reduced mobile 
prepaid voice prices but it is still very expensive in the mobile broadband market. 
Botswana is a land-locked country characterised by a low level of competition in the 
wholesale market and international gateways. 
Although international bandwidth prices have dropped significantly over the last 
few years, with the end of the SAT 3 monopoly for the southern Africa sub-region, and 
the landing of several competitive undersea cables on the previously barren East and 
West coasts, national transmission and backhaul costs remain very high. Also cross 
border prices within the region are often prohibitive (Gillwald, Moyo and Stork, 2013). 
7.4 Challenges to ICT policy harmonisation and integration at a regional 
level 
The need to identify appropriate structures and processes for the governance of regional 
telecommunications infrastructures comes from the fact that in a converging 
environment dominated by internet and IP-based services, traditional governing bodies 
and decision-making procedures do not work as effectively as in a nationally bounded 
telecommunications environment, dominated by incumbents, and regulated by sovereign 
national government organisations. This is compounded by the lack of financial means, 
human resources, and technical capacity at a regional level, especially with regard to 
ICT policy and regulation. This makes developing countries even more reliant on 
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international, multilateral and donor organisations to develop harmonised and regulatory 
frameworks.  
In the first round of reforms, the wave of liberalisation of telecommunications 
markets was supported by global processes, such as the WTO GATS processes. Support 
from international and multilateral organisations for the SADC was relatively effective; 
at least in developing regional model legislation and guidelines that were instrumental in 
separating regulatory bodies from government organisations. Conversely, the second 
round of reforms, which was part of a global reform movement towards converged, 
broadband services, aligned with new global governance arrangements, and, at the 
regional level, based on the EU model of cooperation, has not been as successful.  
From a political economy perspective, different stages of economic, political and 
social development make it difficult for SADC member countries to have common 
priorities and therefore to adopt common models or frameworks. 
Although an international and global agenda on ICT sector reform has been 
developed, based on policy and regulatory objectives shaped by industry, and 
technological standards coming from the mature markets of the global north - and 
supported by well-structured and well-resourced international and multilateral 
organisations - African countries have seldom been able to participate in international 
debates and decision-making processes, tasked with developing a technical and policy 
agenda for the development and maintenance of the global network (Calandro et al., 
2013). African governments are normally marginalised from ICANN decision-making 
structures and processes. Thus they default to ITU meetings as the African caucus for 
the governance of the internet. At an ITU level, SADC countries have been able to 
successfully coordinate their strategies and positions in an attempt to be more effective 
at an international level on global governance issues. However, African RECs do not 
have rights to vote in such forums.  
In order to include marginalised countries in the process of globalisation of 
telecommunications networks, African RECs have been used as a bridge to compensate 
for the gap between the international and global debate and national policy and 
regulatory agendas. RECs, having no capacity beyond their secretariats, have been 
receptive to technical assistance and capacity-building initiatives, which try to 
compensate for the lack of technical skills, financial resources and independence in the 
sector at a national level.  
Like previous governance reform initiatives in relation to telecommunications, 
these are aligned to an international reform agenda, and are based on a set of values and 
‘best practices’ developed from more mature markets, and shared and supported by the 
epistemic community. In this sense, policymaking in the SADC region can be 
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considered as a foreign affairs tool to advance the shared set of values and beliefs drawn 
from mature markets and Western democracies. These interventions, if not properly 
developed and implemented, create a waste of international technical and financial 
resources, which are critical to support the development of recipient countries. In fact, it 
is doubtful if any member states involved in the reform initiative could have put in place 
this process without any kind of external support.  
In the southern African case of regional ICT policymaking and regulation, one of 
the historical drivers of the development of a harmonised regional ICT policy and 
regulatory framework, is the emulation of the EU model of integration. African states 
hope to reach the same level of regional integration through regional harmonisation of 
national policy and regulatory frameworks, but enforcement of regional ICT policies, 
protocols and declarations at a national level is uneven. Regional policy outputs in terms 
of legislative documents (i.e. protocols, model policy and model bills, declarations) are 
not evenly implemented at a national level. Different legislation, methodology, and 
structures of the laws in each country differ, and that creates an additional obstacle to 
transposing regional policy and regulation at national level. Declarations have been 
extensively used by SADC organisations and are one of the main outputs of regional 
policymaking. Despite this, the documents are not transposed into national law.  
Member states participate in the process of reforming the telecommunications 
sector through meetings, in the form of conferences and validation workshops. Normally, 
these meetings take place at the end of the policy and regulatory process, so member 
states have little input in the actual process, methods, outcomes. As a result, SADC 
member states have a weak buy-in to regional issues. Budget and human resource 
constraints are the main obstacles to effective participation by SADC countries in 
regional processes. In addition, the involvement of member states in regional processes 
is mostly driven by ICT ministers, who often fail to report back to parliaments on issues 
related to ICT. Therefore the follow-up at national level is normally poor.  
7.5 Conclusions 
The regional effort to harmonise and integrate regional markets in a seamless electronic 
communications infrastructure, and to provide universal access and service to all SADC 
citizens, has failed to achieve the intended results. In almost all SADC countries, with 
the exception of South Africa and some of the island states, the performance of the 
SADC telecommunications markets has been poor. Despite South Africa still being the 
highest on several indicators, it has plummeted down global ICT indices over the last 
two decades. 
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The poor integration and harmonisation of national ICT policy and regulatory 
frameworks should raise questions not only about the effectiveness of these 
interventions, but also about alternative measures that can be implemented to make them 
work. There is no doubt that some aspects of national telecommunications regulation 
needs to be integrated regionally; for instance, to avoid cross-border interference or to 
adopt common technical standards for DTT. The SADC case demonstrates that specific 
interventions, such as migration to digital TV, or the adoption of cyber-security 
measures, would have been more effective if they had both been adopted at regional 
level and implemented at national level. However, institutional structures and processes 
failed to develop and implement appropriate regional measures to improve 
telecommunications market performance at national level. The preceding analysis 
indicates that the development and implementation of thematic regional policy and 
regulatory interventions should be incentivised, rather than trying to harmonise and 
integrate national frameworks through regional protocols that are difficult to enforce.  
The last chapter returns to the research problem and questions. By referring to the 
case evidence presented in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, this thesis will 
demonstrate the contribution this work has made to the existing body of knowledge in 
the area. Some final observations and qualifications are made about the research process 
and findings, and some research problems are posed to stimulate further investigation. 
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CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION  
This concluding chapter summarises the main points of the case study, presents the 
conclusions and offers final observations. This chapter concludes with an assessment of 
the original contribution by this research to the theory of regionalism and the role of in 
ICT sectoral reform. Ontologically, the research approach adopted is that of praxis in the 
sense that the thesis aims at creating knowledge that can be used to practically inform 
regional ICT policy, and in line with this approach, some policy recommendations are 
made.  
8.1 The missing objective of integrating African economies 
Globalisation has been one of the main factors driving Africa’s regional integration. The 
common objective of regional economic communities in Africa is to reduce trade 
barriers among member countries to create optimal multilateral trade operations 
(Tinbergen, 1954) by creating a larger economic space (ECA and AU, 2006) especially 
for small countries.123 In addition, the fragmentation of Africa into many states with 
limited economic coherence has led African leaders to adopt regional integration as a 
key strategy for development.124 However, these objectives have only been partially 
achieved in the African case. In the contemporary context 125  of post-colonial 
development within the broader process of globalisation, political and economic 
enthusiasm for integration and reinforcement of regional blocs has intensified. 126 
Throughout the thesis, I have referred to this phenomenon as “regionalism” (Söderbaum, 
2004).  
                                       
123 The objectives of the Regional Integration Arrangements (RIA) are similar to those identified by the 
literature on regional competitiveness (Chapter 2, § 2.3). RIA arrangements, in fact, are expected to lead to 
the creation of larger integrated regional markets, which would enable participating countries to exploit 
economies of scale, enhance domestic competition, raise return on investment, and hence, attract more 
foreign direct investment (FDI). 
124 It has been observed (Chapter 1, § 1.2) that the failure of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), 
which marginalised African countries as domestic economic activities were suppressed, wages and tax 
revenues reduced, and the balance of payments worsened (ECA and AU, 2006), induced African leaders to 
adopt regional integration as a strategy for growth and for increasing negotiating power with major trading 
partners, in order to counter the negative effects of the globalisation process. 
125 More recently, this process of integration of national markets in regional political and economic blocs in 
the African context has been supported by the creation of a Grand Free Trade Area. This free trade 
agreement signed by African leaders was implemented in June 2011 through the creation of an expanded 
regional bloc which is supposed to improve connectivity, increase investment flows and address capacity 
constraints among the 26 member states belonging to three overlapping RECs: COMESA, SADC and EAC. 
126 This is confirmed, for instance, by global bodies, such as the UN, recognising the new powers of the EU. 
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Regional integration is particularly relevant in the SADC region, where eight out 
of fifteen countries - Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia - are classified as least developed 
countries (UN, 2014). Theoretically, a single regional market would increase the 
attractiveness of the regional territory since a regional bloc would attract more capital, 
workers, and firms with stable or rising market shares. This would create economies of 
scale and scope which in turn would improve standards of living in a competitive 
environment. This notion of integration, in the SADC region is linked to the wider 
‘African Renaissance’ and NEPAD motif expressed by president Thabo Mbeki at the 
turn of the millennium. The full economic potential of the region, according to him, 
could have been reached through the harmonisation of trade practices, bringing national 
states closer together as a more uniform and larger market. His idea of regional 
integration is based on good governance, democracy and trading markets. The objective 
of the project is to develop the southern African region as an attractive destination for 
local and international capital.  
In reality, trading rules and agreements, as set by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), impose trade obligations on small sub-Saharan African governments, forcing 
African countries to follow strategies adopted in Europe, in the United States and in the 
Asian emerging economies.127  
From a multilateral trade perspective, the SADC can support the participation of 
less resourced and small member countries in WTO negotiations processes, as it can 
support the preparatory work of their member states and support the coordination of 
regional positions at WTO level, but SADC lacks human and financial resources, lacks 
representation in Geneva and lacks concrete inputs from member states to present at 
WTO negotiation processes. As a result, although most of the recommendations 
provided by the Reference Paper of the IV Protocol to the GATS have been embedded 
in the regional ICT policy and regulatory framework, only six countries (Botswana, 
                                       
127 Chapter 1, § 1.4 showed that the implementation of regional trade liberalisation programmes has 
generally remained behind schedule. SADC countries have found it difficult to significantly influence WTO 
negotiation processes. The thesis highlighted the fact that SADC Secretariat lacks programmes specifically 
dedicated to WTO issues, and staff constraints, insufficient financial and technical means, and insufficient 
absorption capacity with a growing regional agenda has hindered its participation in WTO negotiation 
meetings. Poor and small SADC countries do not have the capacity to influence WTO negotiations, 
particularly determining and defending their positions in technical negotiations including 
telecommunications. Although SADC countries embarked on the reform process of liberalising the 
telecommunications sector, only a few countries made commitments to the WTO, and none propose a full 
liberalisation of the sector. The dominant strategy adopted in the region is cautionary telecommunications 
sector reform, due to strong political opposition (Hodge, 2002). 
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DRC, Lesotho, South Africa, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe) have made specific 
commitments on telecommunications. Angola, Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique 
have only partially liberalised their markets, while ownership restrictions in Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and South Africa may obstruct foreign direct investments in the 
telecommunications markets.  
African regional integration arrangements have partially failed to achieve the 
primary trade objective of eliminating barriers and obstacles to realise a regional free-
trade area. As this constitutes the most important element in motivating their 
establishment, they have therefore failed to address their own development goals from a 
regional integration perspective. 
The research problem identified some of the primary reasons for the failure of 
regionalism and the failure to eliminate barriers and obstacles to realising a regional 
free-trade area on the African continent (Chapter 1). When analysing the regional 
integration process from an institutional perspective, one of the main obstacles related to 
the creation of intra-regional trade at the SADC level, is the overlap in institutional 
functions and objectives with other African regional organisations – the so called 
‘spaghetti bowl’ (Chapter 1, § 1.3, Figure 1.1 page 26). In particular, this has an impact 
on foreign direct investment (FDI) since the multiplicity of trade agreements increases 
the amount of bureaucracy that investors face. Second, government unwillingness to 
relinquish national policy-making power to regional authorities has been identified as 
one of the main causes of the failure of regional integration, together with a lack of 
political commitment. 
The thesis has also placed the issue of regional ICT policymaking in the context 
of regional competitiveness (Chapter 2, § 2.3), as infrastructures, including 
communications, are the determinants of competitive advantage. Infrastructures are a 
tool to improve general economic capacity and underpin the integration of national 
markets. While investment in all infrastructures is associated with economic growth, 
investment in communications infrastructures, and broadband in particular, are 
associated with even greater contributions to national growth domestic products. In 
addition, ICTs have the potential drive of increased and sustainable regional 
productivity, by enhancing information and communication flows and thereby 
improving efficiency. As a result, regional organisations are invoked to formulate 
policies, which would enable a favourable environment for the development of a 
seamless regional ICT infrastructure. 
However, SADC countries, influenced by South Africa’s approach to economic 
policy reform of the information infrastructure, have adopted a gradual ‘managed 
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liberalisation’. This has been partly the result of strong political opposition to full 
liberalisation of the sector (Hodge, 2002). 
The outcome of such an approach to telecommunications markets reform is that, 
in the SADC region, the availability of low-cost backbone network capacity is limited 
and this constrains broadband diffusion. As evidenced in Chapter 1, poor network 
quality, high costs of services, and limited bandwidth are considered the main reasons 
for low broadband and internet penetration in many African countries. Therefore, 
regional policy and regulatory interventions aimed at developing a seamless regional 
infrastructure have, by and large, not met the objectives articulated in regional policy 
and regulatory documents.  
8.2 Research questions 
The analysis of regional institutional arrangements has been guided by a primary 
research question, namely, why in SADC, regional institutional arrangements have 
failed to realise regional objectives regarding integration and harmonisation of ICT 
policy and regulatory frameworks, and how they did so (Chapter 1, § 1.8). 
In order to answer the primary question, sub-questions were asked, in order to 
investigate what the national and international drivers of the development of an 
harmonised regional ICT policy and regulatory frameworks are; why regional ICT 
policies, protocols, and declarations have not always been implemented at national level; 
what the role of international organisations in regional ICT policy and regulatory 
formulation is; and what the policy outcomes in terms of regulatory instruments, market 
structure and development of a regional ICT infrastructure are. 
8.3 Observations on research findings 
Drawing on institutional theory and political economy, the thesis has investigated what 
the role of regional institutions is in shaping regional telecommunications market 
structures and outcomes. In particular, this thesis has empirically investigated the 
reasons for the failure of the region to realise its ICT policy objectives. Conducting the 
research on a regional bloc of developing countries, this thesis aimed not only to 
contribute to the theoretical debate on regionalism and ICT policy development, but 
ontologically through praxis to create knowledge that can be practically used by 
policymakers and practitioners. Chapter 4 described the methodology applied to 
examine how SADC institutional arrangements, including regional structures and 
processes, have shaped intended ICT policy objectives, as stated in SADC protocols and 
declarations, and assessed in terms of regional ICT policy outputs and outcomes. A 
hybrid methodology was used, with an emphasis on qualitative data and analysis. Both 
primary and secondary sources were used, as well as multiple methods to gather 
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evidence for the case study. These included document analysis and in-depth interviews 
with key role players within regional institutions and stakeholders within the ICT sector 
of the region.  
In Chapter 5, document analysis revealed that on paper, SADC has achieved a 
high level of regional integration. Driven by sound political and economic rationale, a 
development community was established, regulated by legally binding documents such 
as the treaty that established the SADC in 1992. Under the treaty, several institutions 
have been created with substantial powers. In addition to the SADC Secretariat and a 
specialised office dealing with regional ICT policies, other regional structures have been 
created to regulate the sector at a regional level, and to monitor the level of development 
of the telecommunications sector supported by the regional organisation. A multi-sector 
Protocol on Transport, Telecommunications and Meteorology enabled the formulation 
of policy guidelines and a telecommunications model bill to govern the sector at a 
regional level and provide guidelines for member states on the regulation of key issues, 
such as the establishment of universal access and service funds, interconnection, 
allocation of scarce resources, public availability of licencing criteria, and independent 
regulators. 
However, an analysis of SADC ICT infrastructure policy outcomes in terms of 
access and prices (Chapter 1, § 1.6), reveals that in southern Africa, regional ICT policy 
and regulatory structures and processes have failed to achieve the protocol’s main 
objectives of establishing efficient, cost-effective, and fully-integrated infrastructure and 
operations, which were expected to promote economic and social development. At least 
some of this failure is the result of a regional ICT agenda, that was mainly driven by 
international organisations and donor communities, and which did not always have 
national buy-in. This inevitably impacts on the performance of telecommunications 
markets at a national level. Certainly, it is evident that regional ICT programmes and 
protocols have not achieved the regional and national objectives of reducing prices, 
improving quality of service, and increasing access to and use of ICT across the region. 
Findings from the in-depth interviews (Chapter 6) reveal that due to lack of financial 
and human resources, and poor institutional capacity at a regional level, especially with 
regard to ICT policy and regulation, international organisations have driven the regional 
agenda on ICT, providing capacity-building and technical support to regional structures. 
For instance, in-depth interviews showed that regional reforms in the SADC ICT policy 
context were driven by international trends towards greater liberalisation and 
privatisation, set in motion by multilateral agencies such as the WTO and the ITU. It 
appears unlikely that any member state would have driven the reform process without 
any kind of external support. As a result of capacity-building and technical assistance 
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initiatives, implemented by the epistemic community (Haas, 1992), regional policies are 
aligned to an international agenda. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, an international 
epistemic community, through consulting, technical assistance and lobbying, infused the 
region with a reform agenda which was often informed by assumptions developed in 
mature markets and political systems.128  
Due to the normative assumptions on which capacity-building has been developed, 
many capacity-building programmes have failed. Many of these capacity-building 
activities often end up as “stopgap measures” (Hameiri, 2009:56), instead of transferring 
real skills and stimulating the development necessary to establish a sustainable 
framework for regional governance. 
Keohane and Nye’s (1975) concept of “institutional integration” has been used to 
assess governments’ policy outcomes (Chapter 1, § 1.6; Chapter 7, § 7.2; § 7.3). 
Institutional and policy integration was related to the level of integration achieved by the 
SADC (Chapter 1, § 1.4; Chapter 2, § 2.2) and with its outputs in terms of regional ICT 
policy and regulatory framework (Chapter 5). Findings reveal that the regional 
governance and institutional arrangements for the ICT sector are largely ineffectual.  
The thesis has demonstrated that SADC has apparently achieved a high level of 
regional integration, sustained by several institutions with power to set rules that bind 
member states, and power to initiate, implement and monitor strategic plans, 
programmes and projects (Chapter 5), but the analysis of the qualitative findings has 
shown that the underpinning regional and harmonised policy and regulatory framework 
has not been fully transposed at a national level. 
Although ‘best practices’ of regional regulation were imparted by the epistemic 
community into the institutions and processes of SADC in order to develop harmonised 
and ICT policy and regulatory frameworks, the following issues constrain effective 
implementation of regional measures at national level: 
a. the absence of enforcement mechanisms of model policy and model bill 
and the voluntary approach to transposing the regional framework at 
national level;  
                                       
128 Research findings (chapter 5) show that the first phase of the regional telecommunications market reform 
was shaped by the agenda of the US State Department and the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration, who introduced the Washington consensus reform agenda and thereby a set of 
economic principles based on neo-liberal theories, which reject government intervention in the market to 
improve the economic conditions of developing countries. European consultants drove the second round of 
reforms so the output of the reform process is based on European reforms and driven by European values. In 
Chapter 3 the thesis introduced the concept of capacity-building as a a political mechanism for state 
transnationalisation and therefore as an instrument of foreign policy in southern Africa (Hameiri, 2009). 
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b. lack of expertise at a parliamentary level to transpose regional measures in 
the national legislation;  
c. lack of parliamentary participation in regional processes;  
d. lack of a robust base of data, research and analysis related to the ICT 
sector which is needed to manage the ICT sector and stimulate growth.  
Taking into account the difficulty with which SADC countries participate in 
regional governance structures and processes, the current model of harmonising ICT 
policy and regulatory frameworks through technical support offered by the international 
community, is under pressure. In SADC countries, governments bring regional issues 
on to their government agendas through the Ministry of Communications, bypassing 
both parliaments and the emerging multi-stakeholder models for internet policymaking 
(chapter 2, § 2.1), and approaching telecommunications and internet issues through ex-
ante regulation. This form of telecommunications and internet regulation is aimed at 
supporting the development of a sector that is nascent in the SADC context, 
safeguarding net neutrality, preventing cyber-crime and harmonising technological 
standards. While conditions that are conducive to the expansion of telecommunications 
and the internet have to be created at the national level – from infrastructure and 
regulation of prices to the quality of service and secure online environments – the 
internet is, by its very nature, global, and requires international coordination and 
cooperation for it to continue to evolve and function as a global communications 
network. 
Harmonisation and integration of national ICT policy and regulatory frameworks 
at a regional level has proved to be ineffective in practice in SADC, existing only on 
paper in guidelines and model legislation for member states. The reality is that the top-
down approach to capacity-building and technical assistance, led by multilateral, 
international and donor organisations - an epistemic community which promotes an 
international agenda - has failed to achieve the main objective of providing universal 
access to the full range of modern communications services for all people in the SADC. 
A more open, decentralised decision-making and effective regional governance process 
should be embraced throughout these institutions, to facilitate telecommunications and 
internet development in ways that respond to local southern African conditions. 
8.4 Contributing to the theory and practice of regionalism for 
the development of an information society 
Approaching regionalism and ICT policymaking within a political economy paradigm, 
and specifically adopting a praxis approach, has highlighted the role played by the 
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epistemic community to advance particular values and norms under the guise of 
capacity-building.  
This thesis has contextualised institutional analysis in the specific political and 
economic circumstances of SADC. It has focused on the analysis of the institutions 
underlying the creation of the SADC region and the political, as well as economic 
reasons for the failure of regional organisations, regional policy, and regulatory 
frameworks. In this way the thesis overcomes the limitations of studies on regionalism, 
which focus exclusively on economic integration. 
Non-state entities and non-formal interactions play a determining role in shaping 
the way the SADC region is organised. In this case study on the SADC, an epistemic 
community of donors, consultants and multilateral agencies, representing the values and 
norms that drove a ‘best practice’ reform agenda, and having the technical knowhow to 
provide technical support in the form of capacity-building, is identified as the main non-
state actor determining regional outcomes. Underlying values and assumptions of good 
governance, democracy and liberalised markets are widely shared by this epistemic 
community of consultants and experts, providing technical support and capacity-
building to reform and integrate national ICT markets through regional policy and 
regulatory frameworks.  
It is the contention of this thesis that technical assistance and capacity-building 
can be ineffectual if it is not properly supported by an understanding of the political 
economy on the ground in SADC countries. In fact, one of the major obstacles to 
economic development in SADC countries is the lack of implementation of democratic 
(open, transparent and accountable), principles in their governance (Chapter 1, § 1.6). If 
international, multilateral or donor organisations overlook the political and economic 
situation, technical assistance or capacity-building programmes are doomed to fail.  
In the SADC case, although consensus built around the first round (SADC 
Protocol on TCM) and the second round of reforms (HIPPSA project), committed 
SADC countries to the major dimensions of the international reform model, the failure 
to fully transpose either set of reforms to the national level can only be understood 
within the political economy of a developing region and emergent democracies. While 
the specific political economy in each country shaped policy outcomes, the institutional 
challenges, dearth of skills and specialised competencies, lack of financial resources, 
and systems of patronage, undermined regional institutions and practices and 
undermined effective regional reforms. 
These insights into regional ICT policy failures, despite a well-articulated formal 
commitment to the development of an equitable information society for all, in the 
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tradition of praxis, provide opportunities for policy intervention in order to rectify 
identified problems within the regional institutional arrangements.  
8.5 Final remarks 
SADC institutional arrangements need to be overhauled to reflect distributions of power, 
interests and ideologies. These are lamentably served by the current dynamics of 
interaction between international, multilateral and donor organisations, regional 
institutions and national governments and regulators. 
As numerous examples in this thesis indicate, a regional reform initiative should 
be tailored to the situation on the ground, taking into account not only the low level of 
internet penetration and high prices of communications services, but the institutional 
endowments in the country and the region.  Institutional arrangements for ICT 
policymaking need to be rooted in the regional political economy rather than imposed 
according to standards derived from more mature competitive markets, more capacitated, 
meritocratic bureaucracies and bigger and more resourced economies. In most SADC 
countries, discussions about an updated protocol dealing with internet governance, 
convergence or cyber-security might seem premature, as transposing mechanisms of 
regional measures are not institutionalised and member states do not have the resources 
and effective institutional arrangements to implement these measures.  In addition, in 
some SADC countries, assumptions of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as 
a basis on which specialised areas of internet regulation or cyber-law can be developed, 
are erroneous. The situation is further complicated by the fact that generally there are 
limited technical capacities at a regulatory level, both at a regional and at national level. 
On the other hand the internet waits for no man, and building a secure and trusted 
environment within countries to harness the benefits of the internet, is essential. Pooling 
regional resources, human and financial, to meet such challenges is a fundamental 
rationale for regionalism. Finding more effective ways of doing so is therefore essential. 
This thesis on regional structures and processes for ICT governance in the SADC 
has shown an increasing need for involvement of SADC countries in law and policies 
affecting the ICT ecosystem (chapter 2, § 2.4). National ICT policy and regulatory 
frameworks are increasingly part of a wider global ICT ecosystem (chapter 2). Internet, 
which is the driver of broadband diffusion, is a matter of global governance and most 
SADC countries are, at best, observers of decisions taken in global forums, with little 
input into agenda-setting and the prioritisation of issues. Global, regional and national 
levels of the regional institutional arrangements are interlinked and affect each other 
through an ecosystem of formal and informal relationships and linkages. At present, the 
effectiveness of such involvement is hindered by the participatory challenges faced by 
 200 
SADC countries both at a regional and at the international level (chapter 2, § 2.1), as 
well as by the mechanisms devised for the implementation of commonly-agreed policies 
and principles at the regional level.  
8.6 Recommendations 
In the exercise of praxis, this thesis recommends more inclusiveness and transparency 
for all organisations, from global governance down to national level, on issues related 
to regional governance. Specifically, regional governance structures and processes 
should evolve and improve in the following aspects: 
1) Regional governance should be developed through an eco-systemic approach. 
Regional organisations represent only a portion of the wider ICT ecosystem, 
which includes global, regional and national organisations (chapter 2, § 2.4) 
and on which RECs have currently limited impact. Therefore, converging 
technological environments should contextualise the purely technological and 
infrastructural dimensions within a broader ecosystem that includes global and 
national governance and regulation. In this ecosystem, market structures and the 
effectiveness of the regulation, with the resulting prices and quality of service, 
are influenced by the policy and legal frameworks which are shaped not only by 
national frameworks but also by regional regulation and global governance 
structures and processes. Therefore, it is the ICT environment created by these 
elements, and the nature of the relationships and processes between and within 
the elements of the ecosystem, which create the conditions necessary for 
investment to drive the growth of the sector and the economy.  
2) The levels of efficiency and innovation that enable the evolution of the 
ecosystem depend on the availability of the skills and competencies of the 
people, and the resources for institutions, at each node within the ecosystem, 
including the regional level. Therefore, technical assistance and capacity-
building should focus on developing the necessary skills and competences for 
regional ICT policymaking and regulation in a converging environment. 
3) Programmes and projects of technical support or capacity-building by 
international organisations and donor communities should involve not only 
regional organisations but also national governments from the beginning of the 
process, i.e. the planning phase. This should continue throughout the entire 
process, in order to improve national and regional buy-in and therefore ensure 
the sustainability of these interventions. Sustainability of the interventions 
should be one of the main objectives of the international cooperation 
interventions. Mechanisms for the sustainability of  interventions should be 
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devised as soon as the beneficiary has agreed to accept technical assistance or 
capacity-building and international organisations and/or donor communities 
have agreed to provide it..  
4) Reforming regional decision-making bodies and policies in the area of ICT, 
with a regional agenda in mind, and through an ICT ecosystemic approach, is 
not the only ICT governance issue at a regional level. A different approach to 
regional ICT policymaking and regulation is needed in order to stimulate the 
sector to grow and to meaningfully contribute to economic growth and social 
development in SADC member states. Understanding national priorities, 
measuring different levels of development of ICT markets and creating concrete 
incentives – and a favourable investment environment - for the private sector to 
grow at a national level, should be the main objectives of regional governance 
structures and processes.  
5) Efforts at greater multi-stakeholder participation at regional level, in order to 
feed into the global internet governance forums is an important link in the 
dynamic ICT ecosystem. For this reason, reforming regional structures, 
decision-making bodies and policies in the area of ICT, taking into account the 
challenges affecting regional institutional arrangements, and taking into account 
the regional political economy, should be a priority in the regional and global 
governance debate.  
8.6.1 From regional ICT policymaking to regional ICT governance 
The weak participation of SADC stakeholders in both global and regional governance 
structures and processes for the maintenance, management and administration of the 
global and regional networks, requires an open, inclusive and participatory approach to 
overcome some of the limitations of SADC governments to fully participate in such 
debates and policymaking gatherings. In a complex converged environment, dominated 
by vertically-integrated regional mobile networks, global IP-based and internet services, 
a multi-stakeholder approach to regional ICT policymaking must be devised. This 
approach should harness the best human resources in the country, and encourage greater 
regional participation by all actors involved in ICT policy and regulation – from the 
international down to the local level. In this model of regional ICT governance, 
international, multilateral and donor organisations should operate and participate on the 
same level as regional and national organisations, in a more horizontal governance 
structure and process. Although they still provide technical assistance, capacity-building 
and funds for the development of programmes and projects, their involvement is 
institutionalised in a multi-stakeholder and collaborative model of governance. Together 
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with member states, regional organisations and other stakeholders from the private and 
non-for-profit sector, all shape a regional agenda for the development of the information 
society and knowledge economy. Their agenda should not be shaped by values and 
assumptions derived from mature markets and Western democracies, and should not 
adopt regional models of integration and harmonisation based on sophisticated and 
resource-intensive legislative and institutional systems. Rather, the agenda should be co-
created with all the stakeholders involved in the process, so that it builds on the 
institutional structures and processes already in place. The agenda should build on a 
deep understanding of the national and regional political economy, which should inform 
specialised areas of policy intervention such as ICT. Also, it should take into account 
national differences in terms of ICT sector development and in terms of constitution, 
administration and justice in place in each country. In this way, not only will SADC 
member states have the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the development of 
regional initiatives, they will also have the opportunity to shape their own national 
agendas with the support of experts coming from different international, multilateral and 
donor organisations, from the public, private and non-for-profit sector. 
8.7 Conclusions 
This chapter concludes a case study of institutional arrangements for 
telecommunications reform in a developing region. This thesis has provided insights 
into the reasons for, what the findings revealed as, the failure of the regional 
telecommunications reform project within SADC, despite the formalities of a legal 
framework on ICT policy and regulation with associated structures and processes. The 
research allows one to draw conclusions on regionalism in SADC and to observe how 
institutional arrangements underpinning the geopolitical process of integration can 
promote or obstruct the development of an information society at national level. 
In the process of analysing the empirical evidence, through the lens of the 
conceptual framework, a theory has been developed to explain the interplay between 
international instruments and agendas for the development of the information society 
and some of the inhibiting domestic factors that influence regional reform outcomes.  
Since this thesis is focused on one specific regional economic community, there 
are limitations to generalising its lessons to other countries and regions. Despite working 
from a single case, a theory of the role of capacity building and technical assistance as 
instruments of foreign policy for regional reform as shaped by epistemic communities, 
has emerged. Arriving with a set reform agenda, informed by political and economic 
assumptions that do not pertain to the political economies of the countries or regions in 
which they provide technical assistance or training, foreign states or multilateral 
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agencies, through their agents, tend to fail often to consider adequately the compatibility 
of political systems, institutional endowments of the region, power relations and 
conflicting interests, overriding more organic and eco-systemic reform initiatives. This 
is the original contribution of this thesis to the existing body of knowledge on 
regionalism.  
Despite the importance placed on political economy contexts to explain regional 
outcomes, this thesis has developed a contention that can be generalised to other 
developing regional blocs, with broadly similar economic and political conditions.  
Learning’s identified in SADC, can be transposed to other regional economic 
communities of developing countries as theories and analytical frameworks to be tested 
in the context of those specific political economies. To develop this thesis further, a 
comparative analysis of the role of foreign policy, state-building and epistemic 
communities in regional reform processes and the factors making some regions more 
conducive to telecommunications reform than others, should be undertaken.  
In terms of praxis, the contribution lies in providing analytical rigor in order to 
understand and explain the interplay between foreign policy, state-building and 
epistemic communities and national and regional political economies that can practically 
inform regional strategies and national policies. This enables the identification of the 
underlying causes for telecommunications reform failure and the points of intervention 
required to facilitate effective regional ICT policymaking. While this thesis provides 
insights into how better to harmonise and integrate national markets in regional 
frameworks for greater competitiveness, each region will need to identify its own 
appropriate structures and processes, taking into account its own institutional capacity, 
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APPENDIX C – QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION: 
What are the drivers (national and international) for the development of an integrated 
regional ICT policy and regulatory framework? Do they take into account national 
differences in terms of ICT sector development? 
Questions for discussion 
1. Why should ICT policy and regulations in the SADC countries be integrated at a 
regional level? 
2. Did member states participate in the development of the regionally harmonised 
ICT policy and regulatory framework during the first round of reforms (i.e. SADC 
Protocol on TCM, Telecommunications Policy for SADC Region, SADC 
Telecommunications Bill Model) and during the second round of reforms 
(2010/11 HIPSSA project)?  
3. What are the mechanisms of participation of member states in the regional ICT 
policy and regulatory formulation? Have institutionalised mechanisms of 
participation been used? 
4. Did member states implement regional policy, declarations or guidelines related 
to both the first round of reforms (i.e. SADC Protocol on TCM, 
Telecommunications Policy for SADC Region, SADC Telecommunications Bill 
Model) and the second round (2010/11 HIPSSA project)? If not, why did they not 
implement the harmonised regional ICT policy and regulatory frameworks?  
5. Did any member state drive/lead the regional telecommunications process to 
reform the telecommunications sector at a national level? Did any member state 
lead the reform debate at a regional level on telecommunications sector reform? 
What was the position taken by that country?  
6. With regard to the first round of reforms, which international organisations took 
part in this process? What kind of support did they provide?  
7. With regard to the second round of reforms, which international organisations 
took part in this process? What kind of support did they provide?  
8. Why did international organisations provide support for the regional policy-
making process on telecommunications during the first round of reforms and 
during the second round of reforms? 
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9. Has an issue pertaining to ICT ever been taken to the Summit level (SADC 
Summit: Heads of State or Government)? What has been the output 
(discussed/approved/rejected)? 
10. Has the SADC Council ever met to oversee the implementation of ICT policies? 
Has it overseen the execution of ICT programmes? Did it approve ICT policy/ICT 
strategy? Did it convene conferences and meetings related to ICT for purposes of 
promoting ICT objectives and ICT programmes for SADC? 
11. Has the committee (Integrated Committee of Ministers) ever decided on issues 
related to ICT in order to ensure rapid implementation of ICT programmes? 
12. What kind of programmes (e.g. capacity-building, policy advisorship, regulatory 
support) related to ICT are managed by the SADC Secretariat? Did those 
programmes achieve the intended results? Did the Secretariat submit harmonised 
policies and programmes to the Council for consideration and approval? 
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SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION: 
Why have regional ICT policies, protocols and declarations not always been enforced at 
a national level? 
Questions for discussion 
13. Which minister has been involved in the process of regional harmonisations of 
ICT policy and regulation? Has the Minister for ICT (Communications) been 
involved in regional harmonisation of ICT policy and regulation? How?  
14. Have regional policies, declarations and recommendations been taken into 
account in national ICT policy-making and regulatory formulation across all 
SADC member states? Could you provide an example? 
15. How many countries implemented the SADC Protocol on TCM? 
16. How many countries implemented the Telecommunications policies for SADC 
(first round of reforms)? 
17. Did the SADC Protocol on TCM influence the telecommunications sector reform 
in SADC countries? In which countries? To what extent? 
18. How many countries used the ICT model bill to develop their own legislation on 
telecommunications? 
19. Regarding those countries that did not implement the regional ICT policy and 
regulatory framework related to the first round of reforms, why did they not 
implement it? 
20. Has any country implemented the updated ICT policy and regulatory framework 
as developed from the HIPSSA project? 
THIRD RESERCH QUESTION: 
How have international organisations been involved in regional ICT policy and 
regulatory formulation?  
Questions for discussion 
21. What are the mechanisms of involvement of international organisations in 
regional processes for the development of the harmonised and integrated ICT 
policy and regulatory framework? 
22. How did international organisations get involved in the process of formulating the 
first round of regional telecommunications sector reform (SADC Protocol on 
TCM, Telecommunications Policy for SADC Region, SADC 
Telecommunications Bill Model)?  
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23. How did international organisations get involved in the process of formulating the 
second round of regional telecommunications sector reform (HIPSSA)?  
24. At what level of the process of regional policy-making did international 
organisations get involved? (i.e. problem identification, economic objectives 
development, technical measures development/support?)  
25. What has been the contribution of international organisations in the development 
of the regionally harmonised ICT policy and regulatory framework? 
26. How did the regional organisation (i.e. the SADC) participate in the definition of 
regulatory standards at an International level (for instance, at the ITU level?) 
27. How did the SADC participate in the process of formulating an internationally 
agreed reference framework on telecommunications sector reform (for instance, at 
the WTO level)? 
28. What support related to ICT issues did international organisations provide to the 
SADC? On what specific programmes related to ICT did they provide support?  
29. What is the relationship between the SADC and other regional organisations 
involved in ICT development such as CRASA, SATU, SABA? On what regional 
issues related to ICT have they been collaborating? Do they coordinate activities 
between them? 
FOURTH RESEARCH QUESTION: 
Has the ICT policy and regulation in the SADC region achieved the level and status of 
integration as declared in protocols and declarations? 
Questions for discussion 
30. Have member states implemented the regional framework? If they have not, why? 
31. What are the main obstacles to harmonisation of the regional ICT policy and 
regulatory framework?  
32. Did the SATCC-TU monitor the implementation of the policies? Did the SATCC-
TU monitor the implementation of the ICT bill model? Did it report to the 
Committee of Ministers? 
33. Comparing the SADC with other regional organisations such as COMESA and 
ECOWAS, which of these organisations have been most effective in facilitating 
the harmonisation of the ICT policy and regulatory framework? Why? 
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APPENDIX D - CODIFICATION SCHEDULE 
 
  
AREAS OF DISCUSSION THEME / CATEGORY CODES  LABELS 
National, regional, and international 
drivers for an integrated ICT policy and 
regulatory framework 
 
Impact of leadership positions in the 
SADC on regional policies; 
 
Identification of institutional 
arrangements to ratify regional regulation 
at a national level; 
 
 
The degree of political 
power of regional 
institutions and their 
capacity to influence the 
telecommunications sector 
reform process at a national 
level 
 
The capacity of regional 
institutions to influence 
ICT policy at a national 
level 





























Level and mechanisms of participation of 
member states in the reform process; 
 
Level and mechanisms of involvement of 
national policy-makers in regional policy 
issues;  
 
Level of implementation of regional 
measures at a national level; 
The degree of participation 
of member states in 
regional decision-making 
processes and regional ICT 




















Degree of influence – and mechanisms of 
involvement - of international 
organisations in setting the regional 
agenda on ICT; 
 
Degree and level of participation of the 
SADC in international forums and global 
policy-making; 
 
Level and degree of collaboration of the 
SADC secretariat with other regional 
organisations involved in ICT policy 
development 
The degree of involvement 
of international 
organisations in processes 
of regional ICT policy 
formulation 
- Influence of 
international 
organisations 




















Regional policy and regulatory outcomes; 
 
The impact of regional ICT 
policy and regulatory 
frameworks on market 
structure and regional ICT 
infrastructure development, 
and the development of 
ICT infrastructure because 






- ICT access 
- ICT use 
- ICT policy 
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